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1  Introduction  
High technology industries, where IT artifacts are core to the business model of a 
firm, are marked by a high level of market competition and uncertainty. Firms within these 
industries are constantly evolving at a swift pace. Products and services developed in 
these industries have the shortest life cycle from product development to maturity, 
compared to those developed in other industries. According to a 2015 KPMG report, 
products and services in the high technology industry have an average maturity life cycle 
of 0.5 - 5 years, which is the shortest among all sectors (KPMG, 2015). Value generation 
and capture from these products and services must happen in a shorter duration 
compared to those from other industries. Imitation of products and services in these 
industries is also rampant, diminishing opportunities to generate value from innovative 
products and services. According to extant research, imitation among vendors in the IT 
sector is widespread, and firms mimic direct competitors in the introduction and 
withdrawal of products and services (Ruckman et al., 2015; Rhee et al., 2006). While the 
inherent nature of products developed in the IT industry and the associated incremental 
innovation leads to better performance gains, these gains erode quickly via imitation from 
firms competing in the same domain (Ethiraj et al., 2008). For many firms, these issues 
lead to a shift in their revenue generation model. Rather than appropriating the value from 
direct sales of products and services, firms have slowly started opting for innovation 
strategies that allow rent-seeking through opening up the business and revenue models 
of the firm. These strategies may include but are not limited to, adopting open standards 
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for their products and services, establishing platform business models and engaging in 
open innovation. In this thesis, I assess these three innovation strategies and their value 
to a firm in terms of product and services and related value performance. 
In the first essay of this thesis, I start by examining the lifecycle of products in 
information technology-intensive firms, which is deemed to be shorter compared to other 
industries. I call these products complex assembled digital products (CADP). In the 
product innovation literature, the emergence of a dominant design configuration in a 
product category is seen as the start of a technological lifecycle that allows winners of the 
industry to appropriate long-term returns through incremental innovation. In the context 
of a complex assembled digital product, a dominant design will manifest itself as a single 
dominant design configuration or a narrow set of configurations that represent a majority 
of the products manufactured in a product category (Tushman & Murmann, 1998; Cecere 
et al., 2015).  However, in technology-intensive firms, two challenges need further 
exploration. Firstly, due to the pace of innovation in technology-intensive industries, it is 
highly likely that a dominant design configuration never emerges (Srinivasan et al., 2006). 
Secondly, due to the modular nature of the products, even if a dominant design is 
achieved, it is achieved at the configurational level. It manifests itself as the set of 
components that achieves dominance in a product configuration (Murmann & Frenken, 
2006). 
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In the first essay, I examine the evolutionary attributes of the components of a 
CADP, which enable the components to become and remain part of the dominant design 
configuration of the product for a longer duration. I model the entry and survival of a 
component in a dominant design configuration using three evolutionary attributes: (1) 
pleiotropy of the component, (2) openness of the standard supporting the component, 
and (3) innovation source of the component. Pleiotropy as a construct is adapted from 
evolutionary biology and defined as the number of functionalities supported by a 
component. The standard supporting a component can be open or proprietary. The 
innovation source can be internal to the industry or external. I empirically test my 
hypotheses using a rich, longitudinal dataset of TV models spanning 15 years (2002-
2016). The results show that components that have higher pleiotropy and that are 
supported by open standards not only have a higher chance of being selected into the 
dominant design configuration of TVs but also remain in the TV market for a longer time. 
However, while components developed through endogenous innovation efforts were 
nearly four times more likely to enter the dominant design configuration of TVs, their 
longevity was not significantly different from that of the components sourced exogenously.  
In the first essay, I look at how adopting components with specific sets of attributes 
allows firms to win a product market and appropriate value for a long duration from 
product development. In the second essay, I shift my focus from a product-based 
business model to a platform business model as an innovation strategy to achieve a 
competitive advantage. In recent years we have observed the emergence of platform 
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businesses across domains of information technology-intensive industries (van Alystyne 
and Parker 2016). Firms are either completely shifting to platform business models or 
starting to include platform business models as part of their business strategy portfolios. 
Newer firms in these industries are more likely to adopt a platform business model as the 
core model for value generation and value capture. Seven of the ten most valuable 
companies in the world have opted for a platform business model as part of their overall 
business strategy (Cusumano et al., 2019). However, not all firms adopting the platform 
business model succeed in dominating the market. An exploratory study examined the 
success of platform businesses in terms of the number of years the firm remained in 
business. Taking a 20 years dataset of the firms in US markets, it was observed that only 
43 out of 252 platform firms flourished are still active (Yoffie et al., 2019). Most of the 
surviving firms have to spend a considerable amount of resources in incentivizing the 
stakeholders of the platform, R&D, and marketing activities to stay relevant in the market 
(Cusumano, 2020). 
In Essay Two, I investigate the effect of a platform innovation on a firm’s 
performance under competitive threats. As argued earlier, technology-intensive firms 
operate in an ever-changing environment where competition is continuously evolving and 
mimicking the products of the focal firm. This constantly evolving product market 
competition is inherent in high technology industries. While product market competition 
encourages the overall pace of innovation as seen in technology-intensive industries, we 
are not aware of its effect on value generated by the firms operating in those industries. 
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In the second Essay, I model the effect of product market competition on a firm’s 
performance. I look at how adopting a platform business model mitigates the effect of 
product market competition on a firm’s value generation. I use a machine learning-based 
firm classification method to measure the business model adopted by a firm. I extracted 
data from 10-K annual reports of the sample firms and classified the firms as platform or 
non-platform based on the supervised classification of 10-K annual reports of the firm. 
Using a 20-year panel of the firm’s financial data and their business classification, I 
explore the effect of a platform business model on a firm’s performance under high 
product market competition. My results suggest that adopting a platform business model 
can be an effective business strategy in delivering better value in general and under high 
market competition in particular. 
A third innovation strategy that has found favor with firms in recent years to build 
a competitive advantage over rivals is engaging in open innovation. Open innovation is 
defined as “a paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well 
as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as the firms look to advance 
their technology” (Chesbrough, 2003). In the context of information technology-intensive 
firms, open innovation manifests itself in many ways. In recent years, for-profit firms have 
started engaging with open-source communities to develop products and services on 
social coding platforms like GitHub. According to my investigation, 41 of the top 100 firms 
by market valuation have a direct presence on GitHub and actively develop their products 
with support from open-source developer communities. Opening up open software 
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products and services for the world is another way that allows for faster development and 
propagation of products across user and developer communities (Khan, 2018). Firms also 
sponsor open source community developed products and regularly sponsor summer 
coding schools and hackathons (Mitchell, 2012). These open innovation events have 
shown promise in the collaborative development of products and services (Tereweisch 
and Xu, 2008). Firms appropriate rents by selling complementary services for the 
products they are developing as open-source.  In his famous 1997 book, “The Cathedral 
and the Bazaar,” Eric Raymond coined the term “Cathedral” model of software 
development to represent the closed sourced, hierarchical and proprietary model of 
software development and “Bazaar” to represent the open-source, free and equality 
based software development model (Raymond, 1997). However, there is limited empirical 
evidence to suggest that firms create and capture value on open innovation platforms like 
GitHub (West et al., 2014). We do know that firms have started selective revealing of their 
accumulated knowledge and started engaging with open source communities (Fosfuri et 
al., 2008; Henkel et al., 2014; Alexy et al., 2018). In the third Essay, I investigate the effect 
of open-source engagement on the economic outcomes of a firm. More specifically, I look 
at how engagement on the open-source platform and intensity of that engagement 
influence the financial performance of a firm. To investigate the influence of open-source 
innovation on a firm’s financial performance, I created a data set containing all continuous 
open-source engagements of firms in high technology sectors. I collected this data from 
multiple sources, including GitHub, 10-K reports, and a search of innovation contests 
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organized by firms. I then matched this data set with the financial information of the firms. 
I employed the generalized synthetic control method (GSynth) to estimate the model. I 
estimated the dynamic panel data regression model to measure the influence of open-
source engagement intensity on financial performance. 
Additionally, I also investigated the heterogeneity in the effect of open-source 
engagement on the financial performance of the firm using the random causal forest. My 
results suggest that open-source engagement and its intensity positively influence the 
financial performance of a firm. The effects are heterogeneous and based on the 
absorptive capacity of the firm, market competition, and other environmental factors. I 
explore and discuss the implications of my findings on open-source engagement choices 
by firms. 
Finally, I conclude this dissertation with the findings of my essays and their 
implications on information technology-intensive firms. I provide additional details about 
my studies in the Appendices. The Appendices also highlight the additional analysis done 
during the research to test the robustness of the results. Overall, this dissertation has 
broader implications for research and practice alike. There are opportunities for future 
research and investigation into various innovation strategies adopted by firms in high 
technology industries. This research also provides directions for applying novel research 
methods, like the generalized synthetic control method and machine learning algorithms, 
in IS research. 
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2 Essay 1: Design in Complex Assembled Digital Products: A Longitudinal 
Analysis of Television Components  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
When an innovative technology or product category emerges, competing firms typically 
introduce several alternate designs that vie for market share (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; 
Murmann & Frenken, 2006). It has been observed that such competing designs evolve 
incrementally over time, and typically, for successful innovations, eventually a specific 
design, referred to as the dominant design, achieves allegiance from a majority of the 
firms in the industry (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Suarez et al., 2015). Complex 
assembled products are characterized by a set of components and interfaces arranged 
together in a hierarchy of subsystems, and dominant designs in these products can 
emerge at multiple levels of product design (Clark, 1985; Christensen, 1992a). The 
process of selection, arrangement and design of components and interfaces is critical for 
product management and collaborative productive development, as it gives rise to 
multiple, alternate design and assembly options for the same category of products 
(Mishra & Shah, 2009; Chao et al., 2008). In the context of a complex assembled product, 
then, a dominant design will tend to manifest itself as a single dominant design 
configuration, or a narrow set of configurations which represent a majority of the products 
manufactured in a product category (Tushman & Murmann, 1998; Cecere et al., 2015).  
The emergence of the dominant design configuration, where product variation is 
limited to peripheral components, brings stability to a firm’s multi-partner collaboration 
and learning, R&D efforts, and its operational performance (Yao et al., 2013; Mishra et 
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al., 2015). For designers and manufacturers of complex assembled products the 
emergence of dominant design configuration reduces the cost of sourcing of non-
dominant components and narrows product offerings, leading to better management of 
product rollovers, substitution, and diffusion into global markets (Koca et al., 2010; 
Schmidt et al., 2005). Narrow product offerings lead to better firm performance in 
unpredictable environments and firms can better manage competition and coopetition in 
their supply chains (Wilhelm, 2011; Kovach et al., 2015). As component mix changes and 
product variety increases, the operational efficiency of a firm’s assembly operations tends 
to decrease due to increased manufacturing costs, higher manufacturing overhead, 
longer shipping times, and additional expenses related to stock management and 
enforcing conformance quality (Mukherjee et al., 2000; Salvador et al., 2002). The 
emergence of the dominant design configuration also reduces the stress on the 
component supply chain. In the absence of a stable core product configuration, suppliers 
may experience scale diseconomies due to component variety, which has a negative 
effect on the component sourcing performance of a firm (Wacker & Trelevan, 1986).  It 
also increases standardization efforts and improves the effectiveness of component 
supply chains, further reducing the overall operational costs of manufacturing complex 
assembled products (Wakharia et al., 1996; Park & Ro, 2010; Park et al., 2018).  In order 
to consider these implications on the operational performance of firms and their supply 
chains, it is first important to understand the dynamics related to component selection 
strategy in the context of complex assembled products.  
10 
 
In the modern economy a particularly important set of complex assembled 
products are complex assembled digital products (CADPs), which I define as a 
combination of computer software and digital hardware components arranged together in 
a hierarchy of technical subsystems within a product architecture. Prior research on digital 
products suggests that, even while the core architecture of product design remains 
temporally stable, components within the product design tend to change over time 
(Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Baldwin, 2018). In such products the entry, dominance, and the 
exit of components is facilitated by the inherent modularity of the product design and by 
the interfaces among product design components (Fixson, 2003). Modular design and 
standardization of interfaces allow for independent deployment, update and release of a 
component from the product design without affecting other digital product components 
(MacCormack et al., 2010). These competing components can be embedded together in 
product design, or they can substitute for each other to create product variety (Ramdas, 
2003).  Modularity, as a manufacturing strategy, leads to improved operational efficiency 
and competitive performance as it allows for harnessing of component commonality 
across product variants and enabling independence in assembly-based manufacturing 
(Jacobs et al., 2007; Danese & Filippino, 2010). However, this independence of 
component selection and short-term benefits to operational efficiency may also lead to a 
generational cost incurred due to the failure of the emergence of a dominant design at 
the product level. The emergence of a dominant design in the products developed in the 
high technology industry, where continuous innovation is a norm, has been reported as 
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less likely relative to traditional products (Srinivasan et al., 2006). To address such 
scenarios of product development I adopt the configurational view of the product. At the 
granular level, a CADP is represented by a set of components that complete the 
functionality of a product in a specific configuration. I posit that, in the context of CADPs, 
the competition among components to address specific functionalities of the product 
leads to the emergence of a dominant design configuration.  
In this paper I explore two ideas: (1) the factors that influence the entry of a 
component into a dominant design configuration of a CADP, and (2) the factors that 
influence the longevity of a component in the product market. I define component 
dominance as the inclusion of a component in the dominant design configuration. As 
explained before, the entry of a component into the dominant design configuration of a 
CADP is an important event in the component’s lifecycle, because it allows for 
standardization of the component within a product category and shifts the innovation 
focus to incremental improvements and cost optimization. It also allows for more stability 
in the component’s evolution and in the development of complementary services around 
the component technology and improves both manufacturing efficiencies and supply 
chain collaboration (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Mishra & Shah, 2009).  
I also examine component longevity, the number of years a component is included 
in any of the models in production within the CADP market. Typically, product markets 
are modeled as a technological cycle of an incumbent technology followed by a 
technological discontinuity due to the emergence of a new technology (Tushman & 
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Murmann, 1998). The longevity of an incumbent technology can be seen as being 
determined by the entry timing of a new technology that replaces it. However, in the 
context of CADPs, where a product’s design typically goes through rapid and incremental 
changes due to product modularity, the component longevity in the product configuration 
also has important practical implications (Vickery et al., 2018). Product designers are 
inherently limited by the number of components they can include and configure in a 
product design. In such a scenario, component selection becomes a major decision in 
defining core product architecture and its management over its entire lifecycle (Schmidt 
& Druehl, 2005). The early exit of a component from a product’s dominant design 
configuration may result in the reconfiguration of other components in the product 
architecture, which can  introduce significant costs associated with redesigning the core 
product and with balancing assembly lines (Shunko et al., 2018). Hence, all else being 
equal, it is advantageous for firms to select components in product design which provide 
long-term stability in product evolution. 
While exogenous firm-level and environmental-level factors considered in prior 
research may provide some insight into component dominance and longevity (Suarez, 
2004; Sharma et. al., 2019), they do not directly inform the component selection problem 
for product manufacturers. Component selection in product management requires 
evaluation of components based on their design characteristics and supported 
functionalities, which I define as the evolutionary attributes of a component. Insight into 
the linkages between these evolutionary attributes and a component’s dominance may 
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assist product designers in making informed component selections and provide more 
control over the product technological life cycle. For firms, it can mean both lower costs 
in product design and the opportunity for strategic investment into technologies which, 
based on their technical attributes, are expected to dominate in the future. At the industry 
level this results in faster standardization of the core product design configuration and a 
shift in emphasis towards incremental innovations in the product category.  
 In particular, I identified three specific evolutionary attributes of components to 
model the technological cycle of components: (1) pleiotropy of a component, (2) 
openness of the standard supporting the component, and (3) innovation source of the 
component. The total number of functions performed by a component is known as its 
pleiotropy (Frenken, 2006). A standard defining the technical specification of a component 
can be open or closed.  Suitability and acceptance of a technological component may 
also be dependent on the innovation source of the technology. A component can be 
developed either within the technological paradigm in which the component is embedded 
or outside of it. I posit that the pleiotropy of a component, the openness of the standard 
supporting the component and the innovation source of the component influences both 
the acceptance of a component into the dominant design configurations of CADPs and 
its longevity in the product market. 
To empirically test my propositions, I selected the modern television (TV) product 
category as the product domain for my analysis of CADPs. The television product domain 
is an especially attractive one for the study because this domain has seen rapid changes 
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due to the entry and exit of a variety of components. For instance, the dominant design 
configuration of a TV in 2002 was an analog input-based CRT screen television. By 2016, 
a majority of the components found in the 2002 dominant design configuration of a TV 
had been replaced by newer components, such as LED displays, HDMI ports, and 
wireless connectors. Using a longitudinal dataset collected specifically for this research 
of 2,830 TV models produced from 2002 to 2016, I model the inclusion of a component 
into the dominant design configuration of a TV as a function of its evolutionary attributes.  
my results suggest that all three factors significantly predict a component’s entry into the 
dominant design configuration, with open standards as the single biggest influencer.  
Further, I model component longevity as the number of years a component is present in 
the TV market, and I find that both open standards and a component’s pleiotropy to be 
positively associated with component longevity. 
My research contributes to the operations management literature in at least three 
ways. First, I empirically model the technological cycle of a CADP in terms of its 
constituent components and highlight the relevance of this approach for CADP 
manufacturing and supply chains. I consider technological cycles at the component level 
in order to provide insight into how product managers can adopt a lifecycle approach for 
managing CADPs, which are modular and fast-changing, and can evolve over time 
without encountering architectural transformation. Second, complementing extant 
market-level and product-level studies in the literature (e.g., Li & Liu, 2018), I provide 
insight into the entry and exit of the technological components in a dominant design 
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configuration of CADPs by modelling three evolutionary design attributes of its 
components. Examining such product design attributes are important to understand how 
firms can effectively manage product substitution and diffusion of their innovations 
(Schmidt & Druehl, 2005). Third, by investigating component longevity in a CADP market, 
I generate insights for operations management related to component selection strategy 
in incremental innovation regimes. Overall, my research on component dominance and 
component longevity contributes to the operations management literature by shedding 
light on the dynamics of component selection in CADPs, and by discussing the 
implications of those dynamics for manufacturing, product management, and innovation. 
 
2.2 CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
A component’s inclusion in the dominant design configuration of a product can be 
considered as an indicator of users’ acceptance of the component’s underlying 
technological paradigm, and it plays an important role in shaping the market success and 
evolution of the product. While studies have focused on technological cycles at the 
product and industry levels (e.g., Jain & Ramdas, 2005; Mehra et al., 2014), the 
technological discontinuities that occur at the level of components that make up a 
complex product are reported to have not received as much attention (Murmann & 
Frenken, 2005).  Accordingly, in this study, I examine the influence of three evolutionary 
attributes of components—pleiotropy, the openness of standards, and innovation 
source—on the components’ initial inclusion in the dominant design configuration of a 
CADP and on their subsequent longevity of presence in the market.  
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2.2.1 Entry and Exit of a Component in a Dominant Design Configuration  
In Figure 1, I illustrate the 15-year evolution of components in the dominant design 
configuration of TVs between 2002 and 2016.  Consistent with other literature, I identified 
the dominant design configuration for each year (starting with 2002) as the product 
configuration that achieves 50% or more share of the total number of models produced 
in that year (Benner & Tripsas, 2012). As shown in Figure 1, new components frequently 
entered into the dominant design configuration of TV, and some older components 
dropped out of the dominant design configuration. Although I present only a few selected 
model years in Figure 1 for readability, and therefore there are visual discontinuities in 
the timeline, it can be seen that, by the end of the study period, none of the components 
that were originally found in the 2002 dominant design configuration, were still present in 
the 2016 dominant design configuration. Moreover, many components entered only into 
non-dominant design configurations of TVs and never succeeded in gaining significant 
market share over the period. For example, FireWire, an audio-video standard component 
sponsored by Apple Inc., entered the TV market in 2003, never achieved more than a 20% 
model share, and remained in non-dominant design configurations over its lifecycle until 
2007.    
Alternatively, some components entered the dominant design configuration, but 
failed to remain in the configuration over the observation period and consequently exited 
the TV product market altogether. For example, Video Graphics Array (VGA), an audio-
video component, entered the dominant design configuration in 2006 and went out of 
favor after being in the dominant design configuration until 2011. Such dynamics at the 
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component level can be expected to challenge the optimization of product design and 
cost efficiencies in production cycles. All else being equal, a desirable configuration of a 
product for a production line entails a stable set of core components and reconfigurable 
peripherals. However, the modular nature of CADPs demands a selection strategy of 
components at the product design stage, which minimizes production-related re-
configurations and potentially limits that activity to the peripherals. Understanding the 
factors that influence the inclusion of components in the dominant design configuration 
can provide insight into this selection strategy.  
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Figure 1: Entry and Exit of Components in TV Dominant Design Configuration 
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2.2.2 Pleiotropy and component adoption  
The concept of pleiotropy was developed more than 100 years ago in biology and referred 
to the phenomenon of a single gene affecting multiple traits (Curtsinger, 2001).  It is the 
basis of current genome mappings and gene editing technologies. Every organism is 
made up of many genes, and these genes affect one or more traits in that organism. High 
pleiotropy genes, or genes which affect multiple traits, influence an organism’s growth 
and evolution in more ways than low pleiotropy genes, and some research suggests that 
the pleiotropy of a gene is the single most contributing function of its adaptation, survival 
and success in the long term evolutionary process of an organism (Dubcovsky & Dvorak, 
2007). 
Analogous to this biological concept, the pleiotropy of a technical component is 
defined as the number of functionalities supported by that component in a complex 
assembled product (Frenken, 2006). To calculate the pleiotropy of a component, I “mined” 
the specification documents of each component, obtained the feature specifications of 
the components from the respective standard-setting organizations, and matched them 
with the features listed by TV manufacturers in their marketing specification sheets. As 
an example, Figure 2 depicts the pleiotropy of two components, RS232C and HDMI, circa 
2011.  RS232C is a serial communication port which, as described in the specification, is 
used for only one function in TVs, multi-device control. Hence, its pleiotropy is one. On 
the other hand, an HDMI port is an audio-video connectivity port that can also be used 
for network connectivity and as an audio return channel, among other audio-video 
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functionalities. Counting all of HDMI’s available functions in 2011 gives it a pleiotropy 
score of 10.  
 
 
Figure 2: Pleiotropy Example (Component designs in the year 2011) 
There are a number of reasons to select evolutionary biology, and, more 
specifically, pleiotropy, as a basis for my study. As per the cited researchers, I see multiple 
similarities between the evolution of an organism with respect to gene pleiotropy and 
innovation progress with respect to the technical design of a CADP. For instance, similar 
to technical design, gene-trait relationships are modular in nature - a mutation in one gene 
has a greater influence on closely related traits in an organism than it does on dissimilar 
traits (Wang et al., 2010). Second, a gene influencing multiple traits has a greater per trait 
influence, and its deletion may lead to sabotaging of the whole production function of an 
organism (Lilburn et al., 1992). Similarly, high pleiotropy components are harder to 
replace and change, as even a minor change in a high pleiotropy component affects 
multiple functionalities. This strengthens the position of such a component in product 
design, tending to support the early dominance of that component and component 
longevity (Murmann & Frenken, 2006). 
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Biological studies have shown that organisms generally have fewer high pleiotropy 
genes than low ones. A high pleiotropic gene has the capability of constraining and 
stabilizing the evolution of an organism over multiple generations, since a high pleiotropic 
gene can tie up the greater part of evolutionary variance by linking multiple traits to a 
single mutation cycle; the rate of evolution is then determined by the remaining free 
genetic variance (Hansen, 2003). Similar to this, in the product design of CADPs, the 
constraining effect of a high pleiotropy component can lead to a stable core design 
configuration, and variations occur only among the peripheral, low pleiotropy components 
of the product design. High-pleiotropy components are attractive in a regime of 
incremental innovation in CADPs because their inclusion in a CADP configuration 
reduces the search cost for designers seeking novelty (Murmann & Frenken, 2006). This 
means a higher pleiotropic component should have a higher likelihood of achieving a core 
position in the dominant design configuration and remaining in the CADP market for a 
longer period of time, which is my first set of hypotheses: 
 (H1a): All else being equal, a high pleiotropy component is more likely to be part of the 
dominant design configuration of a complex assembled digital product, compared to a 
low pleiotropy component. 
(H1b): All else being equal, a high pleiotropy component has greater longevity in a 
complex assembled digital product market, compared to a low pleiotropy component. 
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2.2.3 Open Standards and Component Adoption  
As noted earlier, an open standard is defined as a technical specification which is made 
available to all participating firms and is developed and maintained via a collaborative and 
consensus-driven process (ITU, 2017). Closed standards, on the contrary, are developed 
by individual firms and those firms have proprietary control over the development, 
maintenance, and licensing of the standard (Zhu et al., 2006). Sponsoring an open 
standard both enables and constrains the evolution of a technology at the same time. On 
the one hand, it allows for distributed development of the standard and any 
complementary goods and services. On the other hand, it constrains the direction of 
standard development by moving the trajectory of innovation from the hands of its 
institutional sponsors to the community and standard-setting organizations (Garud et al., 
2002).  
However, in networked technological ecosystems, the benefits of sponsoring and 
adopting open standards often outweigh the benefits of a proprietary standard. While 
committing to open standards might lead to a poor appropriability regime for a firm, it 
allows for faster adoption of technology by rival firms and complementary service creators 
by reducing network-related entry thresholds and by stimulating cooperative input to 
advance the technological offerings of a standard (West, 2003). This, in turn, can lead to 
a larger user base of the technology and a network large enough to accommodate 
multiple competing players, generating revenues by differentiating their services and 
products or developing complementary products and services. For example, Khazam and 
Mowery found that in the case of Sun Microsystems, an open standard strategy 
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contributed to the establishment of Sun’s SPARC architecture as the dominant design in 
the workstation market (Khazam & Mowery, 1994). Supporting and sponsoring an open 
standard also provides benefits to both incumbent and new entrant firms (Greul et al., 
2017). Incumbents who have resources and the expertise to develop complementary 
products around an open standard can benefit from the reduced cost base, weakening 
competitors, faster adoption, and dominance and longevity of the technology (Alexy et al., 
2018). For example, IBM’s leadership in open standard sponsorship and development 
generates the majority of its profits by selling complementary products, like software and 
consulting services (Berlind, 2002). Finally, it has also been observed that the emergence 
of a dominant design is more likely in the case where the standards are set by a 
collaborative process (Srinivasan et al., 2006).  
In high technology product domains, it is also possible that a dominant design 
never emerges if the firms do not converge on a common standard and develop it as an 
open standard under the aegis of a standard-setting organization. According to Tushman 
& Rosenkopf (1992), acceptance of a component into a dominant design configuration is 
a community level socio-political process that advocates “a negotiated logic enlivened by 
actors with interests in competing technical regimes” (p.322). So, I posit that in the CADP 
context components supported by open standards have a higher likelihood of adoption 
by vendors and users, and a collaborative development environment for a standard lead 
to the longer presence of the standard in a technological ecosystem. Accordingly, I 
propose the following testable hypotheses: 
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(H2a): All else being equal, a component supported by open standards is more likely to 
be part of the dominant design configuration, compared to a component supported by 
closed standards. 
(H2b): All else being equal, a component that is supported by open standards, has greater 
longevity in a complex assembled digital product market, compared to a component 
supported by closed standards. 
 
2.2.4 Innovation Source and Component Adoption  
 An innovation artifact can be endogenous (internal) or exogenous (external) to a firm, a 
specific industry (Andergassen & Nardini, 2005), or even a country (Gu & Lundvall, 2016). 
Endogenous innovation is defined here as the development of a component by firms 
operating within the domain of a product in which it is introduced.  For example, the Mobile 
High definition Link (MHL), which is an audio-video streaming standard, was developed 
by Samsung and Sony who are insiders in the television industry, whereas the Wireless 
Display (WiDi), also an audio-video streaming standard, was developed by Intel 
Corporation, which is an outsider to the television market.  Hence, MHL is identified as 
an endogenous innovation, whereas WirelessHD is categorized as an exogenous 
innovation.  All else being equal, product managers of CADPs are likely to have better 
knowledge about, and control over, the evolution of components originating in their focal 
industries versus those originating in external industries.   
 Endogenous innovation has been seen to trigger industry-level growth in many 
sectors because it is easier to adopt knowledge from a related firm than to adopt 
knowledge from a vastly different technological domain. An entity learns by associating 
ideas with what they already know (Fichman & Kemerer, 1997). It has been observed that 
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firms operating in one industry sector tend to form closely knit and vertically integrated 
export economies which tend to have rapid formal and informal exchanges of ideas due 
to a common knowledge base, employees and communities (Tallman et al., 2004). It is 
relatively easier to transfer knowledge in a cohesive environment compared to a 
disassociated setting, and common knowledge plays a role in amplifying such effects 
(Reagans & McEvily, 2003). For example, in the context of the computer industry, the 
R&D spillovers effects are larger in “home” (internal) industries as compared to “foreign” 
(external) industries (Griliches, 1991). Another example of the type of firms that benefit 
from endogenous innovation within the industry would be those developing on open 
source platforms like GitHub, where it has been shown that it is easier to absorb 
knowledge and innovate from a similar development environment than a dissimilar 
development environment, as the cost and administrative effort to search and absorb 
knowledge is much lower in a similar environment. (Daniel et al., 2018). 
Building on this prior research I posit that the components developed by firms 
internal to the industry will have a relatively higher adaptability and acceptance in a 
dominant design configuration. This adoption of an endogenously developed component 
is expected to be much faster within the industry as the new component is more likely to 
be aligned with the current design, as compared to an innovation coming from another 
industry. The functionalities of a component developed within an industry have been 
shown to be more aligned to the requirements of firms in that focal industry relative to 
exogenous ones, which has the effects of both reducing organizational restructuring costs 
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for firms (Andergassen & Nardini, 2005) and increasing acceptance by peer firms from 
the same industry (Benner & Tripsas, 2012). From the perspective of product architecture 
I posit that adoption of innovation from within the industry will require less reconfiguration 
of the product design, resulting in less restructuring of organizational processes and 
research and development functions within the organization. Since a stable product 
design is a prerequisite to emergence of a dominant design (Murmann & Frenken, 2006), 
I posit that firms would tend to choose components internal to the focal industry to be part 
of the dominant product design configuration. As a result, I propose the following testable 
hypotheses: 
 (H3a): All else being equal, a component developed endogenously is more likely to be 
part of the dominant design configuration, compared to a component developed 
exogenously. 
(H3b): All else being equal, a component developed endogenously has greater longevity 
in a complex assembled digital product market, compared to a component developed 
exogenously. 
Figure 3 summarizes these relationships into the research model that will be empirically 
tested. 
Figure 3: Research Model 
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2.3 VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION AND MODEL ESTIMATION 
  
2.3.1 Data Collection 
My study of CADPs is set in the context of the evolution of digital televisions and their 
components. Since I am interested in the dominance and longevity of components in 
television design, I constructed a unique multi-level dataset of TV models, their 
components and functionalities through multiple sources. I collected specification data of 
all TV models produced by the top seven TV manufacturers in North America between 
2002 and 2016. These seven manufacturers consistently lead the TV industry in market 
share and held nearly 85 % of the total market share in 2015 (Statista, 2017). The rest of 
the market is distributed across many small manufacturers at the low end of the market, 
and most of these firms do not have an online presence. Therefore the availability of 
detailed specifications data about the TV models manufactured by them is limited and 
inconsistent. For the years 2008–2016, data about TV models were secured from the 
national Consumer Electronics Show (CES) announcements and later verified from model 
lists available on manufacturers’ websites and the website Flatpanelshd.com. CES is 
traditionally organized in the first week of every year, where top manufacturers of digital 
electronics announce their products to be released that year. In any case of an inexact 
match between CES announcements and the lists on the manufacturers’ websites, I 
selected the models available on manufacturers’ websites. For the years 2002 to 2007, I 
visited the historical websites of TV firms using Wayback Machine and collected the list 
of all TVs marketed for those six years. Most of the firms changed their domain names in 
the last ten years, and hence archival search using tools such as the Wayback Machine 
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is an appropriate way to extract data about legacy systems including TV models (Arora 
et al., 2016).  This effort resulted in a comprehensive database of 2,830 TV models. For 
each television model, its technical specifications were obtained from the website of the 
manufacturing firm, and this data is cross-validated using specification information 
available for the same model on www.cnet.com. For each component, the standards 
documentation was downloaded from their respective special interest group portals, or 
from portals of component sponsors. Overall, my dataset consists of 46 components that 
were introduced in TV models at various points in time over a period of 15 years.  
2.3.2 Variables 
Consistent with prior empirical research, in a given year a component is said to be part of 
the dominant design configuration when it is present in the majority (50% or more) of 
television product models produced in that year (Suarez, 2004; Benner & Tripsas, 2012). 
Figure 4 shows the model share of audio/video connectivity components in TV designs 
between 2002 and 2016 which illustrates the variance in component dominance. For 
example, the first component in the legend, DVI, a proprietary audio-video connectivity 
port introduced in 2002, achieved a peak model share of 35% and exited the TV market 
in 2008. In contrast, HDMI, which was also introduced in 2002, evolved to achieve a 
model share of greater than 90% since 2006 and was still present in the dominant design 
configuration of TVs in 2016. The dependent variable component longevity is measured 
as the number of years a component remains in a given product category, and it is 
operationalized by counting the number of years a component had been included in any 
of the TV models produced by the top seven manufacturers in North America. For 
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example, the HDMI component has a longevity of greater than 15 years, whereas the DVI 
port only had a longevity of 6 years. 
 
Figure 4: Adoption of Audio-Video Components in TV Design 
Pleiotropy measurement 
I created pleiotropy maps for each year for each component, as components were 
introduced over a period of time. The steps involved in this derivation are detailed in the 
supplement Appendix A. In brief, to draw pleiotropy maps and to measure the pleiotropy 
score of each component I conducted a detailed text mining analysis on the specification 
documents of TV models. I first extracted all the features listed in specification documents 
using word frequency analysis. Based on most frequently occurring word combinations, I 
clustered the words and identified the main features in the TV models. I then extracted 
component occurrence in TV models using manual coding, and cross-validated it by 
conducting word frequency analysis on the specification documents. After matching 
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specifications of components and TV features extracted from text mining analysis, I 
developed the pleiotropy map for each of the 15 years (2002-2016) in my observation 
period. There is a significant variance in the pleiotropy score of different components in a 
given year. For example, the pleiotropy scores in 2011 range from 1 (component: AAO) 
to 10 (component: HDMI).  
Open standards and Innovation source 
The other two main variables are binary predictors. Open standards capture the 
openness of the standard supporting a component. A component can either be 
developed based on an open standard or a proprietary standard and therefore it is 
measured as a binary predictor. The identification of a component as an open standard 
or proprietary standard is based on the description provided in the component’s 
specification document. Innovation source is a similar binary variable, where a 
component developed within an industry domain is scored as a 1, or 0 otherwise. I used 
component specification documents and press releases to make this assessment.  
Control variables 
The research models also include a set of control variables based on a review of the 
literature, including (a) the type of the component (digital vs analog, software vs 
hardware, etc.), (b) the number of firms introducing a component in the first year, (c) the 
introductory footprint of the component, and (d) the royalty (licensing) fees associated 
with a component. After the digitalization of television content in 2008 most television 
manufacturers transitioned from analog-based to digital product design by introducing 
more digital components, either through software or hardware (Livingston et al., 2013). 
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Initial adopters of a technology are key determinants in the success or failure of a 
technology. The speed of innovation adoption and its dominance is directly related to 
the adoption timing of firms. All else being equal, higher initial adoption leads to faster 
market dominance (Christensen, 1992a). I control for initial adoption as the number of 
firms adopting a component in its first year of introduction. The introductory footprint is 
the initial model share of a component averaged across all firms, and it is argued to be 
a strong determinant for the successful adoption of a technological artifact (Kishore & 
McLean, 1998). Licensing a technology for royalties to competitors and industry 
partners results in a reduction in the likelihood of the emergence of a competing 
technology, and in the dominance of a focal technology in the industry (Hill, 1992). I 
control for licensing in my models as a binary predictor. Finally, I used dummy variables 
to account for the fixed effects of the component type. Table 27 in Appendix A lists all 
the variables of interest with additional details of their measurements. 
2.3.3 Estimation Models 
 
Component Dominance 
Overall, I am interested in identifying the influence of a component’s evolutionary 
attributes on component dominance and component longevity. Component dominance 
may not occur for some components due to left and right censoring of the data collected 
during my observation period. Left censoring may occur due to the withdrawal of a 
component by firms before it ever achieves dominance. On the other hand, limited 
observations on a newly introduced component due to the truncation of the study period 
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may result in right censoring. Hence, similar to other studies in the literature, I employ 
hazard models to analyze the entry of components in the dominant design configuration 
of TVs (Ramasubbu & Kemerer, 2015). I selected a semi-parametric Cox-proportional 
hazard model for my analysis over other parametric proportional hazard models, and 
accelerated failure time models as it does not require the assumption of an underlying 
distribution for the base hazard or survival function (Wuttke et al., 2019). My first 
specification is related to a component entering into a dominant design configuration, and 
is shown in Equation (1).  
hi(t/X) = λ0(t). exp {α1(pleiotropyi ) + α2(open standardi)  + α3(innovation sourcei) + 
β(control variablesi)}  (1) 
Where, hi(t/X): The hazard of dominance for the ith component at year t, given a set of 
covariates X; λ0(t):  a baseline hazard that is a function of time, but does not vary by 
individual component; αs: the coefficients of the study variables; and β: a vector of 
coefficients of the control variables.  
 Note that in this application of hazard models, the “hazard rate” and “failure event” are 
interpreted as positive and desirable outcomes of the phenomenon. A higher hazard rate 
signifies a higher likelihood of a component entering into the dominant design 
configuration at a given point in time. The occurrence of a “failure event” in the analysis 
is interpreted as a component’s successful entrance into the dominant design 
configuration (i.e., the ‘failure’ of the replaced component).  This is consistent with their 
use in this literature (Fichman & Kemerer, 1999). 
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Component Longevity – Count Model Specification 
In addition to whether a component becomes part of the dominant design configuration, I 
am also interested in predicting a component’s longevity in product design, based on the 
evolutionary attributes of the component. Recall that component longevity is defined as 
the number of years a component is included in any TV model, and this number is always 
greater than or equal to one.  
As component longevity is a count variable, count models, such as  Poisson and 
negative binomial regressions, are best suited for this type of analysis rather than ordinary 
least squares regression. And, in cases where the assumption of the equality of the 
conditional mean and variance function is violated, negative binomial regression is 
preferred over the Poisson regression (Wooldridge, 2002). First, I compared the 
conditional mean of the dependent variable, component longevity, with its variance, and 
then conducted a likelihood ratio test. These tests indicated that the assumptions of the 
Poisson model are violated and showed the presence of over-dispersion for component 
longevity, and therefore the negative binomial regression model was chosen as the 
appropriate approach for my analysis. Additionally, recall that my data is right-censored, 
as many of the components continued to stay in product design post my observation 
period. To account for this right censoring, I estimated a censored negative binomial 
regression model (Hilbe, 2011). I used component fixed-effect models, and to account for 
heteroscedasticity, robust standard errors were used during hypothesis testing.  
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𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑋𝛽; 𝑌, 𝛼) = 𝛿 {𝑌𝑖 ln (
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝑖𝛽)
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋i𝛽)
) −
ln(1 + exp(𝑋𝑖𝛽))
𝛼
+ 𝑙𝑛𝛤 (𝑌𝑖 +
1
𝛼
) − ln 𝛤(𝑌𝑖 + 1)
− 𝑙𝑛𝛤 (
1
𝛼
)} + τ {ln (𝛽1 (𝐶𝑖 − 1,
1
𝛼
,
1
1 + exp(𝑋𝑖𝛽) − ln(𝛼)
))} 
The specification for estimating component longevity is shown in Equation (2): where, δ: 
1 if observation not censored, 0 otherwise; τ: 1 if observation is right censored, 0 
otherwise; α = heterogeneity parameter; β1 = incomplete beta function; Xi = Vector of 
exogenous variables; β = Parameter vector; Ci = 1, if latest year of component i is equal 
to 2017; 0 otherwise. 
  
2.4 ANALYSIS 
 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
A total of 46 components introduced during 15 years of observation were used for my 
analysis. Since not all components entered into the television models in the same year, 
I have an unbalanced longitudinal data set, resulting in 708 total observations. Out of 
these 708 observations, 179 observations began on or after the first “failure event”, 
resulting in 529 observations for analysis.  
2.4.2 Hypothesis Test Results 
 
In the first set of hypotheses, I am interested in identifying the influence of pleiotropy of a 
component (H1a), the type of standard supporting the component (H2a), and its 
innovation source (H3a) on its likelihood of entering the dominant design configuration. 
Table 1 presents results from a Cox proportional hazard estimation model. The first model 
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in Table 1 is a controls-only model, whereas the second model includes the hypothesized 
variables for predicting component dominance.  
Results presented in Table 1 support my hypotheses. Hypothesis 1a proposed that 
ceteris paribus, at any given point in time, the Pleiotropy of a component significantly 
influences the likelihood of dominance of the component. For every unit increase in the 
functionality of a component, it is estimated to be nearly three times more likely to achieve 
dominance in complex assembled digital products (H.R. = 2.82, p < 0.001). My second 
hypothesis (2a) posited that components supported by open standards are more likely to 
achieve dominance than components supported by proprietary standards. My results 
show a significant hazard ratio for Open standard (H.R. = 4.44, p < 0.05). This result 
suggests that components supported by open standards are almost four times more likely 
to achieve dominance than components supported by closed standards. Innovation 
source (H3a) also positively influenced the likelihood of dominance of a component (H.R. 
= 4.40, p < 0.01). Components developed by firms within the focal industry are also about 
four times more likely to achieve dominance compared to components developed by 
external firms.  
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Table 1: Survival Model Results: Component Dominance 
 Cox proportional hazard model 
Dominant_50 Model 1 (Control) Model 2 (Full) 
  Hazard Ratio 95% C.I. Hazard Ratio 95% C.I. 
Pleiotropy   2.82*** [1.64 - 4.86] 
Open standard   4.44* [1.15 - 17.11] 
Innovation source   4.40** [1.49 - 12.94] 
Hardware 3.40 [0.89 - 12.92] 4.86 [0.23 - 100.11] 
Digital 0.44 [0.05 - 3.51] 0.03** [0 - 0.41] 
Versioning 2.96 [0.42 – 20.51] 1.25 [0.15 - 9.94] 
No of firms 2.55*** [1.59 - 4.10] 2.55** [1.36 - 4.78] 
Introductory 
footprint 1.04* [0.96 - 1.13] 1.10* [1 - 1.2] 
Introduced by leader 4.85** [1.71 - 13.73] 5.64* [1.07 - 29.55] 
Licensing 1.00 [0.17 – 3.92] 0.98 [0.13 - 7.09] 
D_interface 1.02 [0.39 - 2.64] 0.56 [0.19 - 1.6] 
D_off_data 1.05 [0.01 – 84.84] 0.61 [0.01 - 19.05] 
D_network 0.77 [0.13 - 4.58] 0.01* [0 - 0.4] 
D_display 0.06*** [0.06 – 1.34] 0.02*** [0 - 0.25] 
No. of Observations 529  529  
Adjust. R2 0.24  0.47  
Logpseudo-likelihood -41.44  -33.36  
Wald Chi2 77.43***   70.77***   
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
 
2.4.2.1 Additional Analysis: Cumulative Impact on Component Dominance 
 While my hypotheses and the results presented in Table 1 examined the individual 
effects of the three hypothesized evolutionary attributes of components at any given point 
in time, it is possible that these three factors have a cumulative effect on component 
dominance over the lifecycle of a component. For examining such a cumulative effect 
over the passage of time, I created cumulative dominance plots. The cumulative 
dominance rate represents the total accumulated likelihood of achieving dominance by a 
component during the entire observation period. For examining cumulative dominance, I 
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treated Pleiotropy to be dichotomous, similar to Open standard and Innovation source, 
and created a binary variable representing low and high levels of Pleiotropy. The 
average pleiotropy in my sample is 2.82. Therefore, I defined pleiotropy scores of less 
than three as low pleiotropy, and any score greater than three as high pleiotropy. Figures 
5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) represent the cumulative dominance rate plots by pleiotropy, open 
standards and innovation source, respectively.   
 As seen in Figure 5(a), the cumulative likelihood of achieving dominance by a 
component is consistently higher for the high pleiotropy group compared to the low 
pleiotropy group over the 15 years of my observation period. At the same time, the low 
pleiotropy group has a flat accumulated likelihood to dominance, suggesting that, for low 
pleiotropy components, the likelihood of entering the dominant design configuration does 
not increase with the passage of time. Similarly, Figure 5(b) suggests that, while the 
accumulated likelihood of entering into dominant design configuration increases for both 
closed and open standard over the lifecycle of a component, the increase in dominance 
likelihood is much higher for components supported by open standards. A similar trend is 
noticeable in Figure 5(c) for components with exogenous vs endogenous innovation 
source. In summary, even when modelled in this alternative way to account for cumulative 
accumulation of dominance likelihood over the lifecycles of components, I see that the 
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main effects of the three evolutionary attributes of components are consistent with the 
results presented in Table 1. 
Hypothesis Test Results: Component Longevity 
In the second set of hypotheses I am interested in identifying the influence of pleiotropy 
of components (H1b), the type of standard supporting the components (H2b), and their 
innovation source (H3b) on component longevity. Table 2 presents the estimates of 
component longevity from Censored Negative Binomial Regression models. Results 
show that both Pleiotropy (H1b) and Open standard (H2b) are positive and significant 
predictors of component longevity. However, a component’s Innovation source (H3b), 
Figure 5: Survival Graphs 
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although a significant predictor of component dominance, was not shown to have a 
statistically significant influence at the usual levels on component longevity.  
Table 2: Censored Negative Binomial Regression: Component Longevity 
 Censored Negative Binomial Regression 
No. years Model 1 (Control) Model 2 (Full) 
  Coeff. 95% C.I. Coeff. 95% C.I. 
Pleiotropy   0.28** [0.07 - 0.49] 
Open standard   0.58*** [0.15 – 1.01] 
Innovation Source   -0.01 [-0.56 - 0.54] 
Hardware  0.25 [-0.40 – 0.92] 0.31 [-0.15 - 0.78] 
Digital  0.78*** [0.35 – 1.21] 0.53* [0.03 – 1.03] 
Versioning -0.30** [-0.79 - 0.81] -0.69*** [-1.11 - -0.26] 
No of firms  0.14 [-0.13 - 0.30] 0.18** [0.06 - 0.30] 
Introductory 
footprint -0.03 [-0.06 - 0.01] -0.01* [-0.04 - 0.22] 
Introduced by leader  0.36 [-0.07 – 0.80] 0.22 [-0.19 - 0.64] 
Licensing -0.05** [-0.58 – 0.46] -0.09 [-0.47 – 0.27] 
Dominant_50  0.48** [0.14 – 0.83] 0.06 [-0.35 – 0.48] 
D_interface -0.05 [-0.77 - 0.66] -0.02 [-0.57 - 0.52] 
D_off_data  0.79** [0.23 -1.35] 0.38*** [-0.06 – 0.83] 
D_network  0.28* [-0.28 – 0.85] 0.07 [-0.56 - 0.72] 
D_display -0.14 [-0.26 - 0.54] -0.59* [-1.16 - -0.03] 
Constant  1.36*** [0.60 – 2.13] 1.15*** [0.47- 1.83] 
          
No. of observations 46  46  
AIC  3.438  3.329  
Wald Chi2 62.14*** 89.90***   
  
Sensitivity Analysis of Component Dominance 
We conducted a sensitivity analysis to explore how defining dominance of a technological 
artifact at different model share levels potentially influences the relationship between the 
independent variables of components and their influence on dominance. To conduct this 
analysis, I defined component dominance at model share levels with higher thresholds 
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than the standard 50%, including 55%, 60%, 65%, and 70% (Models 3, 4, 5, and 6, 
respectively). The results of these sensitivity analyses are listed in Table 3.  
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Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis: Component Dominance 
 Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Dominant_55 Dominant_60 Dominant_65 Dominant_70 
  Haz. Ratio 95% C.I. Haz. Ratio 95% C.I. 
Haz. 
Ratio 95% C.I. Haz. Ratio 95% C.I. 
Pleiotropy 3.90*** [1.71 - 8.89] 2.64* [1.01 - 6.91] 1.76* [1.08 - 2.86] 1.30* [1.04 - 1.64] 
Open standard 4.94* [1.20 - 20.22] 1.68 [0.17 - 15.82] 2.38 [0.53 - 10.58] 1.75 [0.25 - 11.9] 
Innovation Source 7.9* [1.13 - 54.85] 20.36*** [3.59 - 115.26] 9.82*** [2.71 - 35.57] 15.20** [2.74 - 84.37] 
Hardware 4.49 [0.27 - 74.01] 1.13 [0.03 - 41.08] 1.16 [0.09 - 13.85] 0.47 [0.03 - 5.91] 
Digital 0.05* [0.01 - 0.51] 0.02 [0.01 - 1.11] 0.02 [0.01 - 14.12] 0.03 [0.01 - 23.88] 
Versioning 1.36 [0.17 - 10.64] 1.42 [0.02 - 100.55] 0.95 [0.01 - 152.02] 0.70 
[0.01 - 
978.04] 
No of firms 2.64*** [1.59 - 4.39] 2.96* [1.18 - 7.41] 2.19 [0.90 - 5.33] 2.70* [1.17 - 6.22] 
Introductory footprint 1.08* [1.00 - 1.17] 1.07 [0.97 - 1.18] 1.06 [0.94 - 1.19] 1.07 [0.91 - 1.24] 
Introduced by leader 3.26 [0.69 - 15.32] 1.26 [0.39 - 4.02] 2.21 [0.49 - 9.98] 4.93* [1.08 - 22.55] 
Licensing 0.36 [0.02 - 6.22] 1.28 [0.09 - 17.81] 1.26 [0.17 - 9.43] 1.14 [0.08 - 15.73] 
D_interface 0.73 [0.24 - 2.21] 1.71 [0.25 - 11.55] 3.81 [0.43 - 33.05] 4.6 [0.54 - 38.86] 
D_off_data 2.18 [0.15 - 31.65] 10.65 [0.07 - 1540] 14.17 [0.01 - 23827.43] 26.06 
[0.01 - 
60968.77] 
D_network 0.01* [0.01 - 0.32] 0.01 [0.01 - 182.01] 0.2 [0.01 - 121.37] 1.64 [0.04 - 63.15] 
D_display 0.05** [0.01 - 0.33] 0.04* [0.01 - 0.99] 0.12 [0.01 - 1.41] 0.12 [0.01 - 1.57] 
No. of Observations 541  560  580  586  
Log pseudo-likelihood -32.62  -30.45  -33.25  -32.17  
Wald Chi2 146.00***   207.42***  85.42***  133.34***   
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
  
 In all of the models in Table 3, Pleiotropy is still significant in predicting the 
likelihood of dominance of a component. These results suggest that the influence of 
pleiotropy on prediction likelihood of component dominance holds over a range of model 
share values, not just at the traditional 50% threshold. Components supported by an open 
standard also retain their positive dominance rate over the sensitivity analysis in all four 
models. However, the coefficient is only statistically significant at usual levels in Model 3, 
the 55% threshold (H.R. = 4.94, P< 0.05). Finally, like pleiotropy, innovation source is a 
significant predictor of component dominance at all four thresholds of model share.  
Robustness Checks  
 
We conducted a series of empirical checks to verify the robustness of the results 
presented in Section 3. First, to address the possible issues of unobserved heterogeneity 
in the selection of components I used the frailty hazard model, assuming a Weibull 
distribution for the base hazard or survival function (Carlin & Solid, 2014). The results of 
this estimation are similar to the ones reported in Table 1 and confirm my three 
component dominance hypotheses. Next, I performed a lead-lag analysis to verify the 
causal directions in my analysis. In this analysis, I assessed how the hypothesized 
variables predicted dominance of components at t+1 (lead) and t-1 (lag) time periods. As 
expected, the hypothesized variables remained statistically significant in the model 
predicting a future period component dominance (t+1), but they were insignificant in the 
model predicting past period component dominance (t-1), which provides a successful 
falsification test. In the next set of models, I used the actual percentage of market share 
of the TV models as the dependent variable and replicated my analysis. The results 
utilizing this alternative dependent variable once again confirmed my component 
43  
  
43 
 
dominance hypotheses. Finally, I estimated component longevity conditional on achieving 
dominance, and found that the model yielded similar results to those reported in Table 2. 
These consistent results provide high confidence in the robustness of the empirical trends 
I have reported. The results are reported in Table 4 below. 
Table 4: Additional Models to Check Robustness of Results 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
     Parametric 
Model 
  Frailty 
Model 
  Lead 
Analysis 
Lag 
Analysis 
Model 
share 
Lead Model 
Share 
Pleiotropy 1.193*** 2.411*** 0.266*** 2.028 0.095*** 0.086*** 
   (0.445) (0.798) (0.022) (0.907) (0.004) (0.005) 
Open Standard 2.645*** 2.287** 0.332† 5.107 0.172*** 0.138*** 
   (0.896) (1.088) (0.250) (4.505) (0.025) (0.026) 
Innovation source 1.868** 1.553* 0.658** 3.365 0.595*** 0.645*** 
   (0.923) (0.898) (0.277) (2.921) (0.027) (0.028) 
Hardware 2.225* 3.512** -0.221 6.418 -0.468** -0.442** 
   (1.200) (1.477) (0.345) (9.916) (0.031) (0.032) 
Digital -4.708*** -6.332*** 0.524 0.050 -0.615*** -0.571*** 
   (1.790) (2.287) (0.390) (0.82) (0.042) (0.043) 
Versioning -0.878 0.867 0.732*** 0.585 -0.047 -0.047 
   (1.142) (0.963) (0.263) (0.732) (0.031) (0.032) 
No of firms 1.286*** 0.803*** 0.170* 2.608* 0.321*** 0.316*** 
   (0.339) (0.277) (0.087) (1.014) (0.007) (0.007) 
Introduced by 
leader 
2.481*** 1.488* -0.606** 9.723 0.538*** 0.612*** 
   (0.950) (0.869) (0.266) (11.648) (0.027) (0.028) 
Introductory 
footprint 
0.150*** 0.085** 0.006 1.115** 0.037*** 0.036*** 
   (0.041) (0.038) (0.005) (0.056) (0.001) (0.001) 
Licensing -0.188 0.620 0.479** 0.840 0.156** 0.095** 
   (1.015) (0.932) (0.240) (0.816) (0.027) (0.028) 
Distribution 
Parameter 
6.368*** 4.534***     
   (0.218) (0.050)     
Frailty Parameter  -2.954***     
    (0.819)     
Chi    43.75*** 9885.03*** 9753.11*** 
Pseudo R2     0.39 0.41 
Obs. 529 529 423 371 525 479 
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2.5 DISCUSSION 
Summary of Contributions 
The original development of the notion of a dominant design was an important milestone 
in the innovation literature, and remains a valuable concept, as it tends to drive both 
product design and product manufacturing.  The early work was followed by research 
designed to more rigorously define the concept and to go beyond the firm and 
environmental factors with a proposal to investigate dominance at multiple levels of 
product design. Some of these extensions imported theory from biology (ecology) on 
factors affecting survival in an ecosystem, including pleiotropy.  
The ecological lens views design innovation as the evolution of a product configuration, 
with components competing to secure a dominant position in the product design 
configuration. This approach facilitates the study of design innovation at a more granular 
level and allows the empirical investigation of the emergence of a dominant design at the 
sub-system and component levels of a product design. This approach is appropriate for 
CADPs as these products are modular in nature, and their designs can be abstracted to 
the set of components and their functionalities. 
I bring these two views together in my model and empirically test whether a 
component becomes part of a dominant design configuration in a CADP. I test this in a 
modern and important context, that of digital televisions. I validate that variables identified 
by previous research are important factors in influencing whether or not a component 
becomes part of the dominant design configuration of a CADP, but go beyond this to find 
that components with high pleiotropy, based on open standards, and developed from 
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endogenous sources are more likely to become part of the dominant design configuration 
in digital televisions.   
I then extended this work by taking advantage of the longitudinal nature of my 
dataset by also measuring and testing the concept of component longevity in the digital 
design, which has its own important economic implications for a technology. I find that 
open standards and pleiotropy are both significantly associated with component longevity 
in the dominant design configuration of digital televisions.   
Discussion of Results 
There are a number of natural constituencies for these results. On the supply side, 
designers and manufacturers of CADPs can consider the three factors when selecting 
components for their devices.  The empirical results for the television domain suggest 
that, all else being equal, vendors would prefer that their new product become the next 
dominant design and by selecting components that have high pleiotropy, are based on 
open standards, and are developed within the industry, these components are more likely 
to become part of the dominant design configuration, all else being equal. And, high 
pleiotropy and open standards components are likely to remain in the dominant design 
configuration for a longer period of time. Absent this information, manufacturers may 
perceive there to be tension between developing a product with a stable architecture, 
versus being flexible for changing features or user preferences.  By choosing high 
pleiotropy components this tension is eased, as such components are likely to be both in 
the dominant design configuration for a relatively long period of time, and, given the 
greater number of functions/features that they support, will be more likely to address a 
future market need.  
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Analogously, on the demand side, consumers of these products would also, all 
else being equal, prefer to choose products that end up being in the dominant design 
configuration. Such products will, for example, be more likely to have compatible, 
complementary products developed for them. And, for durable goods, longevity in the 
dominant design configuration implies that the product will tend to have a longer useful 
life.    
Other stakeholders are likely to find these results of interest as well.   For example, 
standards-setting organizations may be able to cite the importance of open standards in 
their deliberations. And organizations that are considering so-called ‘coopetition’ 
relationships with other firms may see value in biasing the choice of such relationships to 
within-industry relationships, rather than choosing alliances external to their industry.  
Such a choice might otherwise be more difficult, as such a choice might otherwise be 
somewhat non-intuitive in the sense of a competitive market. Similarly, governments who 
are trying to choose among competing technology designs for products that have public 
goods implications, as was the case in the “Grand Alliance” process to select a high-
definition television standard in the United States, would be well advised to consider these 
factors (Dowell et al. 2002).  Finally, research labs or startup high technology firms might 
use these results to assess the market and identify components that are relatively weaker, 
in terms of their dominant design desirability, and choose those as targets for replacement.   
Televisions as CADPs and Related Model Results Discussion 
While the research relies on theories which are expected to be widely applicable to a 
variety of products, the empirical test was conducted in the television domain. The 
empirical results are consistent with the commonly observed failure of a number of touted, 
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but ultimately unsuccessful, components in the dominant television design.  To name just 
three, NFC (near field communication), the RS232C port, and the webcam image 
recognition system, are all components that exhibit attributes that have been shown to be 
not associated with entry into the dominant design, i.e. are low pleiotropy, represent 
closed standards, and are from a source external to the television industry. However, 
given their use in other contexts, they could have been argued to be ‘the next big thing’ 
in digital televisions. In fact, in 2013, NFC  was promoted as the top differentiating feature 
for TV models developed by top manufacturers (Denison, 2013). Similarly, 3D video and 
imaging, another technology predicted by some to be the ‘next big thing’ (Burrows, 2010) 
in television design, never materialized as being part of the dominant design configuration, 
presumably due, at least in part, to its low pleiotropy and failure to achieve standardization 
across TV manufacturers (Silva, 2019).  
In the recent past, several technologies have made their entry into television 
design configurations, including two display standards: QLED (Quantum-dot Light 
Emitting Diode) and OLED (Organic Light Emitting Diode). QLED is supported by the 
Open Dynamic HDR (High Dynamic Range) Standard, and Samsung Corporation opened 
the QLED trademark for other TV manufacturers, presumably expecting a larger alliance 
of TV manufacturers supporting QLED as the display for dominant design configuration 
(Palenchar, 2017). QLED was developed by Samsung, which is a major player in the 
television market, making QLED an endogenously developed technology. OLED, on the 
other hand, is supported by multiple patented standards, with the most important of them 
held by UDC (Universal Display Corporation), making it a closed standard, exogenously 
developed, component technology. In 2015 LG Electronics signed a long-term agreement 
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with UDC to deploy OLED technology in TV display panels. Both display types are 
supported by leaders in the television market and have been adopted by other players in 
the TV market. Therefore, either could be intuitively anticipated to do well in the market. 
my partial research model in 2019 would suggest that QLED and related technologies, 
assuming equivalent pleiotropy, would improve their market share vs. OLED, and become 
part of the dominant design configuration in coming years, in the absence of any 
exogenous shocks to the equilibrium. 
Future Research 
This research was driven by a desire to extend the current understanding about (1) what 
drives component dominance and (2) what drives component longevity in a dominant 
design in the context of complex assembled products. Within the television domain, I 
examined forty-six components, a sample which was a function of the components 
chosen by manufacturers. However, like any such empirical research, other research 
objectives might drive other data collection choices. For example, in the empirical work 
of Benner & Tripsas (2012), they note that the dominant design literature reflects two 
views, the Technological (supply-side) view and the Market (demand-side) view. The 
research focused on the Market view might choose to, for example, attempt to estimate 
the value to the consumer of individual components’ inclusion in the product. Such 
research could be modelled via hedonic regression (Brynjolfsson & Kemerer, 1996). 
My research focused on components, following on the research literature in applying 
pleiotropy to CADPs. A relatively orthogonal extension would be to take a different focus, 
for example, looking at the eco-system of products and their complements and substitutes. 
49  
  
49 
 
This could be an additional important dimension in predicting the success of a component 
in the dominant design. 
Finally, of course, the empirical analysis here selected televisions as the CADP, an 
industry with considerable economic significance, and one that has undergone a 
substantial amount of innovation in recent years.  One possible avenue for future research 
would be to apply this model to another digital product, for example, smartphones, or an 
Internet of Things (IoT) product  
2.6 CONCLUSION  
The phenomenon of configurational changes in dominant design at the component level 
is unique to CADPs, as the modular architecture of these products facilitates the inclusion, 
substitution, and elimination of components. The architecture change, including 
components, is achieved without detrimentally affecting the stability of the overall 
functionalities embedded in the dominant design of the product. A key goal of this paper 
is to investigate the selection, substitution, and elimination of components in CADPs by 
utilizing both an evolutionary theoretical lens and a configurational perspective on the 
emergence of dominant designs. Specifically, I hypothesized the effects of three 
evolutionary attributes of components (1) pleiotropy (2) open standards, and (3) 
innovation source on their participation in the dominant design configurations of CADPs. 
Empirical analysis using a longitudinal dataset of TV models supported my hypotheses, 
and I conclude that components with high pleiotropy, that are supported by open 
standards, and that originate within the industry, have a higher chance of being included 
in the dominant design configurations of CADPs and, for pleiotropy and open standards, 
remaining in the configuration for a longer time. The study provides prescriptions for 
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product designers and manufacturers for managing their component selection strategies 
and highlights the theoretical and empirical relevance of both the evolutionary and 
configurational perspectives for further research on the emergence of dominant designs 
in CADPs. 
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3 Essay 2: Product Market Competition, Platform Business Model and, Firm 
Performance  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
“In business, the competition will bite you if you keep running; if you stand still, they will 
swallow you.”      
                                                                             Victor Kiam, Ex. Chairman, Remington. 
Market competition is inherently a dynamic process in which product technologies in 
the market continuously emerge, evolve, and fade via the process of creative 
destruction (Schumpeter 1950, Futia 1980). While these dynamics of product markets 
bring significant benefits to society through innovation, in the long run, firms competing 
in these markets have to continually find ways to differentiate and improve their products 
to stay ahead of the competition. The constant churn of innovation is especially 
significant in high technology, internet-based industry sectors. According to a 2019 
survey of CIOs and top tech leaders conducted by the IDG (International Data Group), 
two-thirds of technology leaders shared the concern about market stability, digital 
transformation, and declining competitiveness of their firms (Heltzel 2019). Market 
competitiveness also emerged as the single most significant concern by another survey 
of marketing executives in European countries (Gaspar and Stürmer 2016).  
High technology industries have the shortest product lifecycle, from infancy to 
maturity. According to a 2015 KPMG report, products, and services in the high 
technology industry have an average maturity life cycle of 0.5- 5 years, which is the 
shortest among all sectors (KPMG 2015). Value generation and capture from these 
products and services have to happen in a shorter duration compared to products and 
services from other industries. Additionally, product and services imitation is salient and 
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rampant in the technology sector. Imitation among vendors in the IT sector is 
widespread, and firms mimic the direct competitors in the introduction and withdrawal 
of services (Ruckman et al. 2015, Rhee et al. 2006). While the modular nature of 
products developed in the IT industry and associated incremental innovation leads to 
better performance gains, these gains erode quickly via imitation from firms competing 
in the same domain (Ethiraj et al. 2008). With short appropriation cycles, high research 
and development expenses, and potential risk of imitation, firms need to continually 
think about tackling evolving market threats by enabling appropriate business strategies. 
In this study, using product market fluidity as a measure of evolving product market 
threats, I estimate the effect of the evolving market threats on the financial performance 
of a firm (Hoberg et al. 2014). Product market fluidity is a measure developed by 
extracting business descriptions from annual 10K-reports using computational 
linguistics. It measures the change in a firm’s product space due to moves made by 
competitors in the firm’s product markets. Measuring competitive moves made by rival 
firms is essential as all new product developments, and performance improvements in 
the existing product should be seen relative to the progress made by rival firms in the 
product space. This measure is a meaningful way to capture market stability (instability) 
around a firm and product differentiation achieved by firm compared to its rival firms. 
The measure is also robust since firms are legally bound to accurately describe the 
products and services in 10-K annual reports filed with the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), USA.  
One of the innovation strategies that might provide stability in firm performance 
during evolving market competition is the adoption of the platform business model as 
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part of the overall business strategy. The multi-sided platform is distinct from other forms 
of business models as it allows for interactions and transactions between two or more 
sides through direct affiliations (Hagiu and Wright 2015). Firms managing multi-sided 
platforms generate revenue from platform rents, royalties, and advertising (Rochet and 
Tirole 2003). Multi-sided platforms can be part of the hybrid business model or a core 
business strategy for a firm. For example, Amazon Inc. started as a pure retailer but 
added on to enable third-party sellers to sell products directly to the end consumer 
through its online e-commerce platform (van Alstyne and Parker, 2016). Amazon Inc. 
facilitates the promotion, transaction, and end-to-end delivery of products between 
sellers and buyers. Whereas, the short term vacation rental platform is core to the 
business model for Airbnb Inc., through which the firm facilitates searching and booking 
of vacation rentals listed by property owners. Businesses involving platforms as part of 
their business strategy not only compete with other platforms in the same domain but 
also with traditional firms delivering products and services. However, multi-sided 
platforms have differential features, as they have the potential to introduce new pricing 
structures, new transaction mechanisms and newer features more rapidly and at a 
much lower cost compared to traditional businesses and intermediaries (Zhao et al. 
2019). These differential features may help organizations to negate competitive threats 
from rival firms by delivering similar or better revenue with less investment into 
employees and R&D. In an exploratory study, it has been observed that in fortune 2000 
global firms, platform firms generated the same level of annual revenues (about $4.5 
billion) as their non-platform counterparts, but used half the number of employees. They 
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also had twice the operating profits and much higher market values and growth rates 
(Yoffie et al. 2019).  
Adopting the platform business model as part of a firm’s innovation strategy has 
its risks and challenges as well. The value generation in the platform business model is 
dependent on the size of the platform network. In a multi-sided platform, network size 
is dependent on the adoption of the platform by suppliers and users. Attracting users 
and producers on a platform requires upfront capital investment in incentivizing platform 
use, R&D expenditures on making the platform design, and advertising expenditures to 
promote the platform (Cusumano et al. 2019). In closed platform systems, the 
development of content and complementary offerings is also carried out by sponsoring 
firms, further increasing the magnitude of required investments. Apart from investments 
into new technologies, firms need internal restructuring as well. An alignment of 
organizational identity and organizational structure is needed for the successful 
development of the network of complementors. R&D's focus should be on developing 
market-based capabilities and growing the network (Altman and Tripsas, 2014). Firms 
adopting platform business models need to decide about the governance of the platform 
and intellectual property rights of the product and services developed on the platform 
(Parker and van Alstyne, 2005). Even if a sustainable and growing network of users and 
producers is established around a platform, there is the risk of network clustering, 
localization of network effects, multi-homing, disintermediation, and weakening of 
network effects over time (Zhu and Lansiti, 2019). Adopting the platform business model 
is a radical change in the way firms do their business. As with any other radical change, 
there is a higher risk of business model failure. One of the exploratory studies about the 
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last 20 years of adoption of the platform business model showed that only 17% of firms 
adopting the platform business model succeed in surviving for a long duration (Yoffie et 
al. 2019). Firms need to carefully identify the factors which help maximize the benefits 
from the adoption of the platform business model while managing the risks arising from 
it. The mixed success in the adoption of the platform business model motivated me to 
investigate this issue further. 
Using 10-K business descriptions and Naïve-Bayes text classification algorithms, 
I measure whether a firm is involved in the platform business in a given year or not. This 
measure of identifying the business model is highly accurate (Hoberg et al., 2014). 
Investigation of the effect of platform business strategy on firm performance in the 
presence of high product market fluidity is unique in two ways. First, most of the existing 
literature is either focused on exogenous variables influencing the success of a platform 
business in competition with a rival platform business or on the attributes of platform 
businesses that allow for appropriation of value by multiple stakeholders, including the 
sponsors of the platform. My study looks into the impact of platform business strategy, 
as a firm’s endogenous choice, on its financial performance. Secondly, my study 
contributes to the competition dynamics literature by empirically investigating the effect 
of market competition on firm performance and exploring the platform business model 
as an innovation strategy that might minimize the negative effects of product market 
competition on firm performance.  
Our results suggest that firms that are adopting the platform business model perform 
better than traditional business firms, even under high product market competition. Using 
panel data analysis, I found that the product market competition negatively affects firms’ 
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financial performance. Choosing a platform business model as an innovation strategy 
allows a firm to grow its revenue at a considerably higher rate compared to non-platform 
firms even under increasing competitive threats from rival firms. Additionally, I found that 
larger firms are better in harnessing the value from platform business models, even under 
higher competition. In subsequent sections, I conceptualize and estimate the model, 
interpret the results, and discuss the implications of my findings.  
3.2 CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
3.2.1 Product Market Fluidity and Firm Performance 
Two essential elements of innovation economics are the central tenet of my conceptual 
development: economies of scale and economies of learning (Gilbert and Harris 1981, 
Gaynor et al. 2005). I argue that product market fluidity disrupts value gains from both 
scale and learning for a firm.  
 Economies of scale or increasing returns to scale refer to the position of strength 
for a firm as it captures increasing value from a product or service by decreasing the 
cost of the product resulting from the increased volume of production (Arrow 1996). 
Most of the cost advantage gained in economies of scale is achieved in the maturity 
phase of a product lifecycle. In the product maturity phase, there are fewer competing 
firms in the product market, which means lower product market fluidity, and the focus 
of competing firms has shifted from product innovation to process innovation (Utterback 
and Suarez, 1993). Improvement in the production process and incremental innovation 
leading to product differentiation are essential for capturing the market in the maturity 
phase of the product lifecycle. For a firm to benefit from economies of scale, the product 
maturity phase should be a long uninterrupted phase of the product life cycle where 
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firms appropriate returns for the high investment made in research and development 
during the product innovation cycle (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975).  
Similarly, economies of learning or learning economies refer to the value created 
by knowledge accrued during the repetitive production process (Macher and Boerner, 
2006). There are many ways in which this learning helps drive down cost: boosting 
efficiency and reducing waste in production by R&D synergies and productivity by better 
management, which helps coordinate and balance the different functions and by speeding 
up the production process. Learning reflected at the labor productivity level is known as 
a learning curve, and learning reflected at the organization level is known as experience 
curve. Training and specialization through learning lead to efficiency and growth in an 
organization, resulting in profitable, high added value goods and services. 
 In high technology industries, rival firms choose to compete back by either 
innovating or imitating, both of which hurt the value generated from scale and learning. 
More often, in the high technology industry, a significant technological change or 
innovation interrupts the maturity phase of the product life cycle by introducing a 
discontinuity to the marketplace. This technological discontinuity, in turn, reinitiates a 
new cycle, limiting the gains from economies of scale from previous innovation 
(Anderson and Tushman 1990, Cusumano et al. 2007). Competing firms try to develop 
product features similar to existing innovation resulting in high market fluidity. These 
technological discontinuities also allow new entrants and smaller firms to compete 
effectively with larger firms, reducing the value proposition for established firms (Acs 
and Audretsch 1987). This constant churn of innovation reduces the product life cycle 
and hence lowers the value captured from scaled production, for firms in a highly 
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competitive market. The change in the competitive landscape not only reduces the 
advantages of production scaling, but it also makes the value of “learning by doing” 
obsolete. Knowledge accrued from continuous operations and feedback loops in the 
product innovation life cycle delivers value for a firm. Every production iteration 
emphasizes the knowledge behaviors which provide the best fit in the current context 
and deemphasizes the other learnings and behaviors. In an evolving competitive 
environment where the context and the products change regularly, accrued knowledge 
not only fails to generate value (Fudenberg and Tirole 1983, Lieberman 1987, Gavetti 
and Tripsas 2000, Argote 2012) but it also lowers a firm’s performance. Organizational 
structures developed due to accrued knowledge are hard to destroy, which hinders the 
adoption of new practices (Tushman and Romanelli 1985, Nickerson and Silverman 
2003). 
Imitation is another way firms compete in the evolving market competition, 
reducing product differentiation, and destroying the value proposition for rival firms 
within a product market category. Product and service imitation is quite prevalent in the 
high technology industry (Ruckmanet al. 2015). Imitation can occur at the industry level 
(Fiegenbaum and Howard 1995, Haunschild and Miner 1997) or at the individual rivalry 
level for satisfying social comparisons (Garcia et al. 2006, Sirmon et al. 2008). Imitation 
may happen along the popular service lines (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993, 
Banerjee 1992) or service lines developed by industry leaders (Ruckmanet al. 2015). 
Due to inherent modularity in high technology products, it becomes easier for rival firms 
to mimic products and reduce opportunities for value appropriation by the focal firm 
(Ethirajet al. 2008). Institutionalization of firms because of widely accepted certification 
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standards (Gopal and Gao 2009), a high degree of inter-firm mobility of employees 
(Audretsch and Feldman 1996, Ranganathan and Kuruvilla 2008) and multi-sourcing 
approaches followed by clients (Bapna et al. 2010) makes it easier to imitate. Imitation 
may not necessarily eliminate all the value gained from “learning by doing,” however, it 
limits the quantum of rent expected from a product or services when similar products 
and services are available at competitive pricing.  
 Two things are salient in the arguments presented above. First, both innovation 
and imitation result in competitive parity among competing firms and increase the 
product market fluidity encountered by a firm. Secondly, this constant change in the 
competition landscape, which is the core element of competitive markets, limits the 
value generated by a firm through scale and learning. 
3.2.2 Product Market Fluidity and Firm Performance 
In a high technology industry, firms can choose to compete as a traditional pipe business 
model, a pure platform business, or as a hybrid business model (Van Alystyne and Parker, 
2016). For example, Walmart Inc., Amazon Inc., and Ebay Inc. compete in the retail sector 
with contrasting business models. Walmart opted for a traditional pipe business model 
with both retail and internet stores (Van Alystyne and Parker, 2016). eBay is a pure 
platform business providing business to consumer and consumer to consumer services 
on its e-commerce platform. Amazon operates on a hybrid business model where its e-
commerce platform allows for direct and third-party, consumer to consumer transactions. 
Hence, platforms not only compete with other platform businesses but also with firms 
selling products and services directly to consumers. Apple Inc. is another example of a 
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pure pipeline firm which incorporated platform business models as part of their overall 
business with the advent of the iPhone and the App-store (Cusumano and Gawer 2013).  
 Platform businesses have to make a significant strategic shift in all dimensions of 
businesses to become less sensitive to market threats. Most platforms are two-sided, 
where platform sponsors facilitate the transactions between consumers and producers 
(Cusunamo, 2020). Platform businesses do not generate their value from supply-side 
economies of scale, but rather from network effects (demand-side economies of scale) 
and economies of scope. Focus shifts from selling products to enabling the community to 
connect and transact—this change in focus results in the reduction of variable production 
costs. External producers handle most of the core production related to transactions on 
the platform. Producers and consumers on a platform become an essential asset for the 
firm (Van Alstyne et al. 2015). The relationship between participants of a platform is 
transparent and fluid to the extent that they can swiftly change the role based on network 
requirements. For example, Uber users can be drivers sometimes, and vice versa; and 
Airbnb hosts can be travelers in different settings. Additionally, this fluidity in a consumer-
producer relationship makes it easier to discover changing consumer needs and fulfilling 
them. The focus of platform businesses turns from marketing products to incentivizing the 
platform for increasing the scale of the network.  
 Another aspect of platforms, which makes them superior in creating higher value, 
is expanding scope and platform envelopment. Platform can extend the scope of their 
platform by either adding newer features quickly (Zhao et al. 2019) or extend the reach 
of the platform by enveloping services from the related product and services sectors 
(Eisenmann et al. 2011). The network effect from the existing platform allows for easier 
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adoption and propagation of new features and services, including features from unrelated 
domains. For example, Fitbit engulfed the functions of sports and healthcare performance 
monitors while providing the core functionality of a smartwatch (Purdy, 2016). The 
learning accrued in the pipeline business is context- and market-dependent, and is not 
only obsolete under increased market threats, but also slows down the business transition 
required to mitigate the risks arising from the heightened market threats. The core 
learning developed in generating and managing a network of users, producers, and 
communities can be applied in a completely different context and product market category. 
The transitions of a firm to the platform business model comes with its own 
challenges and risks. Firms assume that early entry into the new business opportunity, 
exploiting the network effects, and raising barriers to entry of rival firms are key to the 
successful deployment of the platform business model (Yoffie et al. 2019). However, the 
transition to the platform business model requires firms to reimagine the organization 
structure and operational strategy. Firms that move from a technology-oriented focus to 
the a business development-oriented focus are more likely to succeed in deploying the 
platform business model. Successful platform firms develop a collective identity of the 
platform ecosystem by sharing risks and surplus-value arising from the platform with the 
stakeholders of the platform (Gawer and Cusumano, 2013; van Alstyne et al., 2016). 
Firms adopting platform business models need to decide about the governance structure 
of the platform, openness of the platform, intellectual property rights of the product, and 
services developed on the platform and issues related to free-riding on the platform 
(Parker and Van Alystyne, 2005). Firms also need to invest continuously into incentivizing 
parties of the platform, R&D and branding, and marketing at least until a tipping point is 
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reached and network effects take over. Once the network tipping point is reached, the 
firm can generate long term value from direct and indirect network effects of the platform 
(van Alstyne et al. 2016). The larger the network gets, the more the investment required 
in continuing the action on the platform. For example, Uber and Lyft, share riding 
platforms, are still incentivizing both driver and rider sides of the platform to promote the 
use of their platforms, burning millions of dollars of cash every month (Cusumano 2020). 
Salesforce.com and other service platform firms spend large sums of money relative to 
their revenues on marketing and administrative expenses (Cusumano et al. 2019). In the 
initial stages of platform developments, firms do not have a large ecosystem of 
complementors. The dearth of complementors compels firms to develop the 
complementary offerings themselves, leading to additional R&D expenses. Failing that, 
the platform is less likely to take off and achieve the user growth required to gain any 
value from network effects. For example, Canonical Ltd, developer of the Ubuntu 
operating system, failed to develop a mobile operating system platform due to a lack of 
investment in the developer network (Hartley, 2017). All these examples indicate that, 
while entry barriers to platform businesses is low, to develop any meaningful network, 
firms need to invest a vast amount of capital for a longer period. Even if firms develop the 
network of producers and consumers around a platform, complacency can be dangerous 
in the presence of high product market competition. The same low barriers to entry into a 
platform business afford competing firms to fight back and capture the market share from 
early movers. For example, Internet Explorer was the largest browsing platform in 2004, 
with a market share of 95%. However, by the year 2015, Google Chrome became the 
market leader in browsing platforms. The fall of Internet Explorer is attributed to the 
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complacency about the product execution and inferior product innovation by the sponsors 
of the platform (Yoffie et al. 2019). The network developed by a firm around its platform 
can itself be fragile and prone to clustering, localization of network effects, multi-homing, 
disintermediation, and weakening of network effects over time (Zhu and Lansiti, 2019). 
Firms bringing in new policies and structure to an existing business due to their transition 
to a platform business model may also run into problems with legal and regulatory 
regimes. They also may have to deal with a lack of underlying infrastructure like internet 
bandwidth (Cusumano et al. 2019). 
The risks and challenges faced by firms adopting the platform business model are 
visible in practice, as well. An exploratory study (spanning 20 years, 1995-2015) 
conducted by Yoffie et al. (2019) found that only 43 firms out of 252 platform firms 
succeeded in continuously operating until the year 2015. The rest of the firms had an 
average life of 4.9 years. More firms disappeared from the market due to a shorter 
investment horizon, failing to capture the market share, merger with another platform, or 
moving out of the platform business (Cusumano et al. 2019). It is in stark contrast with 
the finding that five out of the top 10 firms by market value are platform firms. They have 
a combined market value of more than 3 Trillion USD. The percentage of failed platform 
firms may be likely to be comparable to the percentage of failed non-platform firms. The 
researchers also included firms from all industry domains that may have skewed the 
numbers, as firms in high technology industries may have expertise and relevance for 
platform businesses compared to traditional firms. The same study also highlighted the 
fact that the average revenue generated by platform firms is higher or comparable to non-
platform firms, even when their overall expenditure is considerably lower.These findings 
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suggest that the average value-added productivity (revenue – total expense) of platform 
firms is higher than the value-added productivity of the non-platform firms. These 
contrasting findings provide an opportunity to empirically investigate the performance 
superiority of platform firms to non-platform firms.  
Additionally, as platform firms grow larger in network size, they become harder to 
compete by rivals or new entrants, with the growing number of complements acting like 
a barrier to entry (Gawer and Cusumano, 2013). Platforms supported by a large 
ecosystem of complementors and strong network effects make it more difficult for 
competitors to dislodge (Cusumano 2011). The dominance of a platform with strong 
network effects encourages competition within the platform between complementors for 
incremental innovation, but hinders competition from rival firms, discouraging and 
delaying any radical innovation arising from outside the platform (Gawer and Cusumano, 
2013). It has been argued theoretically that network effects may confer some market 
power to the firms, that firms can strategically exploit to reduce competition and thus 
increase profits (Fuentelsaz et al. 2012). This should lead to a longer maturity phase for 
the platform ecosystem and better-continued performance by a firm with a platform 
business model even under high product market fluidity. Hence, I expect platform 
businesses to deliver higher value-added productivity compared to non-platform firms, 
even under high product market competition.  
I present the basic research model for this investigation in Figure 6 below. I expect 
product market fluidity to have a negative influence on the value-added productivity of a 
firm. However, platform businesses should perform better than non-platform businesses, 
even under high product market fluidity. In this study, I also investigate how investment 
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in the capital, R&D, employees, and branding can be the difference between a successful 
and failed platform business.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3.3 VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION AND ESTIMATION 
3.3.1 Data  
For my analysis, I captured data from multiple sources in a multi-stage process. First, 
from COMPUSTAT, I identified all firms which were active in the last 17 years (2001-2017) 
and listed under the technology and related services sector.  For this I identified 16 
NAICS-5 level classification firms (519130, 511210, 518210, 334413, 334220, 541512, 
334511, 541519, 423430, 334210, 517110,334111, 334112, 541511, 334118, and 
517919). I then removed firms with empty sales data and erroneous data. I also removed 
ADRs (American Depository Receipt) firms from my dataset, because they are cross-
listed with incomplete data in COMPUSTAT. My analysis only includes firms with financial 
data listed in US dollar values. This sampling strategy resulted in 1199 firms. I matched 
Figure 6: Research Model: Product Market Competition, Platform Business Model and 
Firm Performance 
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this data with the Hoberg et al. 2014 product market fluidity dataset. I then extracted 10-
K reports for the resulting 654 firms from the EDGAR database and calculated binary 
variables for the business model using the Naïve-Bayes algorithm, as described in the 
next section.  
3.3.2 Variables 
Dependent Variable 
Value-added productivity: Value-added productivity, a measure of financial 
performance, is measured as deflated sales less deflated materials. I deflated net sales 
using the Bureau of Economic Association (BEA) gross domestic product price index for 
gross output at the 2-digit NAICS level. Materials cost is calculated as total expenses 
minus labor expenses. Total expenses data is available in COMPUSTAT (Data item 
XOPR). Wherever it is not present, I calculated it as the difference between sales and 
operating income before depreciation (COMPUSTAT item OIBDP). Staff expense total 
listed in COMPUSTAT measures labor expenses. Only a few data points are available on 
COMPUSTAT for staff expenses. For the rest of the firm years, the average sector labor 
cost is computed at 2-digit NAICS level using annual sector-level wage data (salary plus 
benefits) from the BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics). The per-hour labor compensation is 
multiplied by 2040 hours of work (51 weeks * 40 hours a week) per year to approximate 
average yearly expenses for an employee in a year (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003). The 
result is then multiplied by the total number of employees to calculate total staff expenses. 
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Independent Variables 
Product market fluidity: Product market fluidity, as a measure of market threats, is the 
degree of volatility (change) in the product mix of the competitors of the focal firm with 
respect to a focal firm (Hoberg et al. 2014). The method to calculate this measure is 
described in detail in Hoberg et al. 2014. In brief, 10-K annual reports are captured for all 
firms of interest from the Edgar database, maintained by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, USA. The product description is parsed from 10-K reports of each firm. 
Product market fluidity captures how rivals are changing the product words that overlap 
with firm i’s vocabulary. Specifically, let Jt denote a scalar equal to the number of all unique 
words used in the product descriptions of all firms in year t. Let Wit denote an ordered 
Boolean vector of length Jt identifying which of the Jt words are used by firm i in year t. 
Element j of Wit equals one if firm i uses word j in its product description and zero 
otherwise. Wit is normalized to unit length and defines the result as Ni,t. To capture the 
changes in the overall use of a given word j in year t, Hoberg at al. 2014 define the 
aggregate vector Dt−1, t  as   
𝐷𝑡−1,𝑡 ≡ |∑(𝑊𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑊𝑗,𝑡−1)
𝑗
| 
A firm’s product market fluidity is simply the dot product between its word vector Nit and 
normalized Dt−1, t     :  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐹𝑙𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 ≡ ⟨𝑁𝑖,𝑡 ⋅
𝐷𝑡−1,𝑡
‖𝐷𝑡−1,𝑡‖
⟩ 
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In summary, if the change in product vocabulary of rival firms makes the products of rival 
firms more similar to the firm of interest, then the firm has high market threat and hence 
high product market fluidity. 
Platform Business Model: Platform business model is a binary variable. This variable 
capture whether a firm has a platform business as part of its overall business model. I 
calculated this variable using the Naïve-Bayes text classification algorithm. The variable 
was developed in multiple stages, as described below:  
Data Collection and pre-processing: To calculate this variable, I first extracted and 
parsed 10-K annual reports using the EdgarWebR library, available for the R language. 
The 10-K annual reports ranged from 2001 to 2018 for 684 firms in my dataset. I extracted 
7250 firm-year 10-K reports averaging 11 annual reports per firm. Using get_filings 
function from EdgarWebR library, I extracted “Item 1: Business Description” from these 
parsed 10-K reports. Business Description section details the type of businesses a firm 
is engaged in, including products and services. This section may also include information 
about recent events, the competition the company faces, regulations that apply to it, labor 
issues, special operating costs, or seasonal factors (SEC 2019). The business description 
section is used by Hoberg et al. 2014 to develop product market fluidity measures. Using 
the tm library in R, I pre-processed the text using standard preprocessing steps, including 
removal of white spaces, lowering the uppercase letters, removing numbers, removing 
stop words, and stemming the document.  
Sub-sampling for training, testing and labeling: For labeling a business as platform 
or non-platform, I used the definition of multi-sided platforms from Hagiu and Wright 2015: 
“Multi-sided platforms (MSPs) are technologies, products or services that create value 
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primarily by enabling direct interactions between two or more customer or participant 
groups”(p. 163). I labeled 934 firm-year business descriptions as either platform or non-
platform by reading business descriptions and collecting information from the internet. I 
arrived at this number after carefully searching the business profile of each firm through 
the popular press, including the firm's website, www.bloomberg.com, 
www.finance.yahoo.com, www.money.cnn.com, www.medium.com, www.forbes.com, 
www.applicoinc.com, and other research outlets. In this comprehensive search, I 
combined the observations from the popular press, company profile, and research 
outputs to identify firms that have a platform business model as part of their business 
strategy and others that do not. For example, according to a report published by Applico 
Inc. in 2015, 20% of the total income generated by S&P500 firms came from firms 
engaging the platform business model, including Apple, Google, Facebook, Yahoo, eBay, 
Microsoft, Adobe, ICE, Red Hat and Amazon (Moazed 2015). Similarly, researchers have 
highlighted Facebook, Uber, Twitter, Microsoft, LinkedIn, Expedia, Alibaba, Snapchat and 
Zillow as some of the famous examples of the platform business model (McIntyre 2019, 
Zhao et al. 2019, Knee 2018, and Parker et al. 2016). I also identified firms which are 
non-platforms like AMD and Analog Devices and labelled them as non-platforms. I used 
700 firm-year business descriptions for training and 234 firm-years business description 
for testing.  
Naïve Bayes prediction and Classification: The Naïve Bayes classification 
algorithm is a supervised learning text classification method used widely in social and 
management research (Li, 2010, Aggarwal et al. 2016, Mejia et al. 2019). Li(2010) used 
a Naive Bayesian classifier to classify the tone and content of forward-looking statements 
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in corporate 10-K and 10-Q filings. The Naïve Bayes classifier was used to classify 
linguistic tone in credit rating action reports and used as a robust alternative measure to 
mitigate measurement error of simple counting of negative or positive words as a 
measure of linguistic tone (Aggarwal et al. 2016). Using the Naïve Bayes algorithm, Mejia 
et al. (2019) measured the sentiment tone of online reviews of New York City restaurants. 
In my research, I first vectorized the pre-processed 10-K documents into a corpus of 
words. Then I created a sparse Document-Term Matrix using the term frequency method. 
For the main analysis, I dropped words that occur less than 20 times.1 The five most 
commonly used words for platform business firms are online, products, services, 
information, and business. The five most commonly used words for non-platform 
businesses are customers, technology, solutions, software, and business. I converted the 
rest of the words into categorical features. Using the law of total probability (Ross 1986) 
and under the assumption of conditional independence among the features (Mejia et al. 
2019, Hand et al. 2001), the probability that a firm is into platform business (based on the 
features extracted from the 10-K business description) is given by the expression: 
P (Platform/x1, x2……, xn) = (∏ 𝑃(
𝑥𝑗
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚
)). (
𝑃(𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚)
𝑃(𝑥1,𝑥2,….𝑥𝑛)
)𝑛𝑗=1   
Where P (Platform) is the prior probability of a firm to be platform business model and 
∏ P(
xj
Platform
))nj=1  is the conditional probability defined as the likelihood of observing a 
feature(x1, x2,…,xn) value given the firm is a platform (non-platform) business. 
P(x1,x2,…..,xn) is predictor features. I trained the model using the e1071 package 
available in R. I predicted the business model classification on test data. I evaluated the 
 
1 I also varied number of frequent words used per document from 5 to 100 (with an interval of 5). The best results 
were achieved with term frequency of 20. 
71  
  
71 
 
results of the prediction model using CrossTable and ConfusionMatrix functions in R. 
The results are reported in the first two columns of Table 9 below. The overall accuracy 
of the base model is 83% [confidence interval between 77% and 88%]. A kappa 
measure of 0.63 is acceptable (Landis and Koch 1977). However, a large number of 
platform businesses were classified as non-platform (36 out of 95). 
Fine-Tuning the base Naïve Bayes model: To reduce the measurement error and 
increase the accuracy of the classification model, I introduce Laplace smoothing to my 
model. Since Naïve Bayes uses the product of feature probabilities conditioned on each 
class in classification (platform or non-platform), a feature value in new data that never 
occurred in the existing classification response will render the whole posterior probability 
as zero. To improve my measurement of classification, I add a small number (in my case 
1) to all the terms, resulting in non-zero posterior probability (Wu et al. 2012). The results 
of Laplace smoothing are presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5. The updated text 
classification model achieved a validation accuracy of 98%. Out of 95 platform firm-year 
descriptions in the testing set, the model was accurately able to predict 93 as platform 
firm-year descriptions. The comparative results of the two models are presented in Table 
5. 
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Table 5: Naïve-Bayes classification for measuring platform 
 
Naïve-Bayes 
Classification 
Naïve-Bayes 
Classification (with 
Laplace smoothing) 
 Actual Actual 
Prediction Platform 
Non-
platform Platform Non-platform 
Platform 59 4 93 12 
Non-platform 36 135 2 127 
     
Sensitivity 0.62 0.98 
Specificity 0.97 0.92 
Kappa 0.63 0.88 
Accuracy 0.83[0.77 – 0.88]    0.94 [0.91 - 0.97] 
No information rate 0.60** 0.60** 
Positive Prediction Accuracy 0.94 0.98 
Negative Prediction 
Accuracy 
0.79 
0.89 
Balanced Accuracy  0.80 0.94 
McNemar's Chi-squared test 
 
       7.14** 
 
As seen in the table above, most model fit measures for the updated model are well above 
the accepted benchmark for text classification. For example, the Kappa statistic, which 
shows how well my classifiers predictions matched the actual class labels while 
controlling for the accuracy of a random classifier, is 0.88. On the strength of agreement, 
this is almost perfect (the highest agreement achievable between classifiers prediction 
and actual class labels) (Landis and Koch 1977). Most importantly, the model predicts 
98% of all platform businesses as a platform (sensitivity), and 92% of all non-platform 
business models as non-platform business models (specificity). 
Post prediction, I applied the optimized text classification model to the rest of the 
firm-year business descriptions. I merged the result of this application with the rest of the 
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financial dataset. Additionally, I compared the Naïve Bayes algorithm with other 
competing text classification algorithms. Results of the comparison are available in 
Appendix B. I found that the naive Bayes classifier is the most accurate on my data set 
among competing machine learning methods for text classification. 
External Validity: To further validate my classification of firms as platform and non-
platform business models, I selected all firms listed in my dataset, which were active in 
2017. I manually checked their business model using the sources identified in the earlier 
section. I compared this list with the predicted classification. Out of 520 active firms, I 
identified 73 firms as having a platform business model as part of their business strategy. 
The matching rate is 100%, with no missing match. The list of firms with their business 
models is available in Appendix B.  
Control Variables 
To address the risks and challenges related to the adoption of the platform business 
model, we controlled for firm-level variables in the model. Existing research has 
highlighted the importance of capital investment during the early phases of platform 
development (Cusumano et al. 2019). Firms with deeper pockets and long term 
investment plans are more likely to adopt the platform business model and able to capture 
value compared to cash-strapped firms. These firms are also more likely to beat the 
competing firms and become larger market players. To control for the effect of the size 
and spending capacity of a firm, I added capital stock, the number of employees, and 
percentile sales (as a proxy for firm size) in my estimation model. To make the platform 
attractive for the prospective stakeholders of the platform, firms need to invest in R&D 
activities to develop a feature-rich platform (van Alstyne et al., 2016). However, a highly 
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leveraged firm finds it hard to invest in R&D activities, resulting in a decline of innovation 
outputs (Desyllas and Hughes, 2010). High leveraged firms are more likely to deliver 
lower profits and go bankrupt under high product market competition (Maksimovi, 2010). 
It has also been observed that some firms adopting the platform business model spend 
a considerably higher proportion of their revenue in branding and advertising of the 
platform (Cusumano et al. 2019). Advertising and branding expenditure makes sense for 
platform firms, as the value proposition of a platform is dependent on its network size, 
which in itself is dependent on attracting consumers and producers to the platform. 
Advertising, in general, has also shown to impact the competitiveness of a firm, helping 
a firm to generate a higher market share (Das et al. 1993). I controlled for all these 
variables in my estimation model. I calculated the variables as follows:  
Capital Stock: I calculated Capital stock (Kit) as per the procedure explained in Hall 1990, 
and Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003. I collected financial data of firms from as far back as 1947 
from COMPUSTAT and deflated gross property, plant, and equipment (PPEGT) by the 
non-residential investment price deflator from NIPA table 5.3.4. For the first year of the 
appearance of a firm in COMPUSTAT, capital stock is fixed as the deflated PPEGT from 
COMPUSTAT. For other years, since investment is made at various times in the past, I 
calculated the average age of capital every year for each company by dividing 
accumulated depreciation (DPACT) by current depreciation (DP), from COMPUSTAT. 
Wherever missing, accumulated depreciation is the difference between PPEGT and net 
property, plant, and equipment from COMPUSTAT (PPENT). Capital age is taken as a 
three-year moving average of capital investment. The resulting capital stock is lagged by 
one period to measure the available capital stock at the beginning of the period (Hall 1990, 
75  
  
75 
 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003, İmrohoroğlu and Tüzel 2014). The capital stock calculation 
program used is adapted from İmrohoroğlu and Tüzel 2014.2 
Research and Development Stock:  I calculated research and development stock using 
the perpetual inventory method as following: 
Rit = (1-δ) Rit-1 * RNDDEFit-1+ Iit 
Similar to the capital stock calculation, research and development stock for the first year 
of a firm in my dataset is equal to research and development expenditures. For the rest 
of the years, I first depreciated R&D stock from the previous year (Rit-1) by a standard 15% 
(δ) (Villalonga 2004, Saunders and Brynjolfsson 2016) and then deflated by using the 
values for private businesses from table 4.1 of the BEA R&D Satellite Account (RNDDEFit-
1). This depreciated and deflated previous year’s research and development stock is then 
added to research and development expenses incurred in the current year (Iit) to arrive at 
research and development stock for the current year (Rit)  
Advertising Stock:  I calculated advertising stock using a perpetual inventory method 
similar to research and development expenses and using the same formula. However, 
standard depreciation used for advertising stock is 45%. I used the producer price index 
(PPI) for advertising agencies to deflate values to current-year dollars (Villalonga 2004, 
Nagle 2018). 
Firm Size:  For the main analysis, firm size is a binary variable where big indicates a firm 
in the top 75 percentile of sales in a given year, and small in the bottom three quarters. 
This measure is consistent with existing microeconomic literature (Nagle 2018). Some 
 
2 The STATA program to calculate capital stock is available on Şelale Tüzel’s website : 
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/10qhOBpBKvrfhjQXaXBUucKr3WLUNxPWX 
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studies have used the number of employees for firm size, but the number of employees 
is already an input variable in my model (Koch and McGrath, 1996; Datta et al., 2005; 
Woo et al., 2013). Below is the variable list for my analysis: 
Table 6: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description 
ln(Value-added) it 
Total sales minus total expense, deflated with 
appropriate GDP deflator. 
Product market fluidityit 
Change in product mix among a firm i’s competitor in 
year t with respect to firm i. (Hoberg et al. 2014)  
Platformit 
Whether a firm i maintained a two-sided platform in a 
given year t or not. Based on the Naive-Bayes 
classification of 10-K reports. 
ln(capital) it 
Net capital stock (calculated using the perpetual 
inventory method: 5% depreciation rate) in millions 
USD for firm i in year t after deflation. 
ln(emp) it Number of employees in thousands for firm i in year t 
ln(r&d expenses) it  
R&D investment in millions of dollars (calculated using 
the perpetual inventory method: 15% depreciation 
rate) for firm i in year t after deflation. 
ln(advertising expenses) it 
Branding expenditure in millions USD (calculated 
using the perpetual inventory method: 45% 
depreciation rate) 
ln(leverage) it Total liabilities by total assets 
firm size it 
Binary variable, if the firm in 75th percentile or higher 
of the sale in a given year t, then it is 1, 0 otherwise. 
 
3.3.3 Estimation Model 
Similar to the standard Cobb-Douglas production function , I modelled  value-added 
productivity as a function of inputs (Bryjolfsson and Hitt 2003, Nagle 2018). Since I am 
performing dynamic panel data analysis, I also include lagged dependent variables in 
the right hand side of the equation. my estimation model is as follows:  
ln(VA)it = β0 + β1ln(VA)it-1  + β2 (product market fluidity)it  + β3(platform)it  +   β4(product 
market fluidityit  * platformit  ) + β5ln(capital)it + β6ln(emp)it + β7ln(r&d expenses) + 
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β8ln(advertising expenses) + β9ln(leverage) + β10(firm_size) + (firm fixed effect)i + (year 
fixed effect)t +  εit                                                                                                     (4)                                                                                                                                                                                                     
3.3.4 Identification Strategy  
With observational data in hand, I decided to conduct panel data analysis.  However, this 
method of analysis is subject to endogeneity concerns (Wooldrige, 2005; Aral et al., 2012; 
Nagle, 2018). For example, as discussed earlier, actions taken by a firm to develop their 
product and service portfolio has an indirect effect on the imitation and innovation carried 
out by rival firms which increase the product market fluidity for a firm. Similarly, the firm’s 
capabilities, production inputs, and previous year’s performance, among other things, 
may influence the decision by the firm to include the platform business model as part of 
the business strategy or not. At the same time, increased product market fluidity in itself 
might change the mix of product inputs for a firm, which in turn might affect the value-
added productivity of a firm. Adopting a platform business strategy to negate the effects 
of product market fluidity requires restructuring of organizational resources. Rather than 
utilizing resources for operational efficiency within the firm, the restructuring and 
deployment of resources should focus on attracting platform participants and facilitating 
the transaction between them. This may lead to heterogeneity in the effect of product 
market fluidity and the adoption of the platform business model on the firm’s value-added 
productivity. Any identification strategy needs to address these concerns of endogeneity 
and individual firm-level effects. To address these concerns, I have taken many steps. 
First, to control for unobserved heterogeneity due to time-varying and firm-level 
unobserved effects, I used year and firm fixed effects in my panel data analysis. I used a 
dynamic panel data model for estimation, where the past performance of a firm (captured 
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by lagged value-added productivity) has an effect on the current performance of a firm. 
By adding lagged value-added productivity in the model, we control for the effect of the 
historical performance of a firm, including the historical inputs (past performance is also 
a function of production inputs). However, the past performance of a firm is correlated 
with the current observed and unobserved variables in the model (individual firm effects). 
For example, a firm's decision to invest in research and development may be based on 
its ability to do the same, which will be based on the financial performance of previous 
years. There is also the concern of causal direction: value-added productivity affects the 
choice of the business model, and other parameters or choice of the business model and 
other parameters lead to value-added productivity. To address these concerns of 
endogeneity, I used the Arellano–Bond method (ABOND)  (Arellano and Bond 1991) for 
dynamic panel analysis. In this method, we start by taking first differences of the original 
model. This wipes out any individual-level effects of the firm from the model. However, 
the differenced lagged value-added productivity is still correlated with the differenced 
error term. We use second lagged value-added productivity as an instrumental variable 
for the difference equation to calculate parameter estimates for the model. We used the 
Blundell-Bond (BBOND) method as a robustness check for ABOND method. The 
Blundell–Bond (BBOND) method extends ABOND to create a system estimator that only 
requires a one-period lag for the instruments and reduces a small downward bias that 
occurs in ABOND when the actual value of a coefficient is high. These lagged 
instrumental variable-based methods of analysis are prevalent in addressing endogeneity 
concerns in micro-productivity research (Nagle 2018). To check for the robustness of the 
results, I allowed BBOND (system GMM) estimators to choose the maximum lags (up to 
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6 years) for variables. I also used the two-step method system GMM analysis to check 
the robustness of the model further. Due to the congruency of BBOND estimates with the 
fixed-effect model and smaller standard errors, I interpret BBOND estimates in this study. 
Additional checks, like coarse exact matching, are conducted to verify the robustness of 
my results. 
3.4 RESULTS 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics: Product Market Fluidity, Platform, and Firm Performance 
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
ln(Value-added) 6456 8.22 .41 0 11.5 
Product Market Fluidity 6456 6.52 2.42 .06 22.71 
Platform 6456 .07 .26 0 1 
ln(Capital) 6456 1.05 1.96 0 11.64 
ln(Employee) 6456 1.08 1.17 0 6.08 
ln(R & D Expenses) 6456 5.93 2.98 0 11.52 
ln(Advertising Expenses) 6456 5.66 .18 0 8.3 
ln(Leverage) 6456 .34 .56 0 7.81 
Firm Size 6456 .25 .43 0 1 
 
Table 7 provides the summary statistics for my panel, and Table 8 shows the 
correlation statistics between the variables of interest in my panel. In the year 2017, the 
average revenue of the top 5 non-platform firms is 61.67 billion USD, and that of the top 
5 platform firms is 96.75 billion USD. However. The top 5 platform firms generated 55% 
percent higher revenue compared to non-platform firms with less than half the number of 
employees (74,000 vs. 165,000 employees) and lower cost of goods sold (26 billion USD 
vs. 41 Billion USD), but higher R&D expenses(10 billion USD vs. 7.8 billion USD) and 
higher advertising expenses (2.37 billion USD vs. 847 million USD). The top five platform 
firms by revenue in 2017 were: APPLE INC, ALPHABET INC, MICROSOFT CORP, 
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FACEBOOK INC, PAYPAL HOLDINGS INC. The top five non-platform firms by revenue 
in 2017 were: INTL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP, DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC, INTEL 
CORP, CISCO SYSTEMS INC, ORACLE CORP. These numbers are in line with the 
existing research, which suggests that top platform firms generated better value with less 
overall expenditures. However, to achieve better financial performance, firms need to 
invest heavily in research and development and advertising of the platform (Cusumano 
et al. 2019). As can be seen in the correlation table, product-market fluidity is negatively 
correlated with firm performance, and the platform business model is positively related to 
firm performance. Consistent with the existing literature, I found a positive correlation 
between research and development expenditures and product market fluidity (Kim et al. 
2016). Advertising expenses are also positively correlated with product-market fluidity. 
This correlation is consistent with existing literature as increased market threats require 
investment from the focal firm in both research and advertisement (Kim et al. 2016). In 
line with existing research, the platform business firms have significantly higher 
expenditures on advertising compared to non-platform firms (Cusumano 2020).  
Table 8: Correlation Matrix: Product Market Fluidity, Platform and, Firm Performance 
Variables 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  (1) ln(Value-added) 1         
  (2) Product Market 
       Fluidity 
-0.01 1 
       
  (3) Platform 0.06* -0.03* 1       
  (5) ln(Capital stock) 0.40* -0.15* -0.01 1      
  (6) ln(Employee) 0.83* -0.02 -0.02* 0.41* 1     
  (7) ln(R & D Stock) 0.12* 0.02 -0.12* 0.40* 0.11* 1    
  (8) ln(Advertising stock) 0.50* 0.02 0.24* 0.25* 0.37* 0.12* 1   
  (9) ln(Leverage) -0.04* 0.01 0.05* -0.05* -0.10* -0.17* -0.03* 1  
  (10) Firm Size 0.60* 0.01 -0.01 0.34* 0.78* 0.08* 0.27* -0.06* 1 
*  significance at the 0.05  
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3.4.2 System GMM estimations 
Table 9 represents the fixed effect estimations for the effect of product market fluidity and 
platform business model on firms' performance. Model 1 in Table 9 is the basic production 
function model. Model 2 presents the effect of Product market fluidity on firm performance. 
Model 3 presents the effect of the platform business model on firm performance. Model 
4 presents the main effects of product market fluidity and platform business model on firm 
performance. Model 5 is the interaction model. The same set of models are repeated in 
Table 10 with the system GMM estimator. System GMM models are appropriate for my 
analysis as there is a significant first-order autocorrelation and insignificant second-order 
autocorrelation. I will interpret the full interaction model (Model 5) from Table 10. The 
results in Model 5 suggest that product market fluidity negatively affects the value-added 
productivity of a firm. The average value-added productivity in my sample is 4.4 billion 
USD. The product market fluidity measure is scaled from 0 ~ 20. So, all else being 
constant, for every 5% increase in product market fluidity (increase in product offerings 
from rival firms which are similar to focal firm), value-added productivity is estimated to 
decrease by 0.2 %, 8.8 million USD. The firms engaged in the platform business model 
have 1.9% higher value-added productivity compared to non-platform businesses, which 
on average, equals 64 million USD. Finally, the interaction between product market fluidity 
and platform is positively significant, suggesting platform businesses mitigate the market 
threats better compared to non-platform businesses.  To better understand the main and 
interaction effects, I created marginal plots.  
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Table 9: Fixed Effect Models: Product Market Fluidity, Platform, and Firm Performance 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
Product market fluidity  -0.002**  -0.001** -0.002*** 
    (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Platform   0.118*** 0.117*** 0.061*** 
     (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) 
Product market fluidity X 
Platform 
    0.008*** 
       (0.002) 
Capital stock 0.110*** 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Employees 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.194*** 0.194*** 0.193*** 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
R & D stock 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Advertising Expense 0.333*** 0.332*** 0.321*** 0.320*** 0.327*** 
   (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Leverage -0.004 -0.006 -0.009 -0.010 -0.011 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Firm size -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.052*** 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant 6.029*** 6.051*** 6.092*** 6.110*** 6.071*** 
   (0.095) (0.095) (0.094) (0.094) (0.095) 
Observations 5536 5536 5536 5536 5536 
R-squared 0.830 0.861 0.889 0.898 0.898 
Firm Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Figures 7(a) and 7(b) represent marginal main effects of product market fluidity and 
platform business model. Figure 7(c) represent interaction effects. As per Figure 7(c), 
platform businesses perform better than non-platform business on average. However, 
as product market threats increase, the performance gap widens, with platform 
businesses outperforming non-platform businesses under high market volatility. 
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Table 10: System GMM Estimates: Product Market Fluidity, Platform, and Firm 
Performance 
       1    2    3    4    5 
Product market fluidity  -0.002***  -0.002*** -0.002*** 
    (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Platform   0.051*** 0.051*** 0.019** 
     (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) 
Product market fluidity X 
Platform 
    0.007*** 
       (0.002) 
Capital Stock 0.058*** 0.062*** 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Employees 0.331*** 0.327*** 0.342*** 0.339*** 0.338*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
R & D expenses -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Advertising expenses 0.519*** 0.519*** 0.452*** 0.453*** 0.448*** 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Leverage -0.063*** -0.061*** -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.047*** 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Firm size -0.179*** -0.179*** -0.182*** -0.182*** -0.183*** 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 4.965*** 4.981*** 5.303*** 5.311*** 5.340*** 
   (0.038) (0.038) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) 
Observations 5536 5536 5536 5536 5536 
No. of firms 654 654 654 654 654 
Firm Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Autocorrelation test 
order 1 
-12.80 -12.73*** -12.45*** -12.39*** -12.58*** 
Autocorrelation test 
order 2 
0.19 0.24 -0.16 -0.11 0.05 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Figure 7(a): Product Market 
Fluidity 
Figure 7(b): Platform Business 
Model 
Figure 7(c): Product Market 
Fluidity and Platform Business  
Figure 7:  Marginal Effects of Product Market Fluidity and Platform Business Model on 
Firm Performance 
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3.4.3 Additional Analysis 
Moderating effect of firm size on product-market fluidity and firm performance 
 Relationship 
To further explore the moderation effect of the platform business model on firm 
performance, I conducted further analysis. It is unlikely that all firms will be impacted by 
the adoption of the platform business model similarly (Cusumano et al 2019). Firms that 
are larger and have better preparedness for transitioning to a platform business model 
are likely to perform better under high market fluidity. Larger firms can develop 
necessary complements and services faster than smaller firms and can utilize the 
existing customer and supplier base to develop larger network effects (Rogers 2004), 
which is essential for the success of the platform business model. On the other hand, 
smaller firms are more agile and deliver higher innovation performance compared to 
larger firms (Stock et al. 2002). It has also been observed that some smaller platform 
firms are extremely profitable as they have still not incurred the cost of expanding their 
platform network (Cusumano et al. 2019). To explore this, I interacted firm size with 
platform business model and product market fluidity. I also expanded the portfolio of 
variables representing firm size to build robustness in the analysis. Existing literature 
has used the number of employees as alternative measures of firm size. I created a 
binary variable using the number of employees, with firms in the 75th percentile and 
above in a given year as 1 and 0, otherwise. I ran the interaction analysis with both firm 
size variables. Results are consistent with the main analysis. Firms which are larger and 
adopt a platform business model have better firm performance under high product 
market fluidity than firms which are smaller in size and have a traditional pipe business 
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model. The results are presented in Table 11 below. Model 1 is the base fixed-effect 
model, as presented in Table 9. Model 2 includes the interaction of the sales-based firm 
size variable with the product market fluidity and platform variable. Model 3 adds an 
interaction of the employee based binary firm size variable with the product market 
fluidity and platform variables. All of the models consistently point to the fact that larger 
firms are better in capturing value from the platform business model under high product 
market fluidity compared to smaller firms. The main effect of the platform business 
model is positive but not significant. All models include lagged value-added productivity 
as an explanatory variable, but not shown in the result column. For a better 
interpretation of results, I created marginal plots for Model 2. Figure 8, below, is the 
visual depiction of Model 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Interaction margin plot: Product market fluidity, platform business model and firm 
size. 
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Table 11: Interaction effect model with product market fluidity, platform, and firm size 
Y = Value-added productivity      (1)   (2)   (3) 
Capital stock 0.006* 0.006 0.008** 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Employees 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
R & D expenses 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Advertising expenses 0.016* 0.016* 0.003 
   (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Leverage 0.007 0.004 0.006 
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Platform  0.003 0.004 
    (0.012) (0.011) 
Product market fluidity  -0.001 -0.000 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Product market fluidity X Platform  0.001 0.001 
    (0.002) (0.001) 
Firm size(sales)  0.015**  
    (0.006)  
Product market fluidity x Firm size(sales)  -0.003***  
    (0.001)  
Platform x Firm size(sales)  0.026  
    (0.020)  
Product market fluidity x Platform x Firm 
size(sales) 
 0.006**  
    (0.003)  
Firm size(employees)   0.026*** 
     (0.006) 
Product market fluidity x Firm size(emp)   -0.005*** 
     (0.001) 
Platform x Firm size(emp)   0.012 
     (0.023) 
Product market fluidity x Platform x Firm 
size(emp) 
  0.011*** 
     (0.003) 
Constant 0.715*** 0.868*** 0.964*** 
   (0.066) (0.071) (0.074) 
Observation 5536 5536 5536 
No of Firms 654 654 654 
R-squared 0.874 0.876 0.877 
Firm Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Effect Yes  Yes  Yes 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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As can be seen in the graph above, for non-platform businesses, the value-
added productivity of larger firms declines with the increase in product market fluidity. 
Smaller non-platform firms are indifferent in their performance under increased 
product market fluidity, resulting in higher marginal performance compared to bigger 
non-platform businesses. On the other hand, the average platform business's 
performance is consistently better than that of the non-platform business, even under 
higher product market fluidity. The average performance difference between platform 
and non-platform business increases with increasing product market fluidity. However, 
contrary to the trend in non-platform businesses, bigger platform businesses perform 
better than smaller platform businesses, with the performance gap widening with 
increasing fluidity. Larger firms with platform business models improve their value-
added productivity under higher product competition. 
Moderating effect of firm maturity on product market fluidity and firm performance 
Relationship 
Firm maturity, as measured by firm age, has a dichotomous influence on a firm’s 
performance. Mature firms tend to be more stable and absorb uncertainty in the markets 
better than newer firms (Bulan and Yan 2010). Older firms tend to be more diverse in the 
product portfolio, which also leads to stable performance during the aggressive market 
competition (Habib et al. 2013). If a firm's maturity influence the stability of a firm in the 
market, firm maturity should moderate the effect of high market fluidity on firm 
performance. At the same time, older firms are also less likely to adopt radical innovation 
initiatives, and they grow significantly slower than younger firms. This phenomenon is 
especially true for firms engaged in the technical domain (Balasubramanian and Lee 
2008). Younger firms also generate higher value from their R&D investment, even though 
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the R&D investments of younger firms may be riskier than those of mature firms (Coad et 
al. 2016). A likely outcome of this reluctance to innovate may be an unsuccessful attempt 
at transitioning to a platform business model from the traditional business model. A 
mature firm is apt at transitioning the technological structure of the firm but finds it difficult 
to change the inorganic organizational structure of the firm. 
To explore the effect of firm maturity on firm performance under high market fluidity and 
platform business model strategy, I ran the fixed effect interaction model, with firm 
maturity as a moderating variable. I did not find any significant interaction of firm maturity 
with product market fluidity or platform in influencing firms’ performance. The results are 
presented in Appendix B. 
3.4.4 Robust Analysis 
I conducted three main robustness analyses to validate my analysis further. First, I used 
a Naïve-Bayes algorithm to classify a business as a platform or a non-platform business 
model. While my classification is highly accurate, it is prone to measurement error. So, 
I ran the main effect OLS model using hand-coded firms only. To be consistent with the 
existing specification, I used lagged value-added productivity as an explanatory variable 
in the model. I have a total of 934 hand-coded firm-years in my dataset. With lagged 
value-added variable as an explanatory variable, 775 firm –year’s observations are 
available for this analysis. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 12. I used 
all production input variables for the analysis. Model 1 is the base model. Model 2 and 
Model 3 includes product market fluidity and platform variables, respectively. Model 4 
includes both product market fluidity and platform in the model. In Model 5, I included a 
one-way time fixed effect. The results are consistent with the main analysis. 
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Table 12: OLS regression: hand-coded platform business model 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
Product market fluidity  -0.002*  -0.002* -0.000* 
    (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) 
Platform (hand_coded)   0.092*** 0.091*** 0.082*** 
     (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Capital Stock 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 
   (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Employees 0.389*** 0.389*** 0.399*** 0.398*** 0.399*** 
   (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
R & D Expenses 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Advertising Expenses 0.445*** 0.447*** 0.402*** 0.403*** 0.404*** 
   (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
Leverage -0.027 -0.027 -0.024 -0.025 -0.046 
   (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) 
Firm size -0.327*** -0.327*** -0.334*** -0.334*** -0.327*** 
   (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Year     0.004** 
       (0.002) 
Constant 5.180*** 5.184*** 5.390*** 5.394*** -3.502 
   (0.145) (0.145) (0.155) (0.155) (3.926) 
Observation 775 775 775 775 775 
R-squared 0.897 0.897 0.898 0.898 0.899 
Year Effect         Yes 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Secondly, I conducted coarse exact matching (CEM) based main effect analysis. 
Using one to one matching, I matched adopters of the platform business model with non-
adopters. This analysis loses power due to the dropping of observations, but it allows for 
causal inference without requiring balanced checking (lacus et al. 2012).  While the CEM 
method assumes that there is no omitted variable bias and no confounding, it removes 
any heterogeneity bias, and it has less model dependence (lacus et al. 2012). The main 
effect results are available in Table 13, Model 1. The results are consistent, with product 
market fluidity negatively effecting the firm performance and platform business models 
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have higher firm performance compared to non-platform business models. Additionally, I 
conducted inverse-probability weighting (IPW) based OLS regression for main effect 
analysis (Horvitz and Thompson 1952; Wooldridge 2002, 2007). The IPW procedure 
helps to control for endogenous selection by weighting firms based on their likelihood of 
adopting a platform business model, improving the balance in the sample such that the 
coefficient can be interpreted in a more causal manner (Hirano et al. 2003, Huber 2013, 
Nagle 2018). It also does not suffer from the reduced sample size as does the CEM 
estimator. However, the assumption is that the choice of business model is dependent 
solely on the covariates in the model and independent of the potential outcomes. The 
results are presented in Table 14 below. The results are consistent with the CEM analysis 
and main results. 
Table 13: CEM and IPW OLS regression 
      CEM IPW_OLS 
Product market fluidity -0.010*** -0.010*** 
   (0.003) (0.006) 
Platform 0.043*** 0.043** 
   (0.015) (0.017) 
Capital Stock 0.106*** 0.305*** 
   (0.027) (0.037) 
Employees 0.343*** 0.265*** 
   (0.035) (0.050) 
R&D Stock -0.009*** -0.010** 
   (0.002) (0.003) 
Leverage -0.035 0.042** 
   (0.040) (0.064) 
Firm size -0.286*** -0.150*** 
   (0.047) (0.009) 
Constant 7.946*** 6.275*** 
   (0.049) (0.037) 
Observations 630 6013 
R-squared  0.798  
Standard errors are in parenthesis   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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To address the issue of possible reverse-causality, I conducted a fixed-effect analysis 
with the lead platform business model variable as the dependent variable and value-
added productivity as an independent variable. While I took necessary measures and 
deployed appropriate estimation models to show that platform business model adoption 
leads to better firm performance, it is likely that the reverse can also be true. Due to the 
temporal effect of firm performance on its business strategy, a firm with better financial 
performance may likely decide to include a platform business model as part of its business 
strategy. The results of my analysis are presented in Table 14 below. The likelihood of 
adopting a platform business model as a business strategy is not significantly different 
between high performing and low performing firms. Similarly, I also did not find any 
association between current product market fluidity and future adoption of the platform 
business model. 
Table 14: Fixed-effect reverse causality results 
      (1) 
       Platform (lead) 
Value-added Productivity -0.292 (2.751) 
Product market fluidity -0.099 (0.161) 
Capital stock -0.040 (0.615) 
Employees -1.668 (1.039) 
R & D expenses -0.333** (0.147) 
Advertising expenses  12.241*** (3.106) 
Leverage -3.094 (2.527) 
Firm size  1.404 (1.374) 
Constant -79.092*** (19.346) 
    
Chi-square 5.328*** (0.115) 
Observations 5536 
No of firms 654 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In our dataset, more than 50% of the firms have missing advertising expense data. Hence 
it is highly likely that the advertising stock is not reflecting the actual effect on a firm's 
performance. To address this issue, we ran two additional models. In first, we excluded 
all the firms with missing data and ran the model with current advertising expenditure 
(deflated to 2012-dollar value). In the second model, I removed the advertising stock 
variable and ran the model without it. Results for the effect of product market fluidity and 
platform business model on firm performance are still consistent with the main analysis. 
The results of these models are updated in Appendix B 
3.5 DISCUSSION 
 
Drawing upon the text-based measure of competitive market threats, product-
market fluidity, developed by Hoberg et al. 2014, I argue that a firm’s performance is 
diminished with increasing market threats. The diminishing financial returns might be 
an unavoidable situation for many firms operating in the high technology industries like 
digital goods, where innovation and imitation play a central role in the evolution of the 
industry. I further tested the role of platform business model in moderating the effect of 
product market fluidity on firm performance. In this essay I used a text-based measure 
for measuring the involvement of a firm in the platform business using a Naïve-Bayes 
text classification model. I found out that including platform business as part of the 
overall business model helps negate the effects of product market threats. Additionally, 
this effect is stronger for larger firms compared to smaller firms. 
Summary of Contributions 
 My research establishes the relationship between product market threats 
(product-market fluidity) and firm performance. In this research I account for temporal 
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variations of market competition and how they influence a firm’s performance, using 
text-based market competitiveness measures. Among other things, the extant research 
has looked into the effect of evolving product market threats on a firm’s payout policy, 
its financial flexibility, cash holdings, innovation, stock crash risk and on analyst forecast 
precision (Hoberg et al. 2014, Li and Zhan 2018, Mattei and Platikanova 2017, Lyandres 
and Palazzo 2016). Researchers have also looked at how market competition 
influences managerial compensation, corporate venture capital investment decisions, 
research and development expenses, advertisement effectiveness, and organizational 
governance (Kim et al. 2016, Chattopadhyay et al. 2001, Ghosh and Stock 2010, 
Subramaniyam 2013). However, understanding the influence of evolving market 
competition on firm performance allows firms to be better prepared with appropriate 
business strategies to mitigate the negative effects of the ever-evolving competition 
landscape. 
Using text-based measure of platform business model, I found out that platform 
businesses not only do better compared to non-platform business, but the performance 
gaps also widen with the increase in product market fluidity. As identified in the 
conceptual development section, the strength of platform businesses lies in the two-
sided network effect they can generate through their platform. Firms can utilize this 
network further to strengthen the performance within a product market or expand to 
related and unrelated product markets. Firms find ways of generating value by selling 
complementarities and services — competition shifts from product to the platform. The 
most valuable asset in the firm’s value chain is not the product but the producers and 
consumers of the platform. The shift in value-proposition leads to the development of a 
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different kind of competitive strength, which is not affected by high product market 
fluidity. With this result, I recommend that firms find ways to include a platform business 
strategy as part of their overall business model. Some firms have already started 
moving in that direction. Early adopters like Amazon Inc., and Apple Inc. started shifting 
towards a platform model as the core element of their overall business model in the 
early 2000s. Firms are continuously investigating ways to make the platform part of their 
core business strategy. In 2019, 50 large corporations like Allianz, Booking Inc, 
Deutsche Bank, GE, Henkel, and Huawei participated in the World Economic Forum’s 
Digital Platforms & Ecosystems executive working group to discuss future of the digital 
world and ways to leverage the digital platform and ecosystem models (Schenker 2019). 
Limitations and Future Research 
This essay provides insight into the relationship between product market fluidity, 
the platform business, and firm performance. However, some limitations of this research 
provide opportunities for future research. While I looked at the importance of platform 
business strategy in mitigating the effect of product market fluidity, I was not able to 
unfold the within-platform competition dynamics. What if all the firms in a product space 
are platform businesses? What endogenous qualities of a platform help in successfully 
competing with rival platform business under high product market threats? As more and 
more firms opt for a platform strategy as part of their overall business model, the 
research focus should shift to inter-platform dynamics under a competitive environment.  
Additionally, not all platform business models are constructed in the same way. Some 
platform businesses are based on innovation platforms where the development of 
products and services, transaction, and delivery occurs on the platform itself. Other 
platform businesses can be only transactional platforms where delivery is physical, and 
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the platform is limited to transactions between the parties (Cusukmano, 2020). For 
example, Airbnb and Uber are transactional platforms, whereas Apple and Google Inc 
have innovation platforms. In innovation platforms, digital goods are developed on the 
platform and transacted to the consumer. This allows for greater control of the platform 
owner on the platform and the transactions, allowing for increasing returns with increasing 
size of the platform network (Yoffie et al., 2019). Similarly, not all firms are pure platform 
firms. Most existing firms adopt the platform business model as part of their overall 
business model resulting in a hybrid business model (Van Alystyne and Parker, 2016). 
Future research may look into how different firms generate value by including the platform 
business model as part of their overall strategy. Finally, variables like advertising stock 
might affect the success of the platform business model, and may not have been 
sufficiently explored in this essay due to the limited availability of data from COMPUSTAT. 
Future research might look into extracting these variables directly from 10-K annual 
reports and explore their relevance in the success of the platform business model 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
As high technology firms continue to embrace the effects of the fast-changing 
competitive landscape, there is a need to revisit some of the propositions of early 
innovation research. The product innovation cycles are getting shorter, and the 
opportunity to appropriate value from the product fermentation phase is limited. In the 
digital landscape, firms cannot escape the effects of innovation and imitation by rival 
firms. Firms need to find new mechanisms to sustain growth and capture value when 
the competitive landscape is dynamic.  
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 We need future research to focus on the business strategies and their elements, 
which can help firms navigate through evolving competitive threats. This research is an 
effort to explore one such business strategy and its impact on firm performance under 
high product market fluidity. With this research I add to the existing literature on platform 
business models and competitive threats by exploring their impact on firm performance. 
I expect future research to investigate other strategies at the micro-level and add other 
dimensions of business strategies to the research literature. 
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4 Essay 3: Open Innovation, Absorptive Capacity, and Firm Performance. 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In his famous 1997 article, “The Cathedral and the Bazaar,”  Eric Raymond coined the 
term “Cathedral” model of software development to represent a closed sourced, 
hierarchical and proprietary model of software development by firms, and “Bazaar” for the 
open-source, free and equality based software development model by communities 
(Raymond 1997). According to early research in open innovation, the two models of 
software development are incongruent, and different motives drive them. The Cathedral 
model of development is extrinsically motivated, profit-driven, and competence-
enhancing. The Bazaar model of software development is intrinsically motivated, 
community-driven, and competence-destroying. The debate is still open about the role of 
open innovation as part of the innovation strategy of a firm. The jury is still out on how 
different internal and external drivers of open innovation like absorptive capacitive of the 
firm and network effects influence the value capture from an open innovation strategy 
(West et al., 2014; West and Bogers, 2016; Bogers et al., 2017) However, in the last 
decade, some for-profit firms have started co-adopting open innovation as a method of 
innovation and product development. For example, during my exploration of open-source 
social coding platform GitHub, I found that 41 of the top 100 firms by market capitalization, 
have established firm-level presence on the platform with multiple open-source projects 
under development. It is in stark contrast with the position most for-profit firms took during 
the early days of open-source project development. In 2001, Steve Ballmer, ex-CEO of 
Microsoft Corporation, who said, "Linux is [a] cancer that attaches itself in an intellectual 
property sense to everything it touches"(Greene, 2001).  In general, exploring the external 
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sources of innovation and opening the internal innovation to the external world is seen as 
a riskier proposition, the one marked with barriers. For example, one survey of European 
SMEs and large enterprises, undertaken in 2008, found that the risk of loss of knowledge, 
higher coordination costs, loss of control, and higher complexity as frequent risks 
connected to open innovation activities. Additionally, it also appeared in the same survey 
that open innovation activities also face internal and external barriers, such as the 
difficulty in finding the right partner, imbalance between open innovation activities and 
daily business, and insufficient time and financial resources for open innovation activities 
(Enkel et al. 2009).  
Even with the established risks and barriers, firms engage with open innovation 
communities to filter and acquire external sources of innovations by either allowing its 
employees to engage with the communities or sponsoring the communities in return for 
improvement to their products (West et al. 2014). For example, Under the same Steve 
Ballmer, who called Linux cancer, Microsoft started open sourcing their .NET framework 
in 2011, and in 2016 he said, “I may have called Linux cancer, but now I love it”(Tung, 
2016). As of today, Microsoft is not only developing more than 2000 software projects on 
GitHub; it has joined the Open-source Innovation Network (OIN) in 2018 and opened 
60,000 of its patents to support Linux development and protect it from litigation (Khan, 
2018).  
However, our understanding of its impact on a firm’s financial performance is 
limited. Advancement in open-source innovation research is encouraging with empirical 
studies on supply-side user engagement in open-source development (Ho and Rai 2017) 
and demand-side strategies firms employ in competing scenarios, including the 
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deployment of open-source systems (Nagle 2018). For example, on the supply side, it 
has been observed that the sponsorship of projects and licensing regiment influences 
user’s engagement in open-source projects (Stewart et al. 2006, August et al. 2017). 
Other studies examined the effect of licensing, collaborative norms, and open-source 
identity on user engagement and software projects. Another set of studies investigated 
user engagement in open-source projects in the context of social network embeddedness 
and team diversity (Grewal et al. 2006, Singh et al. 2011, Daniel et al. 2013). On the 
demand side, researchers developed analytical models to understand firms’ business 
strategy under different business models: proprietary, open, and hybrid (Economides and 
Katsamakas 2006, Kumar et al. 2011). For example, it has been observed that when a 
firm’s software product is of high (low) quality, the firm is more open when it is 
incompatible (compatible) with open-source competitor than under a compatibility 
(incompatibility) condition (Casadesus-Masanell and Llanes 2011). The open-source 
innovation has moved from the domain of non-commercial community-based 
development to a collaborative private-collective model of development, which requires 
further understanding of a firm’s engagement in open-source communities and its direct 
impact on their performance. 
Another aspect of open-source engagement that I study in this essay is the direct 
engagement of a firm in open-source communities. Rather than employee-based or 
sponsorship-based participation in the open-source communities, for-profit firms have 
started engaging on open-source social coding platform directly. Firms are actively 
developing their projects, also known as repositories, on these platforms with involvement 
from voluntary contributors. Figure 9 shows the number of repositories currently hosted 
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by the top 20 for-profit firms on GitHub. As observed in the literature, a firm’s choice of 
opening up innovation is not a binary choice. There are trade-offs in terms of revenue 
models and a shift in competence enhancing assets. Our current understanding of the 
impact of this mode of open-source engagement on a for-profit firm’s financial 
performance is limited. One exception to this is a study by Nagle, which showed that 
open-source operating systems as input to production activities significantly increase the 
overall firm performance (Nagle 2018). A firm’s direct engagement in the development of 
open-source projects creates additional strategic decision choices that I investigated in 
this essay. Specifically, at the firm level, 1) does engagement on an open-source 
development platform improve a firm’s financial performance? 2). How does increasing a 
firm’s presence on open-source development platforms affect the firm’s performance?  3). 
Does a firm’s size and absorptive capacity, defined by the research and development 
capability, change the benefits achieved from open-source innovation?  4). How does the 
market competitiveness and industry concentration moderate the effect of open-source 
innovation on a firm’s financial performance?  
 To answer these research questions, I developed a panel dataset by identifying a 
firm’s active involvement in open-source innovation. Active participation of a firm in open-
source innovation is determined based on a firm's explanation of its open-source 
innovation strategy in 10-K reports, annual reports, firm’s organization of open-source 
initiatives for idea generation like code schools and hackathons, and its direct presence 
on social coding platforms like GitHub. GitHub is especially crucial as most for-profit firms 
with even a basic open-source innovation strategy have a direct presence on GitHub.  
GitHub, as a distributed social coding platform, started in 2009, and first firm-level 
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engagement began in 2010. My primary outcome financial performance measure is 
value-added productivity. My result suggests that, on average, there is a significant 
difference in the value-added productivity between firms that engaged on the open-source 
platform and firms which do not participate on the open-source platform. I estimated this 
effect using GSynth method, which is an appropriate estimation model for matching and 
estimating treatment effect in an unbalanced panel data setting. For firms that engage on 
a social coding platform, the positive impact of open-source innovation gets alleviated 
with an increase in the number of projects developed on the social coding platform. I 
estimated this effect using a dynamic panel data model analysis. Finally, I estimated the 
heterogeneous effect of open-source innovation on a firm’s performance based on firm 
and market attributes using a causal random forest estimation method. I conducted 
various robustness checks to improve confidence in the results. 
With this research, I seek to advance the current literature on firm’s mechanism of 
acquisition and commercialization of open-source, in three ways: First, by capturing the 
firm-level open-source activities based on 10-K reports based classification, extensive 
web search, and GitHub presence, I provide another way of measuring a firm’s 
engagement with an open-source ecosystem. This will advance the open-source 
Figure 10: For-Profit Firms with Most Number of Projects on GitHub i ure 9: Top 20 for profit firms by GitHub engagement 
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innovation literature with emphasis on open-source development in the context of for-
profit firms. Secondly, I model and analyze the effect of firm-level open-source 
engagement on its financial performance. I capture multiple measures of firm-level 
engagement on the GitHub platform and estimate their impact on the financial outcome 
of the focal firms. With this study, I aim to contribute to production economics in general 
and economics of IS research in particular.  Finally, I also explore heterogeneity in the 
effect of open-source innovation on firm performance based on firm and competition 
attributes, advancing the research on IT and business strategy to provide guidelines 
around open-source innovation strategy. 
4.2 CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
Traditionally, for-profit firms have been reluctant to embrace the open sourcing of 
software movement, which began in the early 1990s. The reluctance was mostly born 
out of the fact that in a disconnected technological ecosystem, free revealing of source 
code diminished private profits and limited the returns to research and development 
investment.  
The earliest discussion on open-source innovation model as a private-collective 
model started in 2003. Researchers proposed that firms can benefit from selective 
engagement with open-source ecosystems for faster diffusion of innovation, and firms 
can harness innovation-related profits through network effect (von Hippel and Krogh 
2003). Early research focused on two types of scenarios: one in which firms co-exist 
with open-source competitors (Bonaccorsi and Rossi 2003, Mustonen 2003) and 
second where firms develop a profitable relationship with open-source communities by 
contributing back to open-source communities and embedding open-source code in the 
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product development process (Grand et al. 2004, Dahlander and Magnusson 2006). 
Researchers also observed that technology platforms mediate the competition between 
different software regimes (Cusumano and Gawer 2002, West 2003).  For example, in 
a two-sided platform, when the platform is proprietary, equilibrium prices for the platform, 
the applications, and fee for application access may vary below marginal cost. Whereas, 
when proprietary software is based on an open-source platform, the application sector 
of the industry may be more profitable than the total profits of a proprietary platform 
industry (Economides and Katsamakas 2006). Most of this early research on firm-open-
source nexus were simulations or case studies based on open-source innovation as an 
inbound knowledge source for commercial firms.  
In later years we saw a strategic movement by established for-profit firms to 
sponsor open-source projects, releasing software under open-source licensing and 
encouraging their employees to engage with open-source communities, resulting in 
opening up of the outbound knowledge transfer pathways. Firms started engaging with 
open-source communities and considered them as a viable part of their extensive 
research and development capacity. Firms started sharing their non-differentiating 
design artifacts with open-source communities under common licensing agreements 
through standard-setting organizations (Germonprez et al. 2017). It is was observed 
that firms with a large set of software patents and trademarks are more likely to release 
source code under open-source licenses (Fosfuri et al. 2008). Opening up software 
source code by big firms also induces other firms to introduce open-source software 
and increase the cumulativeness of innovation in the market (Wen et al. 2016). Firms 
contributing to software development of open-source communities via their employees 
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also generate more productive value from such engagement compared to their free-
riding peers by learning through the development process (Nagle 2018b). To achieve 
these productivity benefits firms should deploy specific employee policies and 
incentives which enhance employees’ careers and achieve desirable firm goals (Mehra 
et al. 2011). Employees who engage in open-source communities independent of their 
firm are also more likely to earn higher wages in the future compared to other employees 
(Hann et al. 2013). 
In recent years we observed a new model of engagement by firms with open-source 
communities, which involves both releasing source code on open coding platforms like 
GitHub and also developing projects collaboratively with external developers. Firms are 
also disclosing their open-source involvement to the stakeholders. For example, the 2018 
10-K annual report of Microsoft Inc. states that “At times, we make select intellectual 
property broadly available at no or low cost to achieve a strategic objective, such as 
promoting industry standards, advancing interoperability, or attracting and enabling our 
external development community. Our increasing engagement with open source software 
will also cause us to license our intellectual property rights broadly in certain situations” 
(Microsoft, 2018, p. 11). After reading some more annual reports of high technology firms, 
it was clear to me that firms are not hesitant to develop and disclose innovation on open-
source platforms, which can be of material importance to the business. For example, in 
the 2018 annual report, Facebook Inc. stated: “As a result of our open-source 
contributions and the use of open source in our products, we may license or be required 
to license or disclose code and/or innovations that turn out to be material to our business” 
(Facebook, 2018, p. 23).  Firms are continuously adapting and evolving their open-source 
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innovation strategy using organic and inorganic growth paths. IBM Inc. acquired the 
biggest commercial open-source operating platform Redhat Inc. in 2018. It is also the 
founder partner of call for code, a global initiative that works with software developers to 
create solutions that can help save lives3. In the year 2018, almost 100,000 developers 
responded to the call, creating more than 2,500 applications to help communities recover 
from natural disasters4. Similarly, Alphabet Inc. has organized annual hackathons starting 
in 2012 to develop application programming interfaces with open communities 
collaboratively (Mitchell, 2012). This style of engagement and openings about open-
source innovation strategy may be superior to the other ways of engagement with open-
source communities. Rather than sponsoring projects for other communities, firms have 
started directly developing their source code on social coding platforms. Employees get 
an opportunity to work in the open-source environment deployed by their firms. This mode 
of engagement addresses both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation employees may have 
with regards to developing code for open-source projects. Figure 12 depicts an official 
homepage for Facebook Inc. on the GitHub social coding platform. Facebook is 
developing more than 157 projects, including REACT, the most widely adopted user 
interface library, on GitHub. 
 
 
 
 
3 https://callforcode.org/ 
4 https://www.ibm.com/annualreport/assets/downloads/IBM_Annual_Report_2018.pdf 
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In particular, I will explore deeper into a firm's engagement with open-source 
platforms in developing software code collaboratively and its effect on the firm’s 
performance. Apart from the advantages already mentioned for any kind of open-source 
innovation engagement, like innovation propagation, network externalities, and revenue 
generation from complementariness and services, there are additional reasons why firms 
should engage directly on open-source engagement platforms. While sponsoring external 
open-source initiatives may have some benefits, the challenges arising from ideological 
and licensing misfits may negate those benefits. Developers who believe in open-source 
ideology in the purest form are less enthusiastic in contributing to the projects which are 
sponsored by for-profit commercial firms compared to projects sponsored by non-profit 
firms (Stewart et al. 2006). Ideological misfitting can also hurt the overall productivity of 
employees in the organization if employees are independently contributing to the OSS 
community (Daniel et al. 2018). Also, while opening source code may increase the 
Figure 11: Facebook Homepage on GitHub 
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adoption of software, it may not bring the necessary learning and engagement for future 
development. 
Competing firms have started establishing firm-level presence on social coding 
platform with multiple projects developed on these platforms. These initiatives put 
downward pressure on other firms to follow suit. Competing firms gain a larger market 
share by opening up their technology by attracting free riders to use the technology away 
from proprietary, costly technologies. This increase in free-riders not only improves the 
market share; it reduces the average cost of development due to economies of scale 
(Gambardella and von Hippel 2019). Competing and non-competing institutions that have 
established open-source repositories are closing down on commercial use of their open 
software by other firms. For example, Facebook Inc. has modified its license for the 
REACT framework to avoid any counter-litigation and restricting future competitors to use 
the software commercially without licensing agreement (Kriplani 2017). Due to the 
emergence of cloud-based technologies, it is easier to identify commercial use of a firm’s 
open-source software, enabling firms to restrict the use of technology by competitors. 
Amazon, for example, sells a cloud-hosted service based on the popular open-source 
database Redis, which competes with a similar cloud-hosted service offered by Redis 
Labs, the sponsor of the open-source project (Finely 2019). I expect these types of 
restrictions to get deeper in the future, where firms continue to develop software on open-
source platforms for the public good and faster adoption but restrict competitors from 
using it without appropriate licensing contracts. 
Traditional engagement with open-source communities was limited to either 
acquiring knowledge from these communities or acquiring open-source expertise from 
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the marketplace. This off the shelf procurement of software has its limitations. First, the 
search cost related to the identification of such opportunities diminishes the returns from 
the possible engagements (Laursen and Salter 2006). Similarly, acquiring external 
products from the marketplace may lead to a longer learning curve compared to the 
systems developed by firms as the underlying structures required to absorb the external 
source of innovation may not be available within the organization. Since most of the value 
creation and capture in open-source innovation happens through complementary 
products and services, it is easier to create these products and services when the 
software is openly developed by the focal firm. The knowledge acquired through the 
development process prepares the firm to create high-quality complementariness and 
deliver quality services (Dahlander and Gann 2010). Establishing an open-source 
portfolio is also seen to be positive in terms of corporate branding so much so that it is 
argued that “Open-source represents a final phase in the evolution of corporate brands 
from closed to open brands” (Pitt et al. 2006). Direct open-source engagement also 
provides the opportunity not only to identify talented developers but train them through 
the development cycle on open-source platforms. Firms get a fair assessment of 
individuals while collaborating with them on projects before formally recruiting them 
(Linksvayer 2018). 
However, there are reasons why for-profit firms are still reluctant adopters of open 
innovation. First, firms that are engaging in open innovation for new ideas tend to incur 
considerable search and transaction costs without fully knowing the quality and the fit of 
outputs with their organization goals (Keupp and Gassman, 2009; Borgers et al. 2018). 
This high transaction cost is also identified in a survey as one of the biggest hindrances 
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for firms that want to engage in open source innovation (Enkel et al. 2019). While opening 
up the technology and co-developing it with open innovation communities enables faster 
propagation of the technology, increasing the market share through technology 
propagation comes with the risk of sharing the intellectual property rights of the 
technology with co-developers and free riders (Gan and Stern, 2003; Chesbrough, 2006). 
Younger firms are more at risk in collaborating with open innovation communities as they 
are prone to arm twisting by larger firms (Shane, 2003). For example, Elastic Inc. (a start-
up from the Netherlands) developed ElasticSearch (used to search and analyze data) as 
an open-source tool. Amazon Inc. copied the tool for its cloud service commercial use, 
and Elastic Inc. is still fighting for the trademark with no success (Wakabayashi, 2019). 
Similar to platform business model adoption, firms adopting open innovation, as part of 
their overall innovation strategy, need to restructure the organization in a way that makes 
it receptive to external sources of knowledge. The flexibility in organizational structure 
can be achieved by developing absorptive capacity, services, and complementarities 
around the openly developed products (Alexy et al., 2013; Salter et al. 2014; West et al. 
2014). Absorptive capacity is difficult to develop if employees of the firm refuse to 
integrate the novel external ideas and solutions and stick with the inferior homegrown 
solution (also known as a not-invented-here syndrome) (Hannen et al. 2019). Firms also 
need to decide about governance structure when collaborating and resourcing knowledge 
from open innovation communities (Shaikh and Henfridsson, 2017). Members of open 
innovation communities desire to share authority in the development process, which 
includes shared decision making, open communication, democratic design decisions, and 
sharing in the intellectual property of the developed product (shah 2006; O’Mahony and 
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Ferraro; 2007). The open collaborators likely share a different trajectory for openly 
developed products that limit the value-generation opportunities for the focal firm (Almirall 
and Casadesus-Masanell, 2010). The development complexity and limited 
financial/technical resources available with firms are some of the challenges identified by 
practitioners and researchers in adopting open innovation as part of innovation strategy 
(Enkel et al. 2009). Even if firms can establish meaningful engagement with open 
innovation communities, value capture from the products developed is difficult. Value from 
openly developed products cannot be captured like closed and proprietary products. 
Firms mostly benefit from giving away the openly developed product for free and charging 
for the related services and complementarity. Some of the successful business models 
based on openly developed products are RedHat, Cloudera, Hortonworks, and MongoDB 
(Asay 2018). However, to achieve any meaningful value from openly developed products, 
firms need to wait for the development of large enough network of users (and sometime 
complementors) (Ozam, 2011). In the absence of any other innovation strategy, this can 
be a slow path to the growth and development of the firm. 
In light of these contrasting observations, I decided to investigate the effect of open-
source innovation on the performance of a firm. I first identified firms that are involved in 
open-source innovation by capturing data from three different sources: GitHub, 10-K 
annual reports, and online web search. I investigated the main effect of a firm’s 
involvement in open-source communities on its performance. Additionally, I examined 
how the increased intensity of commitment affects firm performance. Finally, I inspected 
heterogeneity in the effect of open-source innovation on a firm’s performance. This study 
is relevant for both researchers as well as practitioners. From the researcher’s 
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perspectives, in general, there is a dearth of studies that assessed the impact of any 
open-source innovation engagement on firms’ financial performance. In particular, direct 
engagement of firms on open-source platforms is a new paradigm that requires further 
investigation and understanding from researchers about its implications on a firm’s 
performance. Researchers have also theorized that a firm's absorptive capacity in terms 
of research and development expenditures and capital investment may have a significant 
role to play in maximizing value captured from open innovation (King and Lakhani, 2011; 
West et al. 2014, Flor et al., 2018). In this essay, I also investigate if the absorptive 
capacity of a firm plays a role in value captured from open innovation. Figure 16 
represents the base model of the investigation. If the direct engagement of firms’ open-
source platforms are the future of the open-source movement in for-profit firms, then we 
need to have a better understanding of strategic choices a firm should make to maximize 
its financial success. With competitors quickly setting up shops on open-source platforms 
and a renewed focus on the viability of open-source software-based business models 
(Mark 2019), this research aims to provide insight into the feasibility of open-source 
engagement in terms of financial performance. I explain my data, estimation strategy, and 
results in the next sections, followed by the discussion and implication of my results. 
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4.3 EMPIRICAL METHOD AND DATA 
 
4.3.1 Data and variables 
 
For my analysis, I captured data from multiple sources in a multi-stage process. First, 
from COMPUSTAT, I identified all firms which were active in the last 20 years and listed 
under the technology and related services sector.  For this I identified 16 NAICS-5 level 
classification firms (519130, 511210, 518210, 334413, 334220, 541512, 334511, 541519, 
423430, 334210, 517110,334111, 334112, 541511, 334118, and 517919). At a two-digit 
level, this classification shrinks to 4 codes (33, 42, 51, and 54). From this list of firms, I 
removed firms that are listed as duplicates, missing sales data, and ADRs. I only 
considered firms with data in US dollars for my analysis. This sampling strategy resulted 
Figure 12: Research Model: Open Innovation, Absorptive Capacity and Firm Performance. 
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in 1199 firms. I then captured financial data for all these firms from COMPUSTAT. I also 
extracted these firms’ 10-K annual reports from the EDGAR online database. I parsed 
these reports and created a database of Item 1 (Business description) from these reports. 
Then all those firms were searched on Google to check for their involvement in open-
source development, including on platforms like GitHub, Gitlab, and bitbucket.  I found 
291 firms on these platforms out of 1199 firms identified in the first phase. All these firms 
are developing their open-source projects on the GitHub platform. Next, I used the GitHub 
API to collect firm-level engagement data, including the number of projects, project 
registration date, and firm registration date. The first registered firm and project occurred 
in the year 2010. I also searched for reports about firms conducting hackathons, summer 
code schools, and other open innovation challenges. The details about the development 
of the variables are as follows:  
Dependent Variable 
Value-added productivity (l_VA_bryn): Value-added productivity as a measure of 
financial performance is used extensively in microeconomic research (Nagle 2018, 
Brynjolffson and Hitt 2003). I measured it as deflated sales minus deflated materials. The 
same procedure calculates Value-added productivity as in Essay 2 of the dissertation. 
 
Main Independent Variables 
Open-source Engagement (post): Open-source engagement is a binary variable. This 
variable captures whether a firm has engaged in open-source development or not. I 
developed this variable through the following three-stage process: 
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a. GitHub Extraction: For all the firms in my sample, I did an extensive search of 
its involvement in open-source development, mainly on the GitHub platform. I labeled all 
firms that are directly developing open-source projects on the GitHub platform in any 
given year as 1. For the rest of the firms, I actively searched for their involvement in open-
source innovation. For firms where I did not find any evidence of open-source innovation, 
I marked them as 0.  
b. 10-K report based classification: Using GitHub observations and a Google 
search, I labeled 1000 firm-year 10-K reports as open-source, indicating that the firm is 
involved in open-source innovation in a given year and few others as non-open. I ran the 
Naïve-Bayes classification algorithm to train a classification model to predict the 
involvement of a firm in open-source innovation based on the business description on the 
10-K reports. The model achieved over 99% accuracy on the testing dataset. The details 
of the Naïve-Bayes analysis and results are available in Appendix C. I also compared the 
outcome of the Naïve-Bayes algorithm with the SVM classification algorithm. The results 
were qualitatively similar, but the results of the Naïve-Bayes algorithm with cross-
validation and Laplace transformation were quantitatively better than SVM or any other 
variation of the Naïve-Bayes. Then I classified the rest of the firm-years in my dataset as 
open or non-open based on the predictor.  
c. Hackathons and summer schools of coding: Researchers have previously 
highlighted the importance of innovation contests like hackathons, as a tool of open 
innovation, in ideation, and multi-agent problem solving (Terweisch & Xu 2008). I 
conducted an Internet search to identify firms which held hackathons or summer schools 
of coding to help with ideation of product development. my observation suggests that 
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open innovation contests are the extension of a firm's overall open innovation strategy 
and the only subset of firms previously identified as engaged in open-source innovation 
conducted or sponsored open innovation contests. 
We labeled any firm involved in open-source innovation (based on social coding 
platform activities, 10-K report disclosures, and innovation contests) as 1 for open-source 
innovation engagement; 0 otherwise. Social coding platform activities and 10-K 
disclosure-based measurement are 88% correlated with only 11 firm-years misaligned. I 
investigated these 11 firm-years and resolved that measurement for these after an 
exhaustive internet search. None were found to be engaged in open-source innovation. I 
explained the theoretical underpinnings of the Naïve-Bayes algorithm in Essay 3 of the 
dissertation. 
Open-source Engagement Intensity:  I observed that for all the firms, open-source 
development on a social coding platform is centered on GitHub. I measured open-source 
engagement intensity as the log of the cumulative number of actively-developed projects 
for a firm in a given year. 
Control Variables 
Apart from open innovation engagement and standard capital and labor inputs (Berndt 
1991), many other factors may affect a firm’s value-added productivity. Some of these 
factors may also affect the open innovation engagement and firm performance 
relationship. For example, investment in R&D and branding have shown to affect the 
value-added productivity of a firm (Brynjolfsson et al., 2002; Villalonga, 2004; Hall et al., 
2005). The absorptive capacity of a firm, as measured by R&D expenditures, and firm 
size have been shown to increase the capitalization of the external sources of innovation 
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(Cohen and Levinthal,1990). Absorptive capacity amplifies the effects of external 
innovation sourcing, both on innovation productivity and on financial performance 
(Rothaermel and Alexandre, 2009). The overall engagement of a firm with open 
innovation communities increases with firm size and R&D expenditures (Mina et al. 2014). 
Firms with a high capital investment are better placed to engage with open innovation 
communities and develop products as open innovation engagements incur high search 
and transaction costs (Keupp and Gassman, 2009; Borgers et al. 2018). It has also been 
observed that firms competing based on innovation should have low financial leverage to 
succeed in highly competitive markets (O’Brien, 2003). All these variables that may affect 
the engagement of a firm in open innovation and hence affect open innovation and firm 
performance relationships are modeled and controlled in the analysis. I measure these 
control variables as follows:  
Capital Stock: I calculated Capital stock (Kit) as per the procedure explained in Hall 1990, 
and Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003. I explained this procedure in Essay 2 of the dissertation.  
Research and Development Stock:  I calculated research and development stock using 
the perpetual inventory method as follows: 
Rit = (1-δ) Rit-1 * RNDDEFit-1+ Iit                                                       (1) 
The detailed calculation of this measure is available in Essay 2 of the dissertation. 
Advertising Stock: I calculated advertising stock using a perpetual inventory method 
similar to research and development expenses and using the same formula. However, 
standard depreciation used for advertising stock is 45%, and I used the producer price 
index (PPI) for advertising agencies to deflate values to current-year dollars (Villalonga 
2004, Nagle 2018). 
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Firm Size:  For the primary analysis, firm size is a binary variable where large indicates 
firm in the top 25 percent of sales in a given year and small in the bottom 75 percent. This 
measure is consistent with the microeconomic literature (Nagle 2018). I used an 
alternative measure for robustness, which is based on the number of employees rather 
than sales. 
Product market fluidity: Product market fluidity, as a measure of market threats, is the 
degree of volatility (change) in the product mix of the competitors of the focal firm. The 
method to calculate this measure is described in detail in Hoberg et al. 2014. I provided 
details of this measure in Essay 3 of the dissertation. 
Industry Concentration: Industry concentration is a measure adapted from Hoberg et 
al. 2014, which identifies the industry of a firm based on the pairwise cosine similarity 
between the 10-K business descriptions of a firm with another firm. All firms with cosine 
similarity above a specific threshold are classified under the same industry, and the 
industry concentration is calculated accordingly. This method of industry classification is 
better than the traditional way of labeling firms under NAICS and SIC codes, as they have 
superior “ability to explain differences in key characteristics such as profitability, sales 
growth, and market risk across industries. They also better explain the extent to which 
managers mention the high competition in the Management’s Discussion and Analysis 
section of the 10-K, the specific firms mentioned by managers as being competitors, and 
how advertising and R&D investments relate to future product differentiation. ” (Hoberg 
et al., 2014).  
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We summarized variables and their description in table 16 below: 
Table 15: Variable Descriptions Essay 3 
Variable Description 
Open-source engagement 
(Post)it 
Binary variable denoting a firm i was engaged in 
open-source innovation in year t. 
Open_engagement_intensityit Log of no. of cumulative open-source projects 
developed by a firm i in year t. 
Value-added it Log of total sales minus total expense.  
Capital stock it Log of net capital stock (calculated using the 
perpetual inventory method: 5% depreciation 
rate) in millions USD for firm i in year t after 
deflation. 
ln(emp) it Number of employees in thousands for firm i in 
year t 
R&D stockit  R&D investment in millions of dollars (calculated 
using the perpetual inventory method: 15% 
depreciation rate) for firm i in year t after 
deflation. 
Advertising  expenses it Branding expenditure in millions USD (calculated 
using the perpetual inventory method: 45% 
depreciation rate) 
leverage it Total liabilities by total assets 
Firm size it Binary variable, if the firm is in the top 25 
percentile of sales (or employees) in a given 
year, 0 otherwise. 
Product market fluidity it Change in product mix among a firm i’s 
competitor in year t with respect to firm i. 
(Hoberg et al. 2014)  
Industry Concentration it The measure of relatedness among firms in a 
given industry. 
 
4.3.2 Estimation Model 
 
We use the standard Cobb-Douglas production method for my estimation with value-
added productivity as a financial measure of output (Bryjolfsson and Hitt 2003, Nagle 
2018). I include a log-form of the independent variable of interest, along with other 
control variables. This results in the following estimation equation 
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ln(Value-added productivity)it = β0 + β1ln(open_engagement)it + β2ln(capital)it + 
β3ln(emp)it + β4ln(r&d expenses) + β5ln(advertising expenses) + β6ln(Leverage) + 
β7(firm_size) + β8(product market fluidity) + (industry fixed effect) + (firm fixed effect)i + 
(year fixed effect)t +  εit                                                                                     (2) 
Where the independent variable of interest is either a firm’s choice to engage directly 
with an open-source community or the quantum of engagement, which I define as open-
source engagement intensity: number of projects actively developed by a firm i in year t 
on the GitHub platform. I defined the rest of the variables in Table 16. 
4.3.3 Identification Strategy  
 
Continuous Open-source Engagement and firm performance 
 
The continuous open-source engagement model is used to identify the impact of a 
firm’s choice to engage in an open-source platform on the firm’s performance. This is a 
binary choice. In an experimental design, subjects are randomly selected and assigned 
randomly to the treatment and control group. However, in a natural setting, this is not 
possible. So I explored econometric tools to examine the effect of such a choice. 
 We identified Generalized Synthetic Control (GSynth) method as the main 
estimation method for the continuous open-source engagement model (Xu, 2017). This 
method is better suited for my analysis of the more popular difference-in-difference (DID) 
estimator with the propensity score matching method. First, the GSynth method provides 
valid and precise estimates when the assumption of parallel trend and pre-treatment trend 
for the treated firm is violated in DID estimation. Currently, there is no statistical way to 
test for a parallel assumption, and it is practically difficult to find an exact matching pair 
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for treated firm resulting in violation of this assumption in most cases (Xu, 2017). Secondly, 
GSynth is more adept at handling unbalanced data panels with different treatment periods 
for various firms compared to a standard DID procedure. As is the case in organizational 
ecosystems, not all firms adopt a new system or policy at the same time, which makes it 
difficult to estimate the actual effect of treatment over time. Observational longitudinal 
data is also prone to missing data at random, resulting in an unbalanced panel. While the 
generalized DID method can accommodate different treatment periods for different firms, 
the estimates are not precise when the panel is unbalanced. The GSynth procedure can 
also handle multiple treatments over multiple periods with estimates more accurate than 
generalized DID and PSM with DID. Thirdly, by modeling the underlying unobserved 
latent factors, which are the main reason for the violation of the parallel trend assumption, 
it addresses the concerns related to heterogeneity and omitted variable bias. It first 
estimates an IFE (interactive fixed-effect) model using only the control group data, 
obtaining a fixed number of latent factors. It then estimates factor loadings for each 
treated unit by linearly projecting pretreatment prescribed outcomes onto the space 
spanned by these factors. In the end, it imputes treated counterfactuals based on the 
estimated coefficients and factor loadings. Finally, since no observations are discarded 
from the control group, this method uses more information from the control group and 
thus is more efficient than the other matching methods when the model is correctly 
specified. 
Overall, GSynth is a more suitable estimation method for my case, and it provides 
more efficient estimates over PSM with the DID method. DID is a special case of GSynth. 
However, for a robustness check, I estimated a generalized DID model and DID model 
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with coarse exact matching as well, which provided similar results. One of the limitations 
of the GSynth method is that it still cannot estimate parameters for treatment intensity 
and heterogeneity in the treatment effect. To assess the effect of engagement intensity 
on financial performance, I identified a second estimation model, which is explained in 
the next section. I also estimated heterogeneous effects using the random causal forest 
as described in the next few sections. 
The econometric model for the GSynth method is: 
Yit = δit Dit + x’it β + λ’i ft + εit,       (3) 
where the treatment indicator Dit equals one if firm i is engaged in open-source 
development before time t and equals 0 otherwise (i.e., Dit = 1 when i ∈ T and t > open 
engagement year and Dit = 0 otherwise).  δit is the heterogeneous treatment effect on unit 
i at time t ; xit is a (k × 1) vector of observed covariates, β = [ β 1, . . . , βk ]’ is a (k × 1) 
vector of unknown parameters, ft = [ f1t , . . . , frt ]’ is an (r × 1) vector of unobserved 
common factors, λ i = [ λi1, . . . , λir ]’ is an (r × 1) vector of unknown factor loadings, and 
εit represents unobserved idiosyncratic shocks for unit i at time t and has zero mean. The 
main quantity of interest of this research is the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT) at time t (when t>T0) 
ATTt,t>T0 = 1/Ntr ∑ i∈T [Yit(1) −Yit(0)] = 1/Ntr ∑ i∈T  δit                                                             (4) 
This method allows for the use of all firm-year data in the model. However, there 
are a few conditions.  The estimates are precise when at least six pretreatment periods 
of data are available for a firm. For my analysis, I based my main results on a minimum 
of 8 pretreatment periods, for more precise estimates. Also, I cannot use firms with a 
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single data point in pre or post-treatment in the analysis. This condition eliminates some 
of the control and treated firms from the analysis. However, I have included these treated 
firms in open-source engagement intensity analysis. I used firm and time fixed effects to 
control for the unobserved variance. I bootstrapped the estimation to 1000 subsamples 
to check the robustness of the results. For checking the sensitivity of the analysis, I 
included results with 7 and 9 pretreatment periods. The results are statistically similar. 
Open-source Engagement Intensity and firm performance 
 
The open-source engagement intensity model investigates the quantitative effect of the 
depth of open-source engagement on the performance of the engaged firm. Firms may 
have a different degree of engagement on open-source platforms. With observational 
data in hand from the GitHub platform, I decided to conduct panel data analysis.  However, 
this method of analysis is subject to endogeneity concerns. Firms may not only decide to 
engage in open-source development but also how many projects to develop each year. 
Among other things, this decision may be based on a firm’s capabilities and the previous 
year’s performance. Without an appropriate identification strategy, it is difficult to establish 
causality and estimate the proper effect size. To address these concerns, I have taken 
many steps. 
First, to control for unobserved time, firm, and industry effects, I use year, firm, and 
industry fixed (at industry concentration) 5  results. I used robust standard errors (or 
standard errors clustered by industry level) to alleviate concerns of heteroscedasticity. 
Finally, to address the main concerns of endogeneity, I use the Arellano–Bond (ABOND) 
 
5 I also used NACIS 2 digit classification for robustness check. 
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method (Arellano and Bond 1991) and the Blundell–Bond method (BBOND) (Blundell and 
Bond 1998) for dynamic panel analysis. ABOND uses one-period lag of the dependent 
variable as control and uses two-period, or longer lags, as instruments in a generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimation. The Blundell–Bond (BBOND) method extends 
ABOND to create a system estimator that only requires a one-period lag for the 
instruments and reduces a small downward bias that occurs in ABOND when the actual 
value of a coefficient is high.  These lagged instrumental variable-based methods of 
analysis are prevalent in addressing endogeneity concerns in micro-productivity research 
(Nagle 2018). To check for the robustness of the results, I allowed ABOND and BBOND 
estimators to choose the maximum lags (up to 6 years) for variables. I also used the two-
step method in ABOND and BBOND to further check the robustness. 
4.3.3.1 Heterogeneity in effect of open-source engagement 
 
 To estimate the average treatment effect of open-source innovation on a firm’s 
performance, I used GSynth. GSynth is robust against unbalanced panels and missing 
observations. It is also robust when parallel and pre-treatment trend condition is violated 
for treatment-control groups (Xu, 2017). However, there are still a few limitations to the 
method. First, it loses analysis power as it discards the observations with no or limited 
pre-treatment and post-treatment observations (Xu, 2017). It also cannot accommodate 
interaction between variables, especially treatment and covariates. These limitations 
restrict the exploration of heterogeneity in treatment effect, limiting understanding of 
policy estimation and evaluation of a given strategic change like engagement in open 
innovation, for a firm. Traditional panel data analysis methods are inefficient in extracting 
heterogeneous treatment effects, as most methods expect a priori information about 
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possible heterogeneity, which is not always possible in microeconomic research (Wagner 
and Athey, 2018). It is also challenging to estimate all possible interactions, given the no 
of covariates in the model, due to loss of statistical power and difficulty in interpreting 
them. Recent developments in machine learning space have made it possible to evaluate 
possible heterogeneity in treatment effects using algorithms like decision trees, random 
causal forests, Bayesian regression trees, and others (Wagner and Athey, 2018).  
For this research, I am using a causal random forest-based heterogeneous treatment 
effect framework as my identification strategy for treatment heterogeneity (Wager and 
Athey 2018). Under this framework, for a set of independent and identically distributed 
subjects i=1,2,3….,n, I observe a tuple of three parameters where : 
 Xi is a feature vector containing the set of covariates listed in Table 19. 
Yi is the response: Log of Value-added. 
 Wi is the treatment assignment: A firm is engaged in open-source innovation or not 
(variable: post) 
Our goal is to estimate the conditional average treatment effect  
τ(x)=E[Y(1)−Y(0)∣∣X=x]τ(x)=E[Y(1)-Y(0)|X=x] ,                                                     (5) 
 at a pre-specified test point x.  
To achieve this, I grow a causal forest CF from causal trees. Trees in the context of 
machine learning are the sample partitions created based on specific values and groups 
of covariates, which leads to the greatest variance in the treatment effects. A tree is called 
a causal tree when it not only split the sample based on covariates but also estimates 
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treatment effect. Since I cannot observe the counterfactual for a treated subject, I 
calculate the difference in outcome between the treatment and control 
conditions within  a leaf of the tree (similar to nearest neighbor matching), and I label that 
the treatment effect. A causal forest is a random forest created by averaging treatment 
estimates from causal trees. The output of such a framework is a causal model that can 
be tested for goodness of fit using the testing sub-sample. I also compute the rank 
ordering of covariates, which are influential for the treatment effect to materialize. I use 
this rank ordering of covariates to explore the heterogeneity of the effect of open-source 
innovation engagement on the firm’s performance. The treatment effects estimated by 
the causal forest method are asymptotically normal, allowing us to calculate the standard 
error and 95% confidence intervals (Athey et al. 2019).  
4.4 RESULTS 
 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 16 shows the descriptive statistics of the firms in the data set.  Table 17 shows a 
summary comparison between firms engaged in open source innovation and control firms 
for the years 2010 and 2017. Table 18 shows the correlation between variables of interest. 
The final sample contained a total of 6456 observations of 713 firms. I have not assumed 
any pattern about missing data as some variables have missing data, not at random. I 
excluded these firm-year observations from the data. I have focused on all the firms in 
specific NAICS codes. The focus on all firms from specific sectors allows for better 
generalizability of the results while maintaining internal validity.  
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Table 16: Open Innovation, Absorptive Capacity, and Firm Performance 
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
 Value-added productivity 6456 8.222 .373 7.448 11.497 
 Open-source engagement 6456 .101 .301 0 1 
 Open-source engagement intensity 6456 .256 .869 0 7.327 
 Capital stock 6361 1.058 1.197 0 6.831 
 Employees 6456 1.083 1.085 .002 6.076 
 R & D stock 6456 5.94 2.652 0 10.412 
 Advertising expenses 6456 5.667 .176 4.918 8.124 
 Leverage 6456 .347 .186 0 2.193 
 Firm size 6456 .306 .461 0 1 
 Product market fluidity 6456 6.521 2.326 .063 22.71 
 Industry classification 6456 .27 .226 .024 1 
 
Table 17: Summary Comparison Between Treated and Non-treated Firms (All dollar values are 
deflated to 2012 dollar values) 
 2010 2017 
No of firms engaged in open-
source Innovation 
10 out of 733 firms 233 out of 536 firms 
Average sales top 10 open-source 
firms 
5.5 billion USD 77.12 billion USD 
Average sales of top 10 control 
firms 
64 billion USD 17.2 billion USD 
Average sales of all open-source 
firms 
5.5 billion USD 6.2 billion USD 
Average sales of all control firms 2.2 billion USD 1.2 billion USD 
Top 10 firms with open source 
engagement 
ALPHABET, 
BLACKBERRY LTD, 
BSQUARE CORP, 
FACEBOOK INC, LEAF 
GROUP LTD, LINKEDIN 
CORP, MEDIDATA 
SOLUTIONS INC, 
MERCADOLIBRE, 
NVIDIA, and RENTRAK  
APPLE, ALPHABET, 
MICROSOFT, INTL 
BUSINESS 
MACHINES,DELL 
TECHNOLOGIES 
INC,INTEL CORP,CISCO 
SYSTEMS 
,FACEBOOK,HP,SAP SE 
Top 10 control firms APPLE INC, CISCO 
SYSTEMS, DELL 
TECHNOLOGIES INC, 
FUJITSU LTD, INTEL 
CORP, MICROSOFT 
CORP, NEC CORP, 
NIPPON TELEGRAPH & 
TELEPHONE, NOKIA 
CORP, ORANGE 
TECH DATA CORP, 
TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGE
T, QUALCOMM INC, 
SYNNEX CORP, 
BROADCOM INC, TEXAS 
INSTRUMENTS INC, 
BOOKING HOLDINGS 
INC, L3 TECHNOLOGIES 
INC, FIDELITY NATIONAL 
INFO SVCS, QWEST  
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Table 17 shows that the average sales of the top 10 firms engaged in open source 
innovation surpassed the average sales of controlled firms from the year 2010 to the year 
2017. A list of all firms engaged in the year 2017 in open source innovation and firms not 
engaged in open source innovation is available in Appendix C. As per table 19, both 
binary and intensity variables representing open-source innovation are significantly 
correlated with value-added productivity. As expected, usual productivity function 
variables like capital stock, employee stock, and research and development expenses 
are significantly correlated with value-added productivity. The average number of projects 
actively developed by firms on GitHub is 45. Microsoft Inc. hosted the highest number of 
projects (2941, at the time of writing of this thesis) on GitHub. The correlation table shows 
a significant correlation between open-source engagement and value-added productivity.  
 Table 18: Open innovation, Absorptive Capacity, and Firm Performance 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1
2 
  (1) Value-added productivity 1 
  (2) Open-source Eng. 0.18* 1           
  (3) Open-source Eng. Int. 0.21* 0.88* 1          
  (4) Capital stock 0.79* 0.18* 0.20* 1         
  (5) Employees 0.85* 0.18* 0.18* 0.86* 1        
  (6) R & D stock 0.07* 0.09* 0.11* 0.08* -0.01 1       
  (7) Advertising expenses 0.60* 0.13* 0.18* 0.44* 0.41* 0.10* 1      
  (8) Leverage 0.13* 0.09* 0.08* 0.17* 0.19* -0.14* 0.04* 1     
  (9) Firm size 0.56* 0.12* 0.13* 0.73* 0.76* -0.01 0.29* 0.16* 1    
  (11) Product market fluidity 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.09* 0.01 0.06* 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.03* 1  
  (12) Industry classification -0.08* -0.04* -0.04* -0.19* -0.13* -0.15* -0.04* 0.05* -0.13* 0.02 -0.39* 1 
* shows significance at the 0.05 level  
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4.4.2 Open-source engagement and firm performance 
 
Table 19 shows the result of the GSynth model, which examines the effect of engaging 
in open-source innovation on firm performance. The first model in the table is the basic 
GSynth model with 1000 bootstrap samples and with firms having at least eight pre-
treatment years. The second model in the table adds cross-validation of factors. I will 
interpret Model 2 here. Model 3 replaces industry concentration measures adapted from 
Hoberg et al. 2014 with two-digit NAICS code to test for robustness. I used Models 4 and 
5 to test the sensitivity of the results. Models 4 and 5 include firms with seven pre-
treatment period data and nine pre-treatment period data, respectively. All the models 
include two-way interactive fixed effects. I report bootstrapped standard errors for all the 
models. I plotted the model results in Figure 13 and Figure 14. Figure 13 shows the 
average treatment effect on treated, and Figure 14 shows the difference between value-
added productivity between treated and counterfactual. From Table 19, we can see that 
product market fluidity negatively affects firm performance. This observation is consistent 
with Essay 3 of the thesis. Capital and labor measures are significantly positive in 
explaining firm performance, which is in line with existing literature. Firm size negatively 
affects the growth of value-added productivity, which is also observed in recent literature 
(Nagle 2018). The effect of financial leverage on firm performance is negative and 
significant, in line with existing literature (Raza 2013).  In general, high financial leverage 
negatively affects research and development expenditure of a firm, which is also visible 
in my correlation table (Singh and Faircloth 2006). Research and development stock has 
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a positive effect on value-added productivity; however, it is marginally significant. Overall, 
my model and results are consistent with existing literature on microeconomic research. 
All the models in Table 19 consistently reflect the importance of adopting an open-source 
innovation strategy. On average, a firm can increase its value-added productivity by 1.6% 
by adopting open-source innovation as part of their innovation strategy compared to not 
adopting it. In Figures 13 and 14, I summarize that the effect on value-added productivity 
continues to increase over time as more and more products get developed as open-
source projects, and with the acceleration in project development. To re-iterate, the open-
source engagement variable used for this analysis is created by looking at a firm’s social 
coding platform involvement, 10-K report observations about open-source innovation, 
and participation in open-source innovation contests.  
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Table 19: GSynth results: Open-source engagement and firm performance 
    (Base 
GSynth) 
  (GSynth 
with CV) 
  (GSynth 
with CV) 
  (GSynth 
with CV) 
  (GSynth 
with CV) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Open-source 
engagement 
0.045*** 
(0.008) 
0.016*** 
(0.002) 
0.021*** 
(0.002) 
0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.022*** 
(0.002) 
Capital stock 0.087*** 
(0.007) 
0.075*** 
(0.003) 
0.075*** 
(0.002) 
0.085*** 
(0.005) 
0.076*** 
(0.003) 
Employees 0.233*** 
(0.008) 
0.212*** 
(0.002) 
0.213*** 
(0.002) 
0.228*** 
(0.005) 
0.213*** 
(0.003) 
R & D Stock 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.001* 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
Advertising Expenses  0.293*** 
(0.017) 
0.297*** 
(0.007) 
0.298*** 
(0.007) 
0.293*** 
(0.011) 
0.296*** 
(0.008) 
Leverage -0.026** 
(0.013) 
-0.018*** 
(0.003) 
-0.02*** 
(0.004) 
-0.029*** 
(0.007) 
-0.022*** 
(0.004) 
Firm size -0.062* 
(0.007) 
-0.033 
(0.002) 
-0.034* 
(0.003) 
-0.043 
(0.004) 
-0.034* 
(0.002) 
Product market fluidity -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Industry concentration 0.010** 
(0.008) 
0.0038 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.018 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
Obersrvations 6456 6456 6456 6456 6456 
No of pre-treatment 
periods 
8 8 8 7 9 
Firm fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effect Tnic3hhi Tnic3hhi NAICS2 Tnic3hhi Tnic3hhi 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y 
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Figure 13: Average Treatment Effect of Open-source Innovation 
Figure 14: Treated Average and Counterfactual Average 
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4.4.3 Open-source engagement intensity and firm performance 
 
In the previous section, I established the effect of open-source engagement on firm 
performance. In this section, I report results about a specific type of open-source 
innovation: broadcasting and developing open-source projects on the social coding 
platform. As discussed earlier, most firms engaged in open-source innovation have a 
presence on the GitHub social coding platform. Firms post software projects and 
program code on these platforms under their homepage. They also actively develop 
these projects on GitHub. To analyze the importance of such initiatives on firm 
performance, I measure open-source engagement intensity as the log of the number of 
actively posted or developed projects by a firm per year on GitHub and regressed it 
against firm performance.  
 Table 20 shows the result of the panel data analysis. Model 1 is the basic 
productivity model without open-source engagement intensity. Model 2 is the fixed effect 
regression model with open-source engagement as an explanatory variable. Model 3 is 
the ABOND model with industry effect measured by network-based industry 
concentration measure (Hoberg et al. 2014). In Model 4, industry concentration is 
measured by the two-digit NAICS classification. Finally, I present the BBOND model for 
robustness checks. I will interpret Model 3 for this analysis. My estimates for all control 
measures are qualitatively consistent with existing literature and the ones reported in 
Table 19 above. The effect of open-source engagement intensity is positive and highly 
significant. The elasticity of open-source intensity is 0.4 %. To interpret the coefficient of 
open-source engagement intensity, I convert the estimate back to the actual numbers. 
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Since I am using a log form equation here, according to the results in Model 3, Table 20, 
on average, a 1% increase in the number of open-source projects leads to a 0.4% 
increase in value-added output. Alternatively, a 2% increase in the number of projects 
leads to a 0.8 % increase in value-added output. For firms that have a presence on the 
GitHub platform, the average value-added productivity is 3 billion USD, and the average 
number of projects on GitHub are 45. 0.8% of 3 billion dollars is 24 million USD. 1 % of 
projects will be 0.45 of a project. Rounding it up to 2% of projects will be one project. So 
a 2% increase in the project means the addition of one actively developed project. On 
average, adding an active project over 45 actively developed projects leads to a rise of 
240,000 USD (0.008 *0.01*3 billion) in output value. This additional value-added will 
include all other changes made by organizations like the addition of complementary 
assets for the new software, and changes in organization structure and revenue models 
due to an increase in the number of open-source projects. 
Table 20: Open Source Engagement Intensity and Firm Performance 
      (Base 
Model) 
  (OLS-
FE) 
  
(ABOND) 
  
(ABOND) 
  
(BBOND) 
       1    2    3    4    5 
Open-source engagement 
intensity 
 0.012*** 0.004*** 0.012*** 0.024*** 
    (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Capital stock 0.105*** 0.097*** 0.092*** 0.063*** 0.183*** 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
Employees 0.194*** 0.195*** 0.221*** 0.253*** 0.125*** 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
R & D stock 0.001 0.001 0.003*** 0.001* -0.001* 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Advertising expenses 0.320*** 0.321*** 0.539*** 0.532*** 0.181*** 
   (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) 
Leverage -0.011 -0.017 -0.055*** -0.037*** -0.055*** 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
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Firm size -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.138*** -0.148*** -0.002 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Product market fluidity -0.001* -0.001* -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry classification 0.012 0.012 0.055***  -0.008 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.004)  (0.005) 
Constant 6.106*** 6.104*** 4.871*** 5.017***  
   (0.094) (0.094) (0.056) (0.057)  
Obs. 5536 5536 5536 5536 4801 
Pseudo R2 0.80 0.81    
Firm Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Effect Tnic3hhi Tnic3hhi Tnic3hhi NAICS2 Tnics3hhi 
Auto-correlation first order   -12.90*** -12.92*** -4.89*** 
Auto-correlation second 
order 
  1.03 0.97 1.26 
 
As an additional analysis, I plotted the average number of open-source projects 
developed by firms, against the average treatment effect graph of Figure 14, in Figure 15. 
This additional analysis is purely for exploratory purposes. Figure 15 is a two-axis graph 
where the right vertical axis shows the average number of open-source projects 
developed across the firm on the GitHub platform. The central vertical axis shows the 
average treatment effect of open-source innovation on firm performance, as 
demonstrated in Figure 14. I can see a strong correlation between the increase in the 
average number of open-source projects and the average treatment effect of open-source 
innovation on firm performance.  
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Figure 15: Average Treatment Effect vs. Average no. of Projects 
 
4.4.4 Open-source engagement and firm performance 
 
To estimate the heterogeneity in the treatment effect of open-source engagement, I did 
random forest estimation on my sample using the “grf” package in R language (Athey et 
al. 2019). Before I explore the heterogeneous effect of open-source engagement on firm 
performance, I first examine if the effect is truly heterogeneous. I ran the random forest 
analysis with 5000 causal trees on a split sub-sample of my primary sample.6 I ran this 
analysis on 60% of the sample, and I used the 40% sample for prediction and plotting of 
heterogeneous effects. The average treatment effect from random causal forest 
analysis is significantly positive, corroborating my estimates from the generalized 
 
6 Detail method of analysis is made available by Mark H. White here: 
https://www.markhw.com/blog/causalforestintro  
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synthetic method (β = 0.013, S.E. = 0.000, p<0.0001). I plotted the treatment effect by 
rank order of trees in Figure 21 below. The figure on the left is without the confidence 
interval, and the one on the right is with the confidence interval. I can see the variance 
in the treatment effect across trees suggesting heterogeneity in the treatment effect of 
open-source innovation on firm performance. Next, I explore the rank order of important 
variables for the variance of treatment effect. Table 21 below shows the variables of 
importance for the treatment effect. “Variable of importance” function in “grf” package 
shows a simple weighted sum of how many times feature i was split on at each depth in 
the forest. It is called a split index (White, 2018). The sum of the split index always 
equals 1. The higher number of times a feature is split, the more heterogeneous the 
treatment effect of open-source engagement is with regards to that feature.  
Figure 16: Heterogeneity in Effect of Open-source Innovation on Firm Performance 
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Table 21: Split index of effect heterogeneity 
Variable 
Split 
Index 
Capital stock 0.341 
R & D expenses 0.323 
Employees 0.212 
Leverage 0.034 
Product Fluidity 0.032 
Industry 
Concentration 0.023 
Firm size 0.004 
 
For example, in Table 21, the split index of capital stock is 0.341, which means 34% 
of all the splits in the sample trees occurred because of the variance of open-source 
engagement effect on value-added productivity based on the variance in the capital stock 
value. This does not imply that capital stock contributes to 34% heterogeneity in the 
treatment effect of open-source engagement, as tree leaves include both control and 
treated firms. I developed graphs for all the variables identified above to evaluate the 
effect heterogeneity of open-source innovation. I only presented figures for six variables 
here as they create heterogeneity in the effect of open-source engagement: 
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Figure 17: Heterogeneous Treatment Effect 
As expected, higher capital and labor expenses lead to a higher impact of open-
source engagement on firm performance. Higher research and development stock reflect 
a higher absorptive capacity of a firm for an external source of innovation (West et al. 
2014). Investment in research and development will create efficiencies for absorbing 
innovation created outside the firm in an open-sourced environment. Open-source 
innovation also leads to superior firm performance in a high market competition 
environment (product-market fluidity). Under high market competition, open-source 
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innovation provides the opportunity for a firm to develop products faster through open-
source development. It also helps in triggering higher adoption by users and suppliers, 
resulting in superior performance by adopting a firm. It is also visible that bigger firms can 
leverage open-source innovation better compared to smaller firms as they have the 
resources and organizational capabilities to develop services and complements around 
the openly developed products. Overall, apart from the capital and labor investment, 
research and development stock, product-market fluidity, and firm size seems to 
moderate the effect of open-source innovation on firm performance positively. 
4.4.5 Robust Analysis 
 
Each method used in this research cross validates the estimates of each other. For 
example, random forest and GSynth reported qualitatively similar results for the average 
treatment effect. I further improved upon my analysis by estimating treatment effects 
using the approaches used in existing microeconomic research. I present the results of 
such estimations in Table 22 below. The first model in the table shows the staggered 
difference-in-difference estimation of the treatment effect. In the second model, I show 
that the results are consistent with my GSynth estimate using the difference-in-difference 
method with propensity score matching. Finally, I present the results of OLS with inverse 
probability weight matching. All results are consistent with my primary analysis. 
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Table 22: Regression Results: Robust Analysis 
      (1)   (2)   (3) 
 Staggered DID 
 
DID with CEM OLS  with IPW 
Open-source engagement 0.018** 0.015*** 0.017*** 
   (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
Capital Stock 0.088*** 0.102*** 0.084*** 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.067) 
Employees 0.250*** 0.194*** 0.335*** 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.075) 
R & Stock -0.003* 0.001 0.159*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.021) 
Advertising expenses 0.913*** 0.321*** -0.300 
   (0.031) (0.017) (0.031) 
Leverage -0.034* -0.014 1.677*** 
   (0.019) (0.011) (0.225) 
Product market fluidity 0.001 -0.001 -0.057*** 
   (0.002) (0.001) (0.022) 
Industry Effect 0.105*** 0.012 -0.414* 
   (0.014) (0.008) (0.214) 
Firm size -0.230*** -0.052*** -0.119 
   (0.011) (0.007) (0.145) 
Constant 2.735*** 6.101*** -2.274*** 
   (0.175) (0.094) (1.145) 
Observations 5536 2506 6301 
R-squared  0.80 0.83  
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
To compare estimates of the average treatment effect of open innovation on firm 
performance, I collated estimates of all models in Table 23. The estimates are in 
congruence with each other and they are range bound.  
Table 23: Comparison of Average Treatment Effect (ATE) Calculated Using Different 
Estimation Approaches 
Method ATE of Open Source Innovation 95% CI 
GSynth 0.016 [0.012-0.020] 
Causal Random Forest 0.013 [0.011-0.015] 
Staggered DID 0.018 [0.001-0.036] 
DID with CEM 0.015 [0.003-0.027] 
OLS with IPW 0.017 [0.005-0.029] 
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To further test the robustness of my results, I ran the main analysis with Tobin’s q 
as the dependent financial performance measure. Apart from economic productivity 
improvements gained by a firm by utilizing a social coding community, I argued in the 
conceptual development section that the open-source innovation also helps a firm to gain 
larger market share through faster propagation of products and services, which is 
essential for the market success of a firm in the long run. Tobin’s q is the measure of 
market performance of a firm, and it is defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm 
to the replacement cost of its asset (Chung and Pruitt 1984). Consistent with the literature 
(Bhardwaj et al. 1999), I calculated Tobin’q as  
Tobin’s Q = ((Common shares outstanding * Price of a share ) + Liquidating value of 
firm’s preferred stocks + Debt )/ Total assets                                                         (6) 
For this analysis, I estimated market value function with Tobin’s Q as the dependent 
variable (Hall et al. 2005) : 
Log(Tobin’s Q) = β0 + β1ln(open_engagement)it + β2ln(capital intensity)it + β3ln(emp)it + 
β4ln(r&d intensity) + β5ln(advertising intensity) + β6ln(Leverage) + β7(firm_size) + 
β8(product-market fluidity)  +  (industry fixed effect)  +  (firm fixed effect)i + (year fixed 
effect)t +  εit           
Here capital intensity, R & D intensity, and advertising intensity are capital stock, 
R&D stock, and advertising expenses scaled by sales of a firm. I extracted all the 
variables for Tobin's Q from COMPUSTAT. To test the effect of open-source 
engagement (intensity) or a firm’s financial performance, I ran four models. The results 
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are presented in Table 24. The first two models test the effect of open-source 
engagement on a firm’s market performance. Model 1 shows DID results, and Model 2 
shows staggered-DID results. Further, to test the effect of open engagement intensity 
on the market performance of firms, I ran fixed effect panel regression. The results of 
that analysis are presented in Model 3, Table 24. I tested the robustness of these 
results with a dynamic panel estimator (ABOND). All estimates of the effect of open-
source innovation on a firm’s market performance are positive and significant. 
Table 24: Regression results: Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q 
Y= log(Tobin’s Q)       (1) 
CEM 
(2) 
DID 
(3) 
F.E.   
(4)  
ABOND  
Open-source Engagement 0.028* 0.031**   
   (0.014) (0.012)   
Open-source engagement 
intensity 
  0.015** 0.047*** 
     (0.006) (0.008) 
Capital intensity -0.004 -0.015 -0.004 0.002 
   (0.003) (0.020) (0.003) (0.003) 
R & D Intensity 0.035** -0.061 0.035** -0.040** 
   (0.015) (0.104) (0.015) (0.017) 
Advertisement Intesity 0.000 0.050*** 0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.201*** 0.137*** 0.199*** 0.124*** 
   (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.036) 
Product market fluidity 0.005*** -0.002 0.005*** 0.010*** 
   (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry concentration 0.025 0.011 0.025 0.009 
   (0.019) (0.031) (0.019) (0.021) 
Firm size -0.103*** -0.006 -0.104*** -0.332*** 
   (0.012) (0.004) (0.012) (0.019) 
Constant 0.716*** 0.127*** 0.718*** 1.627*** 
   (0.027) (0.032) (0.027) (0.034) 
Observations 5447 2250 5447 4688 
Pseudo R2 59.60 67.70 60.31  
Firm Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Alternative measures of open source engagement and removing high leverage subjects 
To further assess the robustness of the results, I explored alternative measures of open 
source engagement and normalized them by firm size. I identified three additional 
measures as an alternative to open engagement and normalized them by the number of 
employees of a firm. These three measures are the total number of projects, the total 
number of commits across all projects developed by a firm, and the total number of events 
across all projects developed by a firm. The unnormalized value of the first measure is 
used in the main analysis. Furthermore, we removed Alphabet Inc. and Microsoft Inc. 
from our sample, as the combined total number of projects developed by these two firms 
on the GitHub platform is more than the remaining 18 firms in the top 20 most engaged 
firms. Table 25 shows the system GMM estimation of this analysis. The first model 
includes the total number of projects developed on the GitHub platform, the second model 
includes the number of commits, and the third model includes the number of events. All 
three measures are normalized by the number of employees (a measure of firm size). 
The results are statistically significant and in line with the main analysis. Finally, we looked 
at the effect of open source engagement on firm performance without Microsoft and 
Alphabet Inc. Here we are using the binary open source engagement variable. I estimated 
both generalized synthetic control model and staggered-DID model. Both the results still 
show a significant effect of open source engagement on firm performance. The results 
are qualitatively similar to the one Table 20. The results are described in Appendix C. 
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Table 25: Regression results: Various measures of open-source engagement 
      (1)   (2)   (3) 
 No of Projects No_of_Comits No of Events 
No of Projects 0.010***   
   (0.003)   
No of Commits  0.002**  
    (0.001)  
No of Events   0.001* 
     (0.001) 
Capital Stock -0.060*** -0.054*** -0.059*** 
   (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) 
R & D Stock 0.001 0.000 0.001 
   (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Advertising Expenses -0.060*** -0.064*** -0.057*** 
   (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) 
Leverage 0.028*** 0.017*** 0.027*** 
   (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) 
Product Market Fluidity -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Concentration 0.006 0.002 0.006 
   (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Constant -0.227 -0.397*** -0.102 
   (0.348) (0.131) (0.345) 
Observations 5888 5888 5888 
Firm Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Effect  Yes  Yes  Yes 
  
  
Aggregate project-level variables and firm performance 
As an additional analysis, I explored three aggregate-level variables from a firm’s open-
source engagement and their effect on a firm’s financial and market performance. These 
three variables are open-source project license mix, degree of originality of projects, and 
average productive events in the open-source projects of a firm. The first two variables 
are related to strategic choices a firm makes while developing products and services on 
the open-source platform. The extant literature has classified open-source licenses in 
broadly two categories: restrictive and permissive licenses (Lerner and Tirole 2005). 
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Restrictive licenses like GPL (GNU Public Licences) are copyleft licenses that restrict the 
license choice of any derivative work from the open-source project to be licensed under 
the same open-source license. Permissive licenses like MIT open licenses permit the 
flexibility of license choices for derivative and original work. Licensing an open-source 
project is a strategic choice for a firm. A firm has the option of using restrictive licenses 
for all their projects, permissive licenses for all their projects or a mix of two. A non-
restrictive or permissive license for a project makes it more attractive for users and 
developers alike as they perceive the higher utility of the project (Stewart et al. 2006). It 
has been observed that a restrictive licensing strategy is better for generating value when 
a firm is better at leveraging investments and service costs are high. A permissive 
licensing choice for a project is better when competing contributors are good at reaping 
benefits from the development efforts of a firm as it allows for broader market consensus 
(August et al. 2018). I extend the open-source licensing literature by studying the effect 
of license mix choice at the aggregate portfolio level of a firm on its performance. I coded 
the open-source project license mix for a firm as the percentage of projects deployed by 
a firm with restrictive licenses on the GitHub platform. A value of 0 suggests that all the 
projects developed by a firm on GitHub use permissive licenses like MIT and BSD. A 
value of 1 suggests that all the projects deployed by a firm on GitHub use restrictive 
licenses like AGPL and GPL. The closer the value is to 1, the more projects with restrictive 
licenses is implemented by a firm.  
 Degree of originality is the percentage of original projects developed by a firm on 
a social coding platform like GitHub. A firm has a choice of forking an existing project 
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from the social coding platform and developing it further or to start an open-source 
project anew with its seed code. Derivative work in this domain is typically referred to as 
projects that are “forked” from an existing project. On the negative side, original work 
takes longer to develop and lacks quality control in the beginning. However, there is no 
restriction of licensing choice and design scope, which can be a constraint if a firm 
decides to derive source code from an existing project for further development.  
 Finally, I examined the average number of productive events happening across 
the projects developed by a firm on GitHub. In GitHub, every action in a project is recorded 
as an event. There are more than 20 types of events listed on the GitHub platform. 
However, only a few of them are productive events, affecting the productivity of a project 
directly. For example, creating an issue, sending a pull request and pushing a commit in 
project code are all productive events as they contribute to the quality and the feature set 
of the project. Examples of non-productive events for a project will be someone 
downloading the project, forking the project, watching the project, or recognizing the 
project by upvoting it. While these events might have an indirect long-term effect, but 
these are not directly visible in the development of a project on the platform. Measuring 
the average number of productive events across projects of a firm supplements my 
primary measure of open-source engagement intensity (number of projects actively 
developed on the GitHub platform). It goes beyond just counting the number of actively 
developed projects by taking the average of all the events happening across these 
projects.  
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 We included all these three variables in the production function (Equation 1) and 
market value function (Equation 6) to estimate the models. To calculate license, mix and 
degree of originality, I filtered those years where a firm is developing 5 or more projects 
actively. A lower limit of 5 projects to calculate measures at the aggregate level is well 
established in the open-source literature (Daniel et al. 2013). The filter reduced my 
sample to 455 firm-years. I ran the panel data regression analysis on this dataset. I listed 
the results in Appendix C. The results are not qualitatively different from my main analysis. 
In both production and market value functions, open engagement intensity is still 
significant. From the project level aggregate variables, only average productive events 
are significant and positive in the production function model. As expected, this variable 
captures additional productive gains not explained by open engagement intensity. The 
remainder of all of the project-level aggregate variables are insignificant in both models. 
Having more original projects in the mix may result in production and market gains. 
However, the effect is not significant. The effect of licensing mix strategy by a firm on its 
performance is also inconclusive. This analysis may be limited by the power of the sample 
and requires further investigation in the future.  
4.5 DISCUSSION 
 
The existing research has examined open-source innovation through the lens of 
community-based development models, and it has largely ignored the mainstreaming of 
open-source innovation as a strategic innovation choice. The limited attention it received 
from researchers as a business strategy choice came in the form of game-theoretic 
models, where multiple aspects of open-source vs. closed source competition were 
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scrutinized, including the lock-in strategy, licensing policies, entry strategies, strategic 
choices under different constraint and hybrid business models. In comparison, for-profit 
firms have started moving on to the bandwagon of open-source software, and more firms 
either have opened up their software platforms or have begun to actively develop their 
products on open-source social coding platforms. These changing dynamics are now 
more pronounced and are finding their place in annual reports of the firms in the form of 
a strategic choice or a competing concern. Firms have directly started engaging on open-
source platforms and have started incubating new open collaborations to harness the 
power of crowd-sourced innovation. 
 In line with the movement in the industry, I decided to investigate the effect of open-
source innovation on a firm’s performance. my results are promising and contribute to the 
literature in open-source innovation, innovation economics, and applied machine learning 
in multiple ways. Firstly, I measured a firm’s open-source innovation through an 
exhaustive search of social coding platforms, supervised classification of firms using 
annual 10-K reports, and embarked on a thorough internet search on the open innovation 
contests organized by firms. My focus on high technology firms helped to measure and 
validate this variable effectively. Secondly, I estimated the effect of open-source 
engagement on a firm’s performance through various estimation strategies addressing 
concerns of measurement errors, omitted variable bias, and endogeneity. My results 
show that open-source innovation positively influences a firm’s performance over and 
above the traditional inputs of productivity. Finally, I used the causal random forest to 
explore heterogeneity in the effect of open-source engagement on firm performance. This 
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study is among the first to apply a machine learning causal algorithm to study a firm-level 
treatment effect. 
My study provides many insights that firms can consider before making open-
source innovation as part of its business strategy. First, firms opting for open-source 
innovation are generally better off in the longer run. Reading 10-K reports also gave us 
the impression that adding open-source innovation to the business strategy portfolio need 
not be an either/or decision. Firms like Microsoft Inc. are successfully developing open-
source products while competing with other open-source firms like VMware Inc. Firms 
need to be selective about opening up their products and developing projects on an open-
source basis. These choice dynamics also provide an avenue for future research. Larger 
firms experience more significant benefits from open-source innovation as they have 
better mechanisms to capture value from open-source developments. Smaller firms also 
benefit from open-source innovation, but the benefit is limited in firm productivity 
compared to larger firms. Studies have found that smaller firms and start-up firms do 
benefit from open-source innovation through the increased likelihood of initial public 
offering and acquisition, the additional effects that may not be captured by value-added 
productivity (Waguespack and Fleming 2009). For larger firms opening up its innovation 
as open-source has an ecosystem effect, with a flourishing of start-up firms and 
“increasing in the cumulativeness of innovation in the market” (Wen et al. 2016, p. 2668). 
We also observed that under high market competition, firms that invested in open-
source innovation are marginally better than firms that have not. In sectors like information 
technology, high market competition is inevitable, and firms have to choose between 
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protecting proprietary rights and capturing higher market share. It appears that in highly 
competitive markets where firms have to innovate quickly, and competitors also mimic 
them quickly, open-source innovation gives a slight edge to firms due to more rapid 
development cycles and a higher likelihood of adoption from customers and freeloaders 
alike. Again, balancing between open sourcing and proprietary rights seems to be the 
magic potion here. Firms also need to expand their research and development investment 
if they want to optimize value captured from open-source innovation. The absorptive 
capacity of a firm plays an essential role in harnessing innovation from outside, and this 
has been impressed upon by extant literature in varied contexts. (West et al. 2014). Finally, 
I expect that this study will trigger the use of machine learning-based causal algorithms 
in applied social science research settings as they are robust, produce asymptotically 
normal outputs and provide the opportunity to explore heterogeneous treatment effects. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
Open-source innovation will inevitably be one of the central innovation strategies for most 
for-profit firms. In a philosophical sense, open-source innovation is a central tenet to the 
globalized economy. In a globalized economy, firms want to buy global, sell global, and 
innovate globally. In line with decentralized buying and selling of goods and services, 
innovation may help in faster development and adoption of goods and services. It is not 
only about information technology firms. Tesla, the highest valued car manufacturer of 
North America, has opened all its patents for faster adoption of its technology (Musk 2014). 
We as academics cannot fall behind in addressing challenges and opportunities which 
come along with open-source innovation.  
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 As researchers, this will require a shift in our thinking and research. We need to 
shift our research focus from user-driven open-source software to firm driven open-source 
innovations. This study is a step in that direction. I expect future studies to focus on 
strategic choices a firm makes while including open-source innovation as part of its 
innovation strategy and how that affects various aspects of its business, including capital 
and labor investment. I expect this study to re-invigorate researchers to study economic 
issues of open-source innovation and its multi-dimensional effect. 
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5 Thesis Conclusion 
 
Firms in high-technology industries are continuously battling the challenges from the 
nature of the industry they are in and competitive forces exerted by rival firms within the 
industry. Due to a dearth of time and resources, firms tend to mimic the innovation 
strategies adopted by rival firms without empirically evaluating the consequences of 
adopting the strategy. In this thesis, I looked at three such innovation strategies a firm 
might adopt to develop competitive advantage over all rival firms and their effects of a 
firm's position in the industry, in terms of dominance and value generation. 
According to innovation theory, traditionally firms generated value mainly by 
economies of scale and economies of learning. For economies of scale and economies 
of learning to deliver sizeable returns, the products need to be adopted by the majority of 
the users in the market. The product manufacturing cycle should be repeated multiple 
times for higher returns. Hence the learning and scale can only be achieved when a 
product developed by a firm is dominant in the market, and it has a long technological 
cycle. Both these conditions are difficult to achieve in fast-paced, high technology 
industries. The first essay in this thesis address this challenge of dominance and longevity 
by looking at the technological factors which influence the dominance of the components 
in the configuration of product design. In this essay, I also explored how these 
evolutionary factors affect the longevity of these components in the product design. 
We found that the evolving number of functionalities supported by a component 
(pleiotropy of the component) significantly affects the induction of a component in 
dominant design configuration and its stay in the configuration. Similarly, a component 
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supported by open standards is more likely to be included in a dominant design 
configuration compared to a component supported by closed standards. Specifically, 
every additional functionality associated with a component increases its likelihood of 
entering the dominant design configuration by approximately three times, and its longevity 
by about a year. Similarly, a component supported by an open standard is approximately 
four times more likely to be part of the dominant design configuration compared to a 
component supported by a closed standard, and it remains in the TV market for 
approximately an additional two years. 
In the second essay, I looked at novel ways of capturing value through network 
effects and economies of scope. Firms continuously try to find ways of increasing the 
customer base for their product and services.  A large network of consumers of 
technology has a multiplicative effect on the overall value generated by the firms active 
in the product domain. One of the strategies to achieve network effects is to develop a 
multi-sided platform that allows for the exchange of value between multiple stakeholders. 
A successful platform business model not only allows for the creation of a large value 
network of associated stakeholders, but it also allows for expanding the scope of services 
on the platform. This combination of network effects and economies of scope has the 
potential to generate higher value for the sponsoring firm and the firms engaged in the 
platform ecosystem. My study suggests that firms adopting the platform business model 
deliver better value compared to non-platform business. They are also more successful 
in delivering value under high market competition compared to non-platform firms.   
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Continuing with the theme of network effects, I study the effect of open-source 
innovation on the value generated by a firm in the third essay. Firms engaged in open-
source innovation have a risk of foregoing rents from the products open-sourced, due to 
free-riding by general users and rival firms. However, if strategically done, open-source 
innovation provides an opportunity for firms to propagate their technology faster and 
capture value from selling services and complementary products around open-sourced 
products. Firms can also develop peripheral projects as open-source and retain control 
on core technologies by developing them in-house. The trade-off between foregoing 
control and rents from the developed open-source products in exchange for larger 
network and knowledge assimilation is only worth it when it can lead to better financial 
performance for the firm. Using a novel generalized synthetic control method and unique 
measure of open-source innovation of a firm, I found that the timing and intensity of open-
source innovation affect the performance of the firm. On average, adding an active open-
source project over 45 actively developed projects lead to a rise of 240,000 USD in output 
value. This effect is heterogeneous and dependent on the capital, labor, and research 
investment made by a firm.  
These three essays provide many insights into strategic choices available to an 
organization active in information technology-intensive sectors. From a product lifecycle 
perspective, insights from the first essay can improve the component selection model 
used in firms during new product development. Components that are more likely to be 
winners in a product domain for a longer period are more likely to be of high pleiotropy, 
supported by open standards, and developed within the industry. 
157  
  
157 
 
 
On the research side, this essay opens a few possibilities as well. A relatively 
orthogonal extension would be to take a different focus, for example, looking at the eco-
system of products and their complements and substitutes.  This could be an additional 
dimension in predicting the success of a component in the dominant design. Further 
generalization of the findings is another avenue of research that can be looked into in the 
future. With the advent of frameworks like the internet of things, the interplay between 
products and components will be more pronounced, requiring components with stable 
adoption across the interconnected products. 
 The second essay is one of the first studies to empirically highlight the importance 
of the platform business model for a firm, especially under high market competition. The 
novelty of this study lies in the measurement of platform businesses and providing 
evidence for its influence on a firm’s performance. However, there are some limitations 
to this study, which opens up future avenues of research. In future research, a more 
nuanced understanding of platform businesses will help in answering questions related 
to the effect of platform maturity and platform engagement on a firm’s performance. My 
measure of platform business model is novel but does not capture the richness of this 
innovation strategy, limiting the insights gained from the study. Measuring platform 
maturity, growth, and platform type will help quantify the effect of platform business 
strategy on the financial performance of a firm. Another avenue of the research is to look 
at the inter-platform competition and its effect on firm performance. Future studies may 
also look at the antecedents of the platform as a business strategy and how endogenous 
and exogenous factors influence the choice made by a firm.  
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 The third and final essay in the thesis expands the discussion on open-source 
innovation in the context of for-profit firms.  For years, open-source development has 
been discussed in the realm of collaborative innovation by open-source communities for 
non-profit and personal usage. However, in the last ten years, open-source innovation 
has taken center stage as a strategic innovation choice a firm has to capture and deliver 
value. Academic research is slowly waking up to the possibilities of looking at open-
source innovation in the context of revenue-generating for-profit firms. I expect that this 
study will reinvigorate the research in this area.  
 Overall, this thesis provides insights for both academic research and practice. Our 
approach of identifying and evaluating the strategic choices a firm has to gain a 
competitive advantage in information technology-intensive industries is novel. The 
analysis for each of the research problems identified in this thesis is carried out with 
several robustness checks to test the validity of the results. This thesis has the ambition 
to influence future research in areas of innovation, market competition, digital platforms, 
and dominant design theory.  
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7 Appendices 
 
7.1 Appendix A 
 
Table 26: Appendix: List of components with corresponding variable values (the year 2017) 
Variables Column Number in Table 26 
Year of introduction 1 
Dominant 2 
Pleiotropy score 3 
Open standard 4 
Endogenous innovation 5 
Hardware 6 
Digital 7 
Versioning 8 
Number     of firms 9 
Introductory footprint (%) 10 
Introduced by leader 11 
Royalty fees 12 
D_Interface 13 
D_Data_management 14 
D_Network 15 
D_Display 16 
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Table 27: Appendix: List of Components and Variables 
 Variables 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
3D Video 2009 No 1 No Yes Yes No No 1 1.19 No No No No No Yes 
Analog Audio Output 2002 Yes 1 No No Yes No No 5 7.87 No No No No No No 
Bluetooth 2008 Yes 4 Yes No No Yes Yes 1 0.22 Yes Yes No No No No 
Component In 2002 Yes 3 No No Yes No No 5 14.4 No Yes Yes No No No 
Composite In 2002 Yes 2 No No Yes No No 5 2.15 No Yes Yes No No No 
Composite Out 2002 Yes 2 No No Yes No No 5 16.5 No Yes Yes No No No 
Cathode Ray Tube 
(CRT) Display 
2002 Yes 2 No Yes Yes No No 5 9.41 No No No No No Yes 
Digital Audio Output 2002 Yes 3 No Yes Yes Yes No 2 8.49 Yes No No No No No 
Display Port 2012 No 3 No No Yes Yes Yes 1 1.23 No Yes Yes No No No 
Digital Living Network 
Alliance (DLNA) 
2008 Yes 5 No Yes No Yes Yes 2 0.81 Yes Yes No Yes No No 
Digital Media External 
(DMEx) port 
2007 No 1 No Yes Yes No No 1 1.33 No Yes No No No No 
Digital Media (DM) port 2008 No 1 No Yes Yes No No 1 2.09 No Yes No No No No 
DVD/Blu Ray Player 2002 No 1 No Yes Yes No No 1 1.72 No No Yes No No No 
Digital Visual Interface 
(DVI) 
2002 No 3 No No Yes No No 2 0.39 No No Yes No No No 
Ethernet 2007 Yes 11 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 3 3.09 No No No No Yes No 
Firewire 2002 No 3 No No Yes No Yes 2 0.83 No Yes No Yes No No 
Frequency Modulator 
(FM)  
2002 No 1 No No Yes No No 1 0.51 No No No No No No 
Google cast 2014 No 4 No No No Yes No 2 2.77 No No Yes No No No 
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High-Definition 
Multimedia Interface 
(HDMI) 
2002 Yes 10 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 0.38 Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Infra-Red (IR) blaster 2008 No 1 No No Yes No No 1 0.82 Yes Yes No No No No 
Infra-Red (IR) Out  2002 No 1 No No Yes No No 2 0.12 No Yes No No No No 
Liquid Crystal Display 
(LCD) 
2002 Yes 3 Yes Yes Yes No No 3 2.88 Yes No No No No Yes 
Light Emitting Diode 
(LED) 
2007 Yes 4 Yes Yes Yes No No 1 0.45 Yes No No No No Yes 
Mobile High-Definition 
Link (MHL) 
2011 Yes 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 1 2.62 No Yes Yes No No No 
Miracast 2013 Yes 3 Yes Yes No Yes Yes 2 1.16 Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Modem 2002 No 1 No No Yes No No 1 2.88 No No No No Yes No 
Near Field 
Communication (NFC) 
2012 No 1 No No No No No 1 0.53 No No No No Yes No 
Organic Light-Emitting 
Diode (OLED) 
2014 No 4 No Yes Yes No No 1 0.45 No Yes No No No Yes 
OneConnect 2014 No 2 No Yes Yes Yes No 1 0.42 Yes No No No No No 
Personal Computer 
Memory Card 
International Association 
(PCMCIA) 
2002 No 1 No No Yes No No 1 0.4 No No No No Yes No 
Digitizer 2013 No 1 No Yes Yes No No 1 0.2 No Yes No No No No 
Plasma Display 2002 No 3 Yes Yes Yes No No 4 0.77 No Yes No No No Yes 
Rear Projection (RP) 
Display 
2002 No 2 No No Yes No No 4 3.55 Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Recommend Standard 
232 Current (RS232C) 
2002 Yes 2 No No Yes No No 3 0.17 Yes No No No No No 
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Separate-Video (S-
video) Out 
2002 No 2 No No Yes No No 5 1.54 No No Yes No No No 
Secure Digital (SD) Card 2002 No 4 No Yes Yes Yes No 1 1.08 No Yes No Yes No No 
Separate-Video (S-
video) In  
2002 Yes 2 No No Yes No No 5 1.39 Yes No Yes No No No 
Universal Serial Bus 
(USB) 
2004 Yes 7 Yes No Yes Yes Yes 2 15.6 Yes Yes No Yes No No 
Video Graphics Array 
(VGA) In 
2002 Yes 3 No No Yes No No 4 0.69 Yes No Yes No No No 
Video Graphics Array 
(VGA) Out 
2002 No 1 No No Yes No No 1 3.55 No No Yes No No No 
Webcam 2009 No 1 No No Yes No No 1 0.31 No No No No Yes No 
Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity) 2007 Yes 13 Yes Yes No Yes Yes 3 0.3 No No No No Yes No 
Wireless Fidelity Direct 
(Wi-Fi-Direct) 
2010 No 4 No Yes No Yes Yes 3 1.1 Yes No No No No No 
Wireless Control Port 2007 No 1 No Yes Yes No No 1 2.08 No Yes No No No No 
Wireless Display (WiDi) 2010 No 1 No No No Yes No 1 1.58 No Yes Yes No No No 
Wake-up On LAN (WOL) 2014 No 1 No No No Yes No 2 1.29 No No No No No No 
178  
  
178 
 
 
Table 28: Appendix: Component Classification Examples 
Component Example of The basis for the classification 
RS-232c Low 
Pleiotropy 
https://www.analog.com/media/en/technical-
documentation/product-selector-
card/RS232%20Quick%20Guide.pdf 
 
HDMI 1.4 
 
High 
Pleiotropy 
https://www.hdmi.org/spec/hdmi1_4b 
 
Bluetooth Open 
Standard 
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/26198/bluetooth  
HDMI 1.4 Closed 
Standard 
https://www.semiconductorstore.com/blog/2014/licensing-
costs-HDMI/654/ 
 
WiDi Exogenous 
Innovation 
https://www.wired.com/2010/09/intel-widi-streaming-media/ 
 
HDMI 1.4 Endogenous 
Innovation 
http://bfiles.chinaaet.com/whpt/blog/20170919/1000008562-
6364143185282736974850538.pdf  
  
Pleiotropy Map and pleiotropy score 
To develop the pleiotropy map and calculate the pleiotropy score from it, I first 
extracted specifications for every TV in my dataset. Specifications are typically listed 
on the TV manufacturers' website. For example, specifications of Sony’s TV model 
46hx720 are presented here: 
https://www.sony.com.au/electronics/support/televisions-projectors-lcd-tvs/kdl-
46hx700/specifications. Using such specification documents and component 
specification sheets, I created the pleiotropy map using the following procedure: 
Step-1. Extract TV Features:  
Using rvest and rcurl packages in R, I assimilated all TV specifications from TV 
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manufacturer's websites. Then I separated these specifications year wise and 
extracted all specification-related details as text. I removed all brand-related 
information, including warranty and repair information from these texts. I also removed 
physical specification details from these texts using tidytext and tm packages in R.  
Following is a graphical depiction of the most used and the least used words in 
specifications of all TV models produced in the year 2014. A total of 285 TV models in 
my sample are produced in the year 2014. I started with 1545 total words used in the 
specification document of all the TV models produced in 2014. I removed such words 
that are not related to any features as power, department, standard, electronics. I also 
removed numbers related to weight and other dimensions of a TV model’s appearance. 
After these filters, I am left with 110 words that represent features of a TV. 
 
Figure 18: Least and Most Frequently Used Words in TV Specification 
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Step-2. Normalizing and combining the words to extract the feature set: 
Features in a TV specification are represented with different and related words in 
specifications of TVs from different manufacturers. For example, 1080p, 60i and 60p 
all represent full high definition video. 4K, 2160p, and ultra hd all represent ultra-high-
definition video. Similarly, 802.11a, networked, network, and wireless all represent an 
Ethernet network. CEC (consumer electronic control) and control represent multi-
device control. I combined such related words to create the representative feature set 
for each TV model year. These words and their word count are presented in Table B2 
below.  
Table 29: Appendix: Word frequencies from specifications of all TVs in the sample 
(the year 2014) 
word count   word count 
  
word count 
hdr10 10  twitter 16  viewer 170 
2160p 10  480p 16  naturalizer 180 
32gb 11  hdr 17  social 190 
768p 11  smartphone 17  fat16 200 
google 11  spotify 17  fat32 200 
miracast 11  processors 18  web 200 
networked 11  hdcp1.4 19  stereo 230 
vie 11  480i 19  interface 240 
youtube 11  hdmi1 19  smart 240 
720p 11  netflix 20  special 240 
fm 11  processor 20  cec 250 
stereos 11  quickflix 20  tuners 260 
chromecast 12  hdd 35  internet 270 
playback 12  hdcp 35  cinemotion 300 
receivers 12  mirror 40  dlna 300 
specials 12  android 47  drive 310 
pandora 13  speakers 50  play 320 
pcmcia 13  chrome 53  surround 340 
hdmi4 13  tweet 65  browser 420 
mobile 13  new 73  skype 430 
nfc 13  smartlink 82  network 440 
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802.11a 14  radio 84  mirroring 450 
atsc 14  sorry 84  sound 460 
software 14  bluetooth 85  control 540 
sport 14  ultrahd 100  rf 560 
1080i 14  glasses 110  4k 610 
hdmi2 14  tuner 110  wireless 620 
hdmi3 14  1080p 120  60i 720 
view 15  3d 120  viewing 730 
tweeter 15  processing 140  music 790 
videos 15  dimming 150  2k 800 
mhl2.0 16   exfat 170       
  
Step-3. Matching components with the feature set 
Finally, for every year, I matched the component features (derived from component 
specification documents) with the TV features extracted in step 2 above to derived 
pleiotropy map.  I derived pleiotropy scores from these pleiotropy maps (as presented 
in Figure 5). I cross-validated these scores with the hand-coded features list derived 
from component specification documents. For example,  
Table 29: Appendix: Example of Words to Component Matching 
Words Feature Component 
4K, 2160p, Ultrahd, 60i,  Ultra-high definition video HDMI 
2K, 1080i, 1080p, 720p          Full-high definition video HDMI, 
Component 
32 GB, exFAT, FAT16, FAT32 Multimedia storage SD Card 
Web, networked, 802.11ac, 
internet, network 
Internet connectivity Wi-Fi, LAN 
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Table 31: Appendix: Likelihood Ratio Test: Poisson vs Negative Binomial 
Regression. 
Model Observations 
log 
likelihood 
(null) 
Log 
Likelihood 
(model) df AIC BIC 
       
Poisson 
model 46 
-
171.7917 -92.76571 16 217.5314 246.7897 
NBR model 46 
-
89.74341 -69.13939 17 172.2788 203.3657 
 LR Chi2 (1)   47.25***      
 *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 
 
7.2 Appendix B 
 
Table 30: Appendix: Text Classification Algorithm Result Comparison 
model Accuracy Kappa 
Accuracy 
Lower 
Accuracy 
Upper 
Mcnemar 
PValue 
SVM (Support 
Vector Machine) 0.6196 0.1413 0.5541 0.6821 3.62E-07 
Naive-Bayes 0.8290*** 0.6256 0.7745 0.8749 9.51E-07 
LogitBoost 0.7991*** 0.5654 0.7420 0.8485 0.000463934 
Random forest 0.6025 0.0249 0.5367 0.6657 1.43E-21 
Naive-
Bayes_Laplace 0.9401*** 0.8779 0.901654 0.9669 0.016156931 
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Figure 19: Appendix: Comparison of Classification Models 
 
 
Table 31: Appendix: Platform Business Model Firms 
  
DIGITAL TURBINE INC MEET GROUP INC (THE) 
MICROSOFT CORP XO GROUP INC 
LGBTQ LOYALTY HOLDINGS INC LIVEPERSON INC 
HER IMPORTS SITO MOBILE LTD 
INVESTVIEW INC TRAVELZOO 
MOBETIZE CORP ALPHABET INC 
ALPHA NETWORK ALLIANCE VNTRS SHUTTERSTOCK INC  
BLACKHAWK NETWORK HLDGS INC SCIENTIFIC ENERGY INC 
CHANNELADVISOR CORP PEERSTREAM INC  
QIWI PLC FACEBOOK INC 
CHEGG INC REMARK HOLDINGS INC 
TWITTER INC ACCELERIZE INC 
58.COM INC  FRIENDABLE INC 
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MOXIAN INC 
REGO PAYMENT 
ARCHITECTES INC 
CARE.COM INC 
NORTHSIGHT CAPITAL 
INC 
SNAP INC  QUINSTREET INC 
QUOTIENT TECHNOLOGY INC LEAF GROUP LTD 
RIMINI STREET INC PANDORA MEDIA INC 
GRUBHUB INC ZILLOW GROUP INC 
TRUECAR INC GROUPON INC 
LIBERTY TRIPADVISOR HOLDINGS BRIGHTCOVE INC 
TRAVELPORT WORLDWIDE LTD YELP INC 
GODADDY INC TRIPADVISOR INC 
ETSY INC PAID INC 
MINDBODY INC SHOTSPOTTER INC  
PAYPAL HOLDINGS INC SPYR INC 
IAC/INTERACTIVECORP CIPHERLOC CORP 
SQUARE INC PAYSIGN INC 
MATCH GROUP INC EBAY INC 
ZEDGE INC KIDOZ INC 
COMMERCEHUB INC AUTOWEB INC 
VIVA ENTERTAINMENT GROUP INC BOOKING HOLDINGS INC 
TRADE DESK INC THESTREET INC 
   
 
 
Table 32: Appendix: Non-platform Business Model Firms 
INTL BUSINESS 
MACHINES CORP SYMANTEC CORP ECHOSTAR CORP 
DELL TECHNOLOGIES 
INC DIEBOLD NIXDORF INC SUNPOWER CORP 
INTEL CORP 
COMMSCOPE HOLDING 
CO INC VERIFONE SYSTEMS INC 
CISCO SYSTEMS INC 
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS 
INTL CP CORELOGIC INC 
ORACLE CORP CACI INTL INC  -CL A MICROSEMI CORP 
FUJITSU LTD CA INC 
ALLSCRIPTS HEALTHCARE 
SOLTNS 
TECH DATA CORP AMKOR TECHNOLOGY INC FLIR SYSTEMS INC 
HEWLETT PACKARD 
ENTERPRISE 
BROADRIDGE FINANCIAL 
SOLUTNS 
TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE 
SFTWR 
NORTHROP GRUMMAN 
CORP JINKOSOLAR HOLDING CO PALO ALTO NETWORKS INC 
RAYTHEON CO 
MICROCHIP 
TECHNOLOGY INC SYNAPTICS INC 
QUALCOMM INC 
ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES 
CP  -CL A MANTECH INTL CORP 
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MICRON TECHNOLOGY 
INC 
SKYWORKS SOLUTIONS 
INC 
SS&C TECHNOLOGIES 
HLDGS INC 
WESTERN DIGITAL 
CORP IHS MARKIT LTD ARISTA NETWORKS INC 
SYNNEX CORP SABRE CORP FITBIT INC 
CDW CORP SCANSOURCE INC VIASAT INC 
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS 
INC TRINET GROUP INC SYKES ENTERPRISES INC 
COGNIZANT TECH 
SOLUTIONS GARMIN LTD CIRRUS LOGIC INC 
AUTOMATIC DATA 
PROCESSING SCIENTIFIC GAMES CORP FORTINET INC 
FIRST DATA CORP QORVO INC CREE INC 
AU OPTRONICS CORP FIRST SOLAR INC 
HENRY (JACK) & 
ASSOCIATES 
SEAGATE 
TECHNOLOGY PLC RED HAT INC EPLUS INC 
SALESFORCE.COM INC CITRIX SYSTEMS INC IPG PHOTONICS CORP 
NVIDIA CORP CIENA CORP NETGEAR INC 
NXP 
SEMICONDUCTORS NV UNISYS CORP TREND MICRO INC 
FIDELITY NATIONAL 
INFO SVCS GENPACT LTD 
NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
CORP 
VMWARE INC -CL A SYNOPSYS INC SPLUNK INC 
ALLIANCE DATA 
SYSTEMS CORP 
TELEDYNE 
TECHNOLOGIES INC WEX INC 
CHUNGHWA TELECOM 
LTD 
LOGITECH 
INTERNATIONAL SA 
FACTSET RESEARCH 
SYSTEMS INC 
ADOBE INC XILINX INC VERISIGN INC 
ACTIVISION BLIZZARD 
INC 
AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES 
INC PTC INC 
INSIGHT ENTERPRISES 
INC 
MARVELL TECHNOLOGY 
GROUP LTD VERINT SYSTEMS INC 
ARRIS INTERNATIONAL 
PLC 
CYPRESS 
SEMICONDUCTOR CORP ANSYS INC 
BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON 
HLDG CP 
MAXIM INTEGRATED 
PRODUCTS MITEL NETWORKS CORP 
CONDUENT INC OPEN TEXT CORP DIODES INC 
NETAPP INC 
FLEETCOR 
TECHNOLOGIES INC BLACK KNIGHT INC 
HARRIS CORP CDK GLOBAL INC ACI WORLDWIDE INC 
FISERV INC DST SYSTEMS INC PURE STORAGE INC 
ON SEMICONDUCTOR 
CORP 
ZAYO GROUP HOLDINGS 
INC VIRTUSA CORP 
ADVANCED MICRO 
DEVICES WORKDAY INC 
DONNELLEY FINANCIAL 
SOLTNS 
INTUIT INC F5 NETWORKS INC VONAGE HOLDINGS CORP 
ELECTRONIC ARTS INC AUTODESK INC LUMENTUM HOLDINGS INC 
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CERNER CORP 
ESTERLINE 
TECHNOLOGIES CORP 
ELECTRONICS FOR 
IMAGING INC 
ANALOG DEVICES 
CADENCE DESIGN 
SYSTEMS INC LOGMEIN INC 
ESSENDANT INC 
NUANCE 
COMMUNICATIONS INC NETSCOUT SYSTEMS INC 
JUNIPER NETWORKS 
INC SERVICENOW INC CAVIUM INC 
COSTAR GROUP INC FINJAN HOLDINGS INC 
BOTTOMLINE 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 
ULTIMATE SOFTWARE 
GROUP INC 
FRANKLIN WIRELESS 
CORP INPHI CORP 
FAIR ISAAC CORP REIS INC ALARM.COM HOLDINGS INC 
BLACKBERRY LTD 
VISLINK TECHNOLOGIES 
INC NIC INC 
SYNTEL INC 
WIRELESS TELECOM 
GROUP INC UNIVERSAL DISPLAY CORP 
GCI LIBERTY INC -OLD INPIXON TUCOWS INC 
LIVERAMP HOLDINGS 
INC LANTRONIX INC PFSWEB INC 
MORNINGSTAR INC TELARIA INC 
ALJ REGIONAL HOLDINGS 
INC 
LUXOFT HOLDING INC GSI TECHNOLOGY INC QAD INC 
TABLEAU SOFTWARE 
INC DAILY JOURNAL CORP 
COMPUTER TASK GROUP 
INC 
PLANTRONICS INC I D SYSTEMS INC PAYLOCITY HOLDING CORP 
INTEGRATED DEVICE 
TECH INC BK TECHNOLOGIES CORP AMBARELLA INC 
TYLER TECHNOLOGIES 
INC NETLIST INC NEOPHOTONICS CORP 
PEGASYSTEMS INC 
GLASSBRIDGE 
ENTERPRISES INC 2U INC 
GTT COMMUNICATIONS 
INC DATAWATCH CORP INTERNAP CORP 
TIVO CORP 
EVERSPIN 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 
COMPUTER PROGRAMS & 
SYSTEMS 
VIAVI SOLUTIONS INC IMMERSION CORP 
INFORMATION SERVICES 
GROUP 
CSG SYSTEMS INTL INC GLOBALSCAPE INC HORTONWORKS INC 
SILICON 
LABORATORIES INC MTBC INC BENEFITFOCUS INC 
NUTANIX INC ECHELON CORP CPI CARD GROUP INC 
EXLSERVICE HOLDINGS 
INC 
MAM SOFTWARE GROUP 
INC 
VISHAY PRECISION GROUP 
INC 
KRATOS DEFENSE & 
SECURITY NVE CORP CALLIDUS SOFTWARE INC 
FIREEYE INC ZOOM TELEPHONICS INC HEALTHSTREAM INC 
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WEB.COM GROUP INC EVOLVING SYSTEMS INC 
DASAN ZHONE SOLUTIONS 
INC 
INFINERA CORP GAIA INC AVIAT NETWORKS INC 
OMNICELL INC QUMU CORP SERVICESOURCE INTL INC 
COMMVAULT SYSTEMS 
INC DETERMINE INC 
MONOTYPE IMAGING 
HOLDINGS 
GOGO INC KOPIN CORP 
ITURAN LOCATION & 
CONTROL 
VEEVA SYSTEMS INC 
ASTEA INTERNATIONAL 
INC PAR TECHNOLOGY CORP 
HIMAX TECHNOLOGIES 
INC 
FALCONSTOR SOFTWARE 
INC QUALYS INC 
MAGNACHIP 
SEMICONDUCTOR 
CORP 
STREAMLINE HEALTH 
SOLUTIONS HEALTHEQUITY INC 
REALPAGE INC NXT-ID INC SPS COMMERCE INC 
ADTRAN INC 
BLONDER TONGUE LABS 
INC INSEEGO CORP 
NET 1 UEPS 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 
SMITH MICRO SOFTWARE 
INC VARONIS SYSTEMS INC 
OCLARO INC 
PROFESSIONAL 
DIVERSITY NETWK WORKIVA INC 
MANHATTAN 
ASSOCIATES INC SOCKET MOBILE INC RIGNET INC 
INTERXION HOLDING 
NV NTN BUZZTIME INC BOINGO WIRELESS INC 
SEMTECH CORP 
DOCUMENT SECURITY 
SYS INC RAPID7 INC 
CHANGYOU.COM LTD MICT INC FIVE9 INC 
COMTECH 
TELECOMMUN 
CODA OCTOPUS GROUP 
INC Q2 HOLDINGS INC 
MEDIDATA SOLUTIONS 
INC AWARE INC APPTIO INC 
NEXTGEN HEALTHCARE 
INC 
INNOVATIVE SOLTNS & 
SUPP INC COUPA SOFTWARE INC 
PROOFPOINT INC BRIDGELINE DIGITAL INC ROSETTA STONE INC 
CALIX INC GLOWPOINT INC DIGI INTERNATIONAL INC 
BOX INC PARETEUM CORP BLACKLINE INC 
MICROSTRATEGY INC 
LIBERTY BROADBAND 
CORP MOBILEIRON INC 
RINGCENTRAL INC TAKUNG ART CO LTD 
QUANTENNA 
COMMUNICATIONS INC 
PERFICIENT INC ISSUER DIRECT CORP TELENAV INC 
ASPEN TECHNOLOGY 
INC COUNTERPATH CORP PROS HOLDINGS INC 
CORNERSTONE 
ONDEMAND INC QUICKLOGIC CORP INSTRUCTURE INC 
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MONOLITHIC POWER 
SYSTEMS INC 
SPECTRA7 
MICROSYSTEMS INC 
CAMBIUM LEARNING 
GROUP INC 
SECUREWORKS CORP 
HELIOS AND MATHESON 
ANALYTIC RUBICON PROJECT INC 
PHOTRONICS INC CREXENDO INC AEROHIVE NETWORKS INC 
INOVALON HOLDINGS 
INC NEONODE INC MIX TELEMATICS LTD 
KEYW HOLDING CORP QUOTEMEDIA INC IDEANOMICS INC 
STEEL CONNECT INC 
INTELLIGENT SYSTEM 
CORP APPFOLIO INC 
EVOLENT HEALTH INC SEMILEDS CORP 
TABULA RASA HEALTHCARE 
INC 
PAYCOM SOFTWARE 
INC MOSYS INC RADISYS CORP 
POWER INTEGRATIONS 
INC 
MOBIVITY HOLDINGS 
CORP CASTLIGHT HEALTH INC 
ZENDESK INC 
ANDREA ELECTRONICS 
CORP MODEL N INC 
WIX.COM LTD PDVWIRELESS INC IMPINJ INC 
MAXLINEAR INC 
RUBICON TECHNOLOGY 
INC AGILYSYS INC 
GLOBANT SA ACORN ENERGY INC DSP GROUP INC 
MERCURY SYSTEMS 
INC 
TECHNICAL 
COMMUNICATIONS CP MAJESCO 
EVERTEC INC INTELLICHECK INC EMCORE CORP 
SYNCHRONOSS 
TECHNOLOGIES 
PARALLAX HEALTH 
SCIENCES INC OOMA INC 
TWILIO INC AUDIOEYE INC FRONTEO INC 
PROGRESS SOFTWARE 
CORP 
SKKYNET CLOUD 
SYSTEMS INC ASTRONOVA INC 
CRAY INC NANO DIMENSION LTD 
AMERICAN SOFTWARE  -CL 
A 
LATTICE 
SEMICONDUCTOR 
CORP 
ONE HORIZON GROUP 
INC 
EDGEWATER TECHNOLOGY 
INC 
ACACIA 
COMMUNICATIONS INC RESONANT INC CSP INC 
ALPHA AND OMEGA 
SEMICONDUCTR 
ASCENT SOLAR 
TECHNOLOGIES TECHTARGET INC 
APPLIED 
OPTOELECTRONICS 
INC 
MARATHON PATENT 
GROUP INC EVERBRIDGE INC 
MAHANAGAR 
TELEPHONE NIGAM RIOT BLOCKCHAIN INC PLUG POWER INC 
XPERI CORPORATION NANOFLEX POWER CORP AXT INC 
HAWAIIAN TELCOM 
HOLDCO INC 
KINGTONE WIRELESS  -
ADR -OLD UPLAND SOFTWARE INC 
CALAMP CORP ATOMERA INC PCTEL INC 
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EBIX INC PARKERVISION INC MAGICJACK VOCALTEC LTD 
DAQO NEW ENERGY 
CORP UMEWORLD LTD 
XPLORE TECHNOLOGIES 
CORP 
HARMONIC INC MAX SOUND CORP NANTHEALTH INC 
NEW RELIC INC WORLDS INC 
COMMUNICATIONS 
SYSTEMS INC 
SPHERE 3D CORP WIDEPOINT CORP SUPPORT.COM INC 
BSQUARE CORP MARIN SOFTWARE INC WESTELL TECH INC  -CL A 
PIXELWORKS INC CYNERGISTEK INC EGAIN CORP 
SEACHANGE 
INTERNATIONAL INC SIGMA DESIGNS INC 
TRANSACT TECHNOLOGIES 
INC 
INUVO INC ZIX CORP 
ADESTO TECHNOLOGIES 
CORP 
REALNETWORKS INC TSR INC ASURE SOFTWARE INC 
SUNWORKS INC INNODATA INC IPASS INC 
CONNECTURE INC IDENTIV INC  
 
 
Table 33: Firms That Transitioned from Non-Platform to Platform Business Model 
APPLE INC 
CHANNELADVISOR 
CORP 
CLEARONE INC 
SABRECORP 
MGT CAPITAL 
INVESTMENTS INC 
STAMP.COM INC 
J2 GLOBAL INC 
UNITED ONLINE INC 
CONVERSANT INC 
NET ELEMENT INC 
LEIDOS HOLDINGS 
INC 
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Regression results  
Table 34: Firm Maturity, Platform Business Model and Firm Performance 
 Y = log(Value-added productivity)  Coef.  S. E. 
Product market fluidity -0.001 0.001 
Platform 0.036* 0.021 
Platform X Product market fluidity 0.005* 0.003 
Product Market Fluidity X Firm 
maturity 
0.000 0.000 
Platform X Firm maturity 0.002 0.001 
Platform X Product market fluidity 
X Firm maturity 
0.000 0.000 
Capital stock 0.004 0.004 
Employees 0.015*** 0.004 
R & D stock 0.000 0.001 
Advertising expenses 0.014 0.009 
Leverage 0.003 0.006 
Firm size -0.004 0.003 
Constant 0.838*** 0.073 
No of observations 5536  
R-square 0.98  
Chi-square 2434.52***  
 
Table 35: Regression Results: With and Without Advertising Stock 
      (1)   (2) 
       Reduced sample with Ad. 
expenses 
Full sample  without Ad. 
expenses 
Product Market 
Fluidity 
-0.003*** -0.002** 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Platform 
Business Model 
0.075*** 0.124*** 
 (0.023) (0.019) 
   
Product Market 
Fluidity X 
Platform 
Business Model 
0.013*** 0.011* 
   (0.003) (0.005) 
Capital Stock 0.174*** 0.120*** 
   (0.010) (0.007) 
Employees 0.123*** 0.211*** 
   (0.012) (0.007) 
R & D Stock 0.007*** 0.003** 
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   (0.002) (0.001) 
Advertising Stock 0.001***  
   (0.000)  
Leverage -0.028* -0.013 
   (0.016) (0.011) 
Firm Size -0.044*** -0.064*** 
   (0.010) (0.007) 
Industry 
Concentration 
0.023** 0.013 
   (0.012) (0.008) 
Constant 7.876*** 7.881*** 
   (0.019) (0.011) 
Observations 2874 5536 
Firm Effect Yes  Yes  
Year Effect Yes  Yes 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
7.3 Appendix C 
 
Table 36: Appendix: Open-source – 10-K Classification 
 Naive-Bayes SVM 
Testing 
(with CV & 
Laplace) 
Without CV & 
Laplace  
Testing (with CV 
& Laplace) 
Without CV & 
Laplace 
Accuracy 0.9994 0.9988 0.9758 0.8918   
Kapppa 0.9892  09776 0.2538 0.0689  
95% CI (0.9966,1) (0.9956, 
0.9999) 
(0.9672, 0.9827) (0.8759, 0.9064) 
 
Sensitivity 0.9994  1 1 0.91107 
Specificity 1 0.9574 0.1489 0.23404 
Pos Pred Value 1 0.9988 0.9757 0.97602  
Neg Pred value 0.9792 1 1 0.07143 
Prevalence 0.9716 0.9716  0.9716 0.97160 
Detection Rate 0.9710  0.9716  0.9716 0.88520 
Detection Prevalence 0.9710  0.9728  0.9958 0.90695 
Balanced Accuracy 0.9997 0.9787  0.5745 0.57256  
Total number of 
samples 
1000 1000 1000 1000 
Number of ‘non-open’ 800 800 800 800 
Number of ‘open’ 200 200 200 200 
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Table 37: Appendix: firms with homepage on GitHub 2017 
2U INC DXC TECHNOLOGY CO MEDIDATA SOLUTIONS INC 
ACTIVISION BLIZZARD INC EBAY INC MEET GROUP INC (THE) 
ADOBE INC EGAIN CORP MELLANOX TECHNOLOGIES LTD 
ADVANCED MICRO 
DEVICES ELBIT SYSTEMS LTD MERCADOLIBRE INC 
AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES 
INC ELECTRONIC ARTS INC MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY INC 
ALIBABA GROUP HLDG ELLIE MAE INC MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC 
ALPHABET INC 
ENDURANCE INTL GRP 
HLDGS INC MICROSEMI CORP 
ALTERYX INC ENPHASE ENERGY INC MICROSOFT CORP 
AMDOCS EPAM SYSTEMS INC MICROSTRATEGY INC 
ANALOG DEVICES ETSY INC MINDBODY INC 
APPFOLIO INC EVERBRIDGE INC MIX TELEMATICS LTD 
APPIAN CORPORATION EVOLENT HEALTH INC MOBILEIRON INC 
APPLE INC EXTREME NETWORKS INC MOBILESMITH INC 
APPTIO INC F5 NETWORKS INC MOBIVITY HOLDINGS CORP 
ATHENAHEALTH INC FACEBOOK INC MODEL N INC 
ATLASSIAN CORP PLC 
FACTSET RESEARCH 
SYSTEMS INC MONOTYPE IMAGING HOLDINGS 
AUTODESK INC FIREEYE INC MORNINGSTAR INC 
AUTOMATIC DATA 
PROCESSING FIRST DATA CORP MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS INC 
BAIDU INC FITBIT INC NANTHEALTH INC 
BILIBILI INC -ADS FIVE9 INC NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS CORP 
BLACKBAUD INC FLIR SYSTEMS INC NETAPP INC 
BLACKBERRY LTD FUJITSU LTD NETEASE INC 
BLACKLINE INC GARMIN LTD NETSCOUT SYSTEMS INC 
BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON 
HLDG CP GLOBAL PAYMENTS INC NEW RELIC INC 
BOTTOMLINE 
TECHNOLOGIES INC GLOBANT SA NOKIA CORP 
BOX INC GODADDY INC NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP 
BRIGHTCOVE INC GROUPON INC NUANCE COMMUNICATIONS INC 
BROADRIDGE FINANCIAL 
SOLUTNS GRUBHUB INC NUTANIX INC 
BSQUARE CORP GUIDEWIRE SOFTWARE INC NVIDIA CORP 
CA INC HARRIS CORP NXP SEMICONDUCTORS NV 
CANADIAN SOLAR INC 
HEWLETT PACKARD 
ENTERPRISE OKTA INC 
CARE.COM INC HORTONWORKS INC OMNICELL INC 
CASTLIGHT HEALTH INC HUBSPOT INC ON SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 
CDK GLOBAL INC IHS MARKIT LTD OPEN TEXT CORP 
CDW CORP IMPINJ INC ORACLE CORP 
CELESTICA INC 
INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES 
AG PAGSEGURO DIGITAL LTD 
CERNER CORP INFOSYS LTD PALO ALTO NETWORKS INC 
CHECK POINT SOFTWARE INNODATA INC PANDORA MEDIA INC 
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TECHN 
CIRRUS LOGIC INC INSTRUCTURE INC PAYLOCITY HOLDING CORP 
CISCO SYSTEMS INC INTEL CORP PAYPAL HOLDINGS INC 
CITRIX SYSTEMS INC INTERNAP CORP PEGASYSTEMS INC 
CLOUDERA INC 
INTL BUSINESS MACHINES 
CORP PERFICIENT INC 
COGNIZANT TECH 
SOLUTIONS INTUIT INC PERION NETWORK LTD 
COMMERCEHUB INC ISIGN SOLUTIONS INC PROGRESS SOFTWARE CORP 
COMMVAULT SYSTEMS 
INC IZEA WORLDWIDE INC PROOFPOINT INC 
COMSCORE INC JACADA LTD PTC INC 
CORELOGIC INC JUNIPER NETWORKS INC PURE STORAGE INC 
CORNERSTONE 
ONDEMAND INC KEYW HOLDING CORP QIWI PLC 
COSTAR GROUP INC LANTRONIX INC QUALYS INC 
COUNTERPATH CORP LEAF GROUP LTD QUMU CORP 
COUPA SOFTWARE INC LEIDOS HOLDINGS INC RAPID7 INC 
CRAY INC LINE CORP RAYTHEON CO 
CREATIVE REALITIES INC LIVEPERSON INC REALPAGE INC 
CYBERARK SOFTWARE 
LTD LIVERAMP HOLDINGS INC RED HAT INC 
CYPRESS 
SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 
LOGITECH INTERNATIONAL 
SA RINGCENTRAL INC 
DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC LUXOFT HOLDING INC ROSETTA STONE INC 
DESPEGAR COM CORP 
MARVELL TECHNOLOGY 
GROUP LTD RUBICON PROJECT INC 
DSP GROUP INC 
MAXIM INTEGRATED 
PRODUCTS SABRE CORP 
SAILPOINT TECHNO HLDG YELP INC TENABLE HOLDINGS INC 
SALESFORCE.COM INC TUCOWS INC THESTREET INC 
SAP SE TWILIO INC THOMSON-REUTERS CORP 
SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY 
PLC TWITTER INC TRAVELPORT WORLDWIDE LTD 
SECUREWORKS CORP UBIQUITI NETWORKS INC TREND MICRO INC 
SERVICENOW INC 
ULTIMATE SOFTWARE 
GROUP INC TRIPADVISOR INC 
SHARPSPRING INC VARONIS SYSTEMS INC STMICROELECTRONICS NV 
SHOPIFY INC VERISIGN INC SYMANTEC CORP 
SHOTSPOTTER INC VERITONE INC SYNACOR INC 
SHUTTERSTOCK INC VIASAT INC SYNCHRONOSS TECHNOLOGIES 
SMITH MICRO SOFTWARE 
INC VIAVI SOLUTIONS INC TABLEAU SOFTWARE INC 
SOCKET MOBILE INC VMWARE INC -CL A TECHTARGET INC 
SOGOU INC WEIBO CORP YEXT INC 
SOHU COM LTD WESTERN DIGITAL CORP 
ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES CP  -CL 
A 
SONIC FOUNDRY INC WIPRO LTD ZEDGE INC 
SPARK NETWORKS SE WIX.COM LTD ZENDESK INC 
SPINDLE INC WORKDAY INC ZILLOW GROUP INC 
SPLUNK INC WORKIVA INC ZYNGA INC 
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SPOTIFY TECHNOLOGY 
SA XILINX INC SQUARE INC 
SPS COMMERCE INC XO GROUP INC  
 
Table 38: Appendix:  Firms not engaged in open source innovation (the year 2017) 
TECH DATA CORP 
NET 1 UEPS TECHNOLOGIES 
INC MARIN SOFTWARE INC 
TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM 
ERICS 
SOLAREDGE TECHNOLOGIES 
INC REMARK HOLDINGS INC 
QUALCOMM INC INTERXION HOLDING NV ZIX CORP 
SYNNEX CORP OCLARO INC 
NETSOL TECHNOLOGIES 
INC 
BROADCOM INC SEMTECH CORP SUPPORT.COM INC 
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC COMTECH TELECOMMUN 
O2MICRO INTERNATIONAL 
LTD 
BOOKING HOLDINGS INC 21VIANET GROUP INC 
TRANSACT 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 
L3 TECHNOLOGIES INC CALIX INC 
ADESTO TECHNOLOGIES 
CORP 
FIDELITY NATIONAL INFO 
SVCS ASPEN TECHNOLOGY INC ASURE SOFTWARE INC 
QWEST CORP 
WAYSIDE TECHNOLOGY 
GROUP INC AMERI HOLDINGS INC 
ALLIANCE DATA SYSTEMS 
CORP STAMPS.COM INC FINJAN HOLDINGS INC 
INSIGHT ENTERPRISES INC 
MONOLITHIC POWER 
SYSTEMS INC INPIXON 
ARRIS INTERNATIONAL PLC INOVALON HOLDINGS INC 
FRANKLIN WIRELESS 
CORP 
CONDUENT INC PHOTRONICS INC 
WIRELESS TELECOM 
GROUP INC 
FISERV INC STEEL CONNECT INC TELARIA INC 
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTL 
CP PAYCOM SOFTWARE INC AURORA MOBILE -ADR 
CACI INTL INC  -CL A POWER INTEGRATIONS INC DAILY JOURNAL CORP 
DIEBOLD NIXDORF INC SEA LTD - ADR RADCOM 
COMMSCOPE HOLDING CO 
INC MAXLINEAR INC BK TECHNOLOGIES CORP 
AMKOR TECHNOLOGY INC EVERTEC INC NETLIST INC 
WORLDPAY INC MERCURY SYSTEMS INC INTERMOLECULAR INC 
JINKOSOLAR HOLDING CO 
LATTICE SEMICONDUCTOR 
CORP DATAWATCH CORP 
SCANSOURCE INC 
ACACIA COMMUNICATIONS 
INC 
EVERSPIN 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 
SKYWORKS SOLUTIONS INC 
ALPHA AND OMEGA 
SEMICONDUCTR IMMERSION CORP 
IAC/INTERACTIVECORP 
APPLIED OPTOELECTRONICS 
INC GLOBALSCAPE INC 
TRINET GROUP INC XPERI CORPORATION MTBC INC 
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SCIENTIFIC GAMES CORP EBIX INC 
MAM SOFTWARE GROUP 
INC 
UNISYS CORP CALAMP CORP CLPS INC 
QORVO INC 
RIBBON COMMUNICATIONS 
INC CYREN LTD 
FIRST SOLAR INC DAQO NEW ENERGY CORP NVE CORP 
GENPACT LTD HARMONIC INC GAIA INC 
CIENA CORP POINTS INTERNATIONAL LTD 
FALCONSTOR SOFTWARE 
INC 
SYNOPSYS INC INPHI CORP KOPIN CORP 
IQIYI INC -ADR ALARM.COM HOLDINGS INC 
ASTEA INTERNATIONAL 
INC 
TELEDYNE TECHNOLOGIES 
INC NIC INC RADA ELECTRONIC INDS 
FLEETCOR TECHNOLOGIES 
INC UNIVERSAL DISPLAY CORP PEERSTREAM INC 
ZAYO GROUP HOLDINGS INC PFSWEB INC SIMULATIONS PLUS INC 
INTELSAT SA ALJ REGIONAL HOLDINGS INC 
BLONDER TONGUE LABS 
INC 
ESTERLINE TECHNOLOGIES 
CORP CERAGON NETWORKS LTD ON TRACK INNOVATIONS 
CADENCE DESIGN SYSTEMS 
INC QUOTIENT TECHNOLOGY INC NTN BUZZTIME INC 
ATENTO SA TRADE DESK INC 
MICROPAC INDUSTRIES 
INC 
MANTECH INTL CORP QAD INC PARK CITY GROUP INC 
ECHOSTAR CORP 
COMPUTER PROGRAMS & 
SYSTEMS MIND CTI LTD 
SUNPOWER CORP QUINSTREET INC AWARE INC 
ALLSCRIPTS HEALTHCARE 
SOLTNS AMBARELLA INC 
CODA OCTOPUS GROUP 
INC 
TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE 
SFTWR GLU MOBILE INC 
INNOVATIVE SOLTNS & 
SUPP INC 
SYNAPTICS INC NEOPHOTONICS CORP BRIDGELINE DIGITAL INC 
SS&C TECHNOLOGIES 
HLDGS INC 
GILAT SATELLITE NETWORKS 
LTD 
WHERE FOOD COMES 
FROM INC 
YANDEX N.V. 
INFORMATION SERVICES 
GROUP PAYSIGN INC 
ARISTA NETWORKS INC 
SAPIENS INTERNATIONAL 
CORP GLOWPOINT INC 
SYKES ENTERPRISES INC SERVICESOURCE INTL INC PASSUR AEROSPACE INC 
SINA CORP BENEFITFOCUS INC PARETEUM CORP 
LIBERTY TRIPADVISOR 
HOLDINGS CHEGG INC 
LIBERTY BROADBAND 
CORP 
HENRY (JACK) & 
ASSOCIATES CPI CARD GROUP INC ISSUER DIRECT CORP 
FORTINET INC 
VISHAY PRECISION GROUP 
INC OPTIMIZERX CORP 
CREE INC HEALTHSTREAM INC QUICKLOGIC CORP 
IPG PHOTONICS CORP 
DASAN ZHONE SOLUTIONS 
INC GIGAMEDIA LTD 
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NETGEAR INC CARBONITE INC 
SPECTRA7 
MICROSYSTEMS INC 
TOWER SEMICONDUCTOR 
LTD AVIAT NETWORKS INC CREXENDO INC 
BITAUTO HOLDINGS LTD  -
ADR 
ITURAN LOCATION & 
CONTROL NEONODE INC 
NICE LTD RIMINI STREET INC QUOTEMEDIA INC 
MATCH GROUP INC A10 NETWORKS INC 
INTELLIGENT SYSTEM 
CORP 
MOMO INC  -ADR HEALTHEQUITY INC SEMILEDS CORP 
WEX INC PAR TECHNOLOGY CORP MOSYS INC 
TRIVAGO N.V. -ADR ENDAVA PLC -ADR GOLDEN BULL LTD 
VERINT SYSTEMS INC JIANPU TECH -ADR INTRUSION INC 
J2 GLOBAL INC RADWARE LTD 
ANDREA ELECTRONICS 
CORP 
ANSYS INC RIGNET INC 
RUBICON TECHNOLOGY 
INC 
MEDIACOM BROADBAND LLC BOINGO WIRELESS INC 
IMAGEWARE SYSTEMS 
INC 
BLACK KNIGHT INC XUNLEI LTD  -ADS ACORN ENERGY INC 
DIODES INC Q2 HOLDINGS INC HOPTO INC 
ACI WORLDWIDE INC DIGI INTERNATIONAL INC INTELLICHECK INC 
FAIR ISAAC CORP 
QUANTENNA 
COMMUNICATIONS INC 
DESTINY MEDIA 
TECHNOLOGIES 
DONNELLEY FINANCIAL 
SOLTNS TELENAV INC 
MICROWAVE FILTER CO 
INC 
VONAGE HOLDINGS CORP PROS HOLDINGS INC TRXADE GROUP INC 
LOGMEIN INC 
VOCERA COMMUNICATIONS 
INC AUDIOEYE INC 
LUMENTUM HOLDINGS INC AUDIOCODES LTD POET TECHNOLOGIES INC 
ELECTRONICS FOR IMAGING 
INC AEROHIVE NETWORKS INC VIRNETX HOLDING CORP 
AUTOHOME INC  -ADR AUTOWEB INC CICERO INC 
TYLER TECHNOLOGIES INC 
TABULA RASA HEALTHCARE 
INC 
ELECTRONIC SYSTEM 
TECH INC 
KIMBALL ELECTRONICS INC KINAXIS INC 
SKKYNET CLOUD 
SYSTEMS INC 
ULTRA CLEAN HOLDINGS INC ZSCALER INC NANO DIMENSION LTD 
YIRENDAI LTD -ADR CHANNELADVISOR CORP 
DRONE AVIATION 
HOLDING CORP 
PLANTRONICS INC CSP INC 
MARATHON PATENT 
GROUP INC 
GTT COMMUNICATIONS INC EMCORE CORP CIPHERLOC CORP 
TIVO CORP TELOS CORP/MD VERITEC INC 
SNAP INC OOMA INC 
DIGERATI TECHNOLOGIES 
INC 
KRATOS DEFENSE & 
SECURITY ASTRONOVA INC DATASEA INC 
CSG SYSTEMS INTL INC TRAVELZOO ATOMERA INC 
EXLSERVICE HOLDINGS INC PLUG POWER INC KIDOZ INC 
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WNS (HOLDINGS) LTD -ADR UPLAND SOFTWARE INC MOXIAN INC 
SILICON LABORATORIES INC AXT INC 
VIVA ENTERTAINMENT 
GROUP INC 
INFINERA CORP 
UTSTARCOM HOLDINGS 
CORP WORLDS INC 
GOGO INC PCTEL INC IMINE CORP 
VEEVA SYSTEMS INC WIDEPOINT CORP 
AIRBORNE WIRELESS 
NETWORK 
M/ACOM TECHNOLOGY 
SOLUTIONS SPHERE 3D CORP 
MICROMEM 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 
HIMAX TECHNOLOGIES INC 
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 
INC 
SOLARWINDOW 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 
MAGNACHIP 
SEMICONDUCTOR CORP ALLOT LTD SMARTMETRIC INC 
STRATASYS LTD QUTOUTIAO INC -ADR 
ADVANCED VOICE 
RECOGNITION 
ADTRAN INC AMBER ROAD INC MY SIZE INC 
MANHATTAN ASSOCIATES 
INC PIXELWORKS INC  
 
  
Table 39: Effect of Open-source Engagement on Firm Performance (Excluding 
Microsoft and Alphabet Inc.) 
      (1)   (2) 
 GSynth Staggered-DID 
Open-source engagement 0.0130*** 0.020*** 
   (0.002) (0.005) 
Capital Stock 0.088*** 0;005*** 
   (0.002) (0.000) 
Employees 0.204*** 0.259*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
R & D Stock -0.003*** -0.005 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Advertising Expenses 0.267*** 0.318*** 
   (0.007) (0.015) 
Leverage -0.014*** -0.005 
   (0.004) (0.008) 
Firm Size -0.034*** -0.049*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
Product Market Fluidity -0.000 -0.001* 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Concentration 0.006*** 0.009 
   (0.003) (0.006) 
Firm Effect Yes  Yes  
Year Effect  Yes  Yes 
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Aggregate project variables of a firm and their effect on firm performance 
 
Production function: 
ln(Value-added productivity)it = β0 + β1ln(open_engagement)it + β2(percentage of 
restrictive licenses)it + β3(degree of original work)it + β4(average productive events) + 
β5ln(capital)it + β6ln(emp)it + β7ln(r&d expenses) + β8ln(advertising expenses) + 
β9ln(Leverage) + β10(firm_size) + β11(product market fluidity)  +  (industry Fixed 
effect)  +  (firm fixed effect)i + (year fixed effect)t +  εit                                                                                    
Table 40: Appendix:  Aggregate project variables of a firm and their effect on firm 
performance 
 
 Coef.  S.E. 
Open-source Engagement 
Intensity 
0.011** 0.007 
Percentage of restrictive 
licenses  
-0.003 0.011 
Degree of origina work 0.001 0.028 
Avergae production events 0.000*** 0.000 
Capital stock 0.130*** 0.022 
 Employees 0.233*** 0.025 
R & D stcok -0.002 0.006 
Advertising stock 0.468*** 0.052 
Leverage -0.096 0.058 
Firm size -0.113*** 0.024 
Product market fluidity -0.002 0.003 
Industry concentration 0.070** 0.035 
Constant 5.214*** 0.293 
No. of Observations 455 
Overall r-squared  0.878** 
Chi-square   1523.217*** 
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Market value function: 
Table 41: Appendix: Aggregate project variables of a firm and their effect on firm 
performance 
  Coef. S.E. 
Open-source Engagement Intensity 0.057*** 0.021 
Percentage of restrictive licenses  0.033 0.038 
Degree of originality 0.119 0.087 
Average production events 0.000 0.000 
Capital intensity -0.222 0.206 
Employees -0.070** 0.035 
R & D intensity 0.492* 0.268 
Advertisement Intensity 0.654 0.629 
Leverage   0.181 0.166 
Product market fluidity -0.004 0.010 
Industry concentration  0.023 0.122 
Firm size -0.061 0.070 
Constant 1.107*** 0.139 
No. of Observations 455  
R-square 0.23  
Chi-square 45.27***  
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